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Abstract
Auctions are nowadays a popular and frequently employed market mechanism in elec-
tronic markets. In economic literature, the success of electronic auctions has been largely
attributed to the reduction of transaction costs, the large number of potential buyers,
and the independence of time and space. However, an additional explanation for the
success of electronic markets, and in particular Internet consumer auctions, is the he-
donic or emotional value bidders derive from auction participation. The emotionality
bidders experience in Internet auctions confronts a market engineer of electronic markets
with two important challenges, regarding both the auction mechanism design and the
user interface design. First, how can an auction system induce emotionality and, thus,
attract excitement oriented consumers? Second, what is the impact of emotionality on
bidding behavior? In order to approach both challenges, a market engineer needs to be
able to actually measure emotions in electronic auctions.
This thesis develops a structured methodology that allows to systematically analyze
emotions in electronic auctions. It provides a unified framework for emotional bidding
in electronic auctions, which comprises the bidders’ processes of cognitive reasoning and
emotional processing. Moreover, a methodology for measuring physiological correlates
of human emotional processing in economic experiments is proposed: physioeconomics.
Physioeconomics extends existing methods of experimental economics by measuring au-
tonomic nervous system activity using well-established psychophysiological methodology
in order to gain a profound understanding of human economic decision-making. Based
on the framework for emotional bidding and the methodology of physioeconomics, this
thesis describes how emotions and their impact can be measured in electronic ascending
auctions, and provides a proof-of-concept study.
Moreover, an experiment was conducted in order to analyze the impact of clock speeds
on the bidders’ emotional processing and behavior in Dutch auctions. Several previous
experimental studies have discovered that the sellers’ revenues in Dutch auctions depend
on the speed at which the standing price is decreased: Slow Dutch auctions generally
yield higher revenues than fast Dutch auctions. This effect is commonly explained by
the conjecture that participants experience a “utility of suspense” which is stronger
in fast Dutch auctions. The experiment in this thesis provides physiological evidence
for a utility of suspense in Dutch auctions, further characterizes the elicited emotional
state bidders experience, and investigates how this emotional state is reflected in bidding
behavior. Furthermore, characteristic patterns of bidders’ emotional processing in Dutch
auctions are identified. It is shown (1) that inducing a bidder with an independent
private valuation directly influences her level of arousal, and (2) that the heart rate of
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Auctions are nowadays a popular and frequently employed market mechanism in elec-
tronic markets. In particular Internet auctions for consumers have turned out to be “one
of the greatest success stories of web-based services” (Ariely and Simonson, 2003). At
the end of 2008, alone the market leader eBay.com alone reported a total number of 86.3
million active users worldwide, net revenues of $5.6 billion US, and a gross merchandise
volume of nearly $60 billion US (eBay Inc., 2009).
In economic literature, the success of Internet auctions has been largely attributed
to the reduction of transaction costs, the large number of potential buyers, and the
independence of time and space (Ockenfels et al., 2006). However, these characteristics
also apply to retail sites as amazon.com or staples.com. Further, the popularity of
Internet auctions seems somewhat counterintuitive from a consumer perspective. Several
field studies have confirmed that on average, auctions yield higher prices compared to
fixed price offers on retail sites (e.g. Lucking-Reiley, 1999; Lee and Malmendier, 2010).
In a field study, Ariely and Simonson (2003) even report that 98.8% of the observed
auctions yield higher prices than commodities on retail sites with bidders paying on
average 15.3% more. While a part of this phenomenon can be explained by search and
waiting costs (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005), Lee and Malmendier (2010) report in another
field study that 42% of the analyzed auctions yield higher prices than simultaneously
listed fixed price offers on the very same computer screen. Taking the shipping costs
into account, even 73% of the observed auctions result in higher total costs.
1
Chapter 1. Motivation and Introduction
1.1. Emotions as a Quality Characteristic of
Internet Consumer Auctions
However, the question arises, why a substantial part of Internet consumers is willing to
pay more on auction sites than on retail sites? An additional explanation for the success
of Internet auctions is the hedonic or emotional value that bidders derive from auction
participation (e.g. Möllenberg, 2004; Stern et al., 2008). Whereas utilitarian value refers
to the utility gained from obtaining the desired commodity, the hedonic value is gained
from perceived entertainment and emotional worth of auction participation.
In this regard, Lee et al. (2009) identify “thrill of bidding, excitement of winning,
stimulation of beating competitors, and enjoyment of finding rare or unusual items”
as sources of hedonic value. Following this reasoning, Internet auctions may be more
appealing to consumers, because they are simply more exciting. This characteristic
clearly distinguishes auctions from fixed price offers and may even be understood as a
quality characteristic of Internet auctions. Bapna et al. (2001) argue that consumers
have to decide whether to purchase with an unexciting fixed price mechanism or to
experience the “bazaar-like competitive atmosphere” of online auctions.
Marketing departments of Internet auction platforms have long understood that emo-
tions play an important role in attracting consumers. Referring to the competitive nature
of auctions, eBay launched an advertisement campaign in 2007 titled “shop victoriously”
stating that “it’s better when you win it” (eBay.com, 2007). In the corresponding tele-
vision commercials, bidding in an eBay auction is compared to sport events such as
football matches or dog races. In Germany, eBay even simply advertises directly the
immediate emotions bidders experience upon winning an auction with “Jippiiieh!” or
blunt “make shopping exciting” in Australia. Similarly, the platform swoopo.com adver-
tises with “pulse up, price down.” This refers to the actual physiological arousal bidders
can experience on their platform. Another indicator for the emotionality in auctions and
their “game-like action and bidding frenzy characteristic” (Stafford and Stern, 2002) is
the terminology bidders apply for describing the course of action. Contrary to retail
websites, bidders do not just buy commodities, they win or lose them. Correspondingly,
Ariely and Simonson (2003) find in an Internet survey that 76.8% of the respondents
perceive other bidders as “competitors” and refer to auction outcomes as “winning” and
“losing.”
2
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The general development outlined above can be interpreted as a paradigm shift to “en-
tertainment shopping” or “auctainment” (Glänzer and Schäfers, 2001). Hedonic values
of Internet auction participation gain increasing importance. Salient evidence for this
paradigm shift are emerging sites, as for example swoopo.com, 1-2-3.tv, and dubli.com.
These sites aim at attracting consumers with new (exciting) auction mechanisms and
explicitly advertise themselves as “entertainment shopping” and “fun shopping” plat-
forms, respectively. By the end of 2009, the platform swoopo.com alone reported more
than 2.5 million registered users worldwide and an average of ten thousand products
sold per month (Stone, 2009).
With respect to the competition between market platforms, it will therefore be in-
creasingly important for market places to distinguish themselves by how products are
sold. In particular in consumer markets, emotionless and unexciting market models will
hardly have the potential to draw the attention of (new) customers and eventually end
up as losers in this highly competitive business segment.
1.2. Engineering Emotionality in Auctions
Electronic market design is far from being a trivial task (Neumann, 2007). As Roth
(2002) put it, “markets don’t always grow like weeds - some of them are hothouse or-
chids.” Especially auctions allow for a large spectrum of design parameters, and even
slight variations in the auction mechanism can lead to large disparities in bidding be-
havior and, subsequently, in auction outcome and seller revenue (Milgrom, 2004). This
thesis concentrates in particular on auctions in which one seller auctions off a single unit
of a commodity, i.e. single-unit auctions.
Highlighting the significance of sophisticated market design, Weinhardt et al. (2003)
introduce an engineering approach for the design of electronic markets: market engineer-
ing. The authors define market engineering as a “structured, systematic, and theoreti-
cally founded procedure of analyzing, designing, introducing, and also quality assuring of
electronic markets as well as their legal framework regarding simultaneously the market
microstructure, infrastructure, and business strategy” (Weinhardt et al., 2003). The key
elements of the structured methodology market engineering are depicted in the market
engineering framework in Figure 1.1.
Based on the market structure and subject to environmental conditions, the agent be-
3
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havior determines the market outcome and, thus, the allocation of the transaction object.
The success of electronic market design crucially depends on a profound understanding
of the element agent behavior, i.e. the behavior of market participants interacting in the
market. In this respect, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) note: “Since the quality
of the resulting auction designs depends on the predictive ability of the theory, we need
a good predictive theory.” In contrast, if the understanding of the agent behavior is
rather limited, the market outcome may deviate considerably from the objectives of the
market engineer and even result in massive losses. In the context of this thesis, the focus











s ruc ure s ruc ure ra egy
Transaction bject
Economic, Technological and Legal Environment
Figure 1.1.: Market Engineering Framework
A distinguished strand of the literature analyzes auctions theoretically with highly
sophisticated analytical models (e.g. Vickrey, 1961; Krishna, 2002). Typically, those
studies assume bidders to be sufficiently sophisticated to derive an optimal bidding
strategy based on their expected monetary payoff. While these models are undoubtedly
an important contribution to the design and understanding of electronic auctions, they
seldomly include hedonic values of auction participation.1 However, results from the
1See, for instance, Katok and Kwasnica (2008) and Ehrhart et al. (2008) for analytical approaches
which comprise non-monetary utilities and behavioral biases, respectively.
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laboratory and the field indicate that emotions induced during the dynamic process of
auctions have an impact on bidding behavior and, subsequently, on auction outcome and
seller revenue (e.g. Ehrhart et al., 2008; Lee and Malmendier, 2010). For instance, Ding
et al. (2005) note that “emotions are an integral component of a bidder’s decision state
and bidding strategy.” One phenomenon frequently observed in traditional and Internet
auctions, which is often referred to an increased emotionality, is “auction fever” (e.g. Ku
et al., 2005; Ehrhart et al., 2008). Under the influence of auction fever, so Murnighan
(2002), bidders’ “adrenaline starts to rush, their emotions block their ability to think
clearly, and they end up bidding much more than they ever envisioned.”
The emotionality bidders experience in Internet auctions presents the market engi-
neer of an Internet consumer auction system with two important challenges, regarding
both the auction mechanism design and the user interface design. First, how can the
auction system induce emotionality and, thus, attract excitement oriented consumers?
As described above, emotions are, for a substantial part of the bidders, an important
incentive for participating in Internet consumer auctions. Second, what is the impact of
emotionality on bidding behavior, and subsequently, on the auction outcome and seller
revenue? In order to approach both challenges, a market engineer needs to be able to
actually measure emotions in electronic auctions.
1.3. Research Questions and Structure
The main goal of this thesis is to develop a structured methodology that allows to sys-
tematically analyze emotions in electronic auctions and their impact on human bidding
behavior. The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 introduce the fundamental elements of this structured
methodology. In order to systematically analyze emotions in electronic auctions, the
market engineer needs a profound understanding of the dynamic interactions between
cognitive reasoning and emotional processing of human bidding behavior. Therefore,
Chapter 2 focuses on Research Question 1 and proposes a unified framework for emo-
tional bidding in auctions.2
2Chapter 2 is based on joint research with Caroline Jähnig, Jan Krämer, Stefan Seifert, and Christof
Weinhardt (cf. Adam et al., 2010).
5
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Research Question 1: How do cognitive reasoning and emotional process-
ing interact in deriving market decisions?
This framework focuses particularly on the interaction of cognitive reasoning and emo-
tional processing of human bidders in electronic auctions. Further, Chapter 2 provides
a detailed literature review regarding single facets of the proposed emotional bidding
framework and derives a definition for the phenomenon of auction fever. The framework
for emotional bidding conjectures a fundamental role of emotions on human bidding be-
havior and human decision-making in general. In order to evaluate this conjecture, one
needs to accurately measure human emotional processing. This objective is reflected in
Research Question 2.
Research Question 2: How can economic laboratory experiments be aug-
mented to allow for physiological measurements as proxies for emotional pro-
cessing?
Chapter 3 focuses on Research Question 2 and proposes a methodology for measuring
physiological correlates of human emotional processing in economic experiments: phys-
ioeconomics.3 Physioeconomics extends existing methods of experimental economics by
measuring autonomic nervous system activity, using well-established psychophysiologi-
cal methodology, in order to gain a profound understanding of the dynamic process of
human economic decision-making. This chapter will outline methodological implications
when applying psychophysiological methodologies to experimental economics and review
psychological literature regarding economic decision-making.
Based on the foundations of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the following chapters outline
how physioeconomics and the unified framework for emotional bidding can be used to
investigate emotions and their impact on bidding behavior. In particular with respect to
auction fever in electronic ascending auctions, Chapter 4 focuses on Research Question
3.
Research Question 3: Is the newly developed physioeconomic methodology
suitable to measure emotional processing in electronic auctions?
3Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are based on joint research with Matthias Gamer and Christof Weinhardt
(cf. Adam et al., 2009). Part of this research is also published in Adam et al. (2009).
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Chapter 4 introduces a basic framework for physioeconomic analyzes of electronic
ascending auctions, which complies with the methodological requirements discussed in
Chapter 3. Variations of the framework outline how different elicitors of auction fever can
be investigated both in isolation as well as in combination. While auction fever literature
frequently conjectures an interaction between physiological arousal and bidding behavior
(Malhotra et al., 2008), physioeconomics allows for actually measuring this interaction.
The chapter concludes with a proof-of-concept study.
Chapter 5 then focuses specifically on emotions in Dutch auctions, i.e. descending
auctions.4 Several previous experimental studies have discovered that the sellers’ rev-
enues in Dutch auctions depend on the speed at which the standing price is decreased:
Slow Dutch auctions generally yield higher seller revenues than fast Dutch auctions (e.g.
Carare and Rothkopf, 2005; Katok and Kwasnica, 2008). This effect is commonly ex-
plained by the fact that auction participants experience a “utility of suspense” (Cox
et al., 1983), which is stronger in fast Dutch auctions. Chapter 5 presents a physioeco-
nomic laboratory experiment, which focuses on Research Question 4.
Research Question 4: Can the methodology of physioeconomics provide
physiological evidence for a utility of suspense in Dutch auctions?
Further, Chapter 5 identifies characteristic patterns of emotional processing, which
occur in the dynamic process of Dutch auctions. In particular, I will show that artificially
induced values influence a bidder’s current emotional state: bidders who receive a high
product valuation also experience a higher degree of arousal in comparison to receive
a low product valuation. Therefore, the methodology of physioeconomic cannot only
contribute to supporting and stress-testing existing economic models of human bidding
behavior. Physioeconomics can also help to gain a deeper understanding of bidder’s
emotional processing and, subsequently, may even contribute to creating new theories
of human bidding behavior.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of this thesis and discusses their signifi-
cance for electronic market design. Further, I will identify avenues for future physioeco-
nomic research regarding emotionality in electronic auctions and discusses methodolog-
ical approaches.




Interaction of Cognitive Reasoning
and Emotional Processing in
Auctions
The main focus of this thesis is to develop a structured methodology that allows to sys-
tematically analyze emotions in electronic auctions and their impact on human bidding
behavior. This chapter provides the first element of such a methodology by introducing
a unified framework for emotional bidding in electronic auctions. Thus, the chapter ad-
dresses in particular the below mentioned Research Question 1. The framework focuses
specifically on the interactions between cognitive reasoning and emotional processing of
human bidders in electronic auctions.
Research Question 1: How do cognitive reasoning and emotional process-
ing interact in deriving market decisions?
2.1. A Unified Framework for Emotional Bidding in
Electronic Auctions
2.1.1. Framework Definition
Traditional approaches of auction theory neglect the influence of emotions. In order
to coherently approach the interaction between cognitive reasoning and emotional pro-
cessing, this section proposes a unified framework for emotional bidding in electronic
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auctions. The framework is depicted in Figure 2.1.
The upper part of the framework describes the traditional perspective of auction
theory. Auction theory typically describes auctions as non-cooperative games with in-
complete information (Bayesian games). A fundamental assumption is that bidders are
sufficiently sophisticated to derive a bidding strategy, which maximizes their expected
monetary payoff (e.g. McAfee and McMillan, 1987a; Krishna, 2002). A strategy is de-
fined as a set of rules, which tells a decision-maker which action to choose at each stage
of the game, given her information set (Rasmusen, 2007). In terms of auctions, a bidding
strategy tells a bidder when to place a bid, for what amount, and whether to participate
in the auction at all. Often, a particular auction mechanism implicates one or more
equilibria, which each consist of a set of bidding strategies. The bidding strategy of



















Figure 2.1.: Unified Framework for Emotional Bidding in Electronic Auctions
The framework is based on the conjecture that the bidders’ emotional processing
interacts with the process of cognitive reasoning asserted above. More specifically, the
lower part of Figure 2.1 illustrates the interactions between the auction mechanism,
bidding behavior, auction events, and emotional processing. In this thesis, the term
emotion1 is defined as:
1With respect to the term emotion, Fehr and Russel (1984) denote: “Everyone knows what an emotion
is, until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no one knows.” As a matter of fact, a large body
of psychological literature defines, depending on the particular context, emotions and feelings from
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Definition (Emotion). An emotion is a subjectively experienced state that
can be described qualitatively and is accompanied by changes in feeling, phys-
iology, and expression.
As pointed out by Loewenstein (2000), emotions can be divided into anticipated and
experienced emotions. Anticipated emotions describe expected emotional processing in
response to a salient future event, e.g. the end of an auction and the anticipated win or
loss. In contrast, experienced emotions describe the actual emotional processing, which
comprises both immediate emotions in response to a single stimulus (Loewenstein, 2000)
and ongoing current emotional states (Ding et al., 2005).
In the context of auctions, immediate emotions are triggered by auction events and
the auction outcome. Auction events comprise, for instance, the placement of new bids,
entry of new bidders, becoming the current high bidder, or being outbidden. The auc-
tion outcome induces immediate emotions such as “joy of winning” and “frustration of
losing” (Delgado et al., 2008). The processing of immediate emotions can be anticipated
by bidders throughout the process of an auction. The set of possible immediate emo-
tions is limited by the auction system2. Therefore, some auction mechanisms pronounce
emotionality stronger than others. For instance, some auction mechanisms only allow
to place a single sealed-bid. These auctions are often referred to as static auctions. In
contrast, dynamic auctions allow bidders for placing multiple bids and observe the be-
havior of other bidders. As argued by Gimpel (2007), auction fever is, in particular, a
phenomenon of dynamic auctions. Again, the auction system limits the set of possible
immediate emotions. Therefore, also the set of possible anticipated emotions is limited
by the auction system.3
The terms immediate and anticipated emotion refer to momentary (phasic) responses
to a single stimulus. In contrast, a bidder’s current emotional state refers to her ongoing
(tonic) emotional processing. As outlined by Ariely and Simonson (2003), the current
emotional state of a bidder is influenced by the “frequency and magnitude of anticipated
various perspectives (cf. Panksepp, 1982; Ortony and Turner, 1990). The definition applied in this
thesis addresses a rather general understanding of emotions in psychological literature (Gerrig and
Zimbardo, 2007). Furthermore, Chapter 3 illustrates a psychophysiological perspective on emotions.
2In this thesis, an auction system is well-defined through the auction mechanism design and the user
interface design. However, as outlined by Weinhardt et al. (2003), the design of an auction system
may also comprise the business structure and further aspects of the technical infrastructure.
3For instance, some auctions allow bidders to experience regret upon learning the auction outcome.
This emotional processing can be anticipated during the auction process (cf. Chapter 2.3).
11
Chapter 2. Interaction of Cognitive Reasoning and Emotional Processing in Auctions
post-auction feelings.” For instance, it can increase a bidder’s tonic level of arousal, if
she frequently anticipates the joy of winning or the frustration of losing. However, an-
ticipated and immediate emotions with respect to auction events other than the auction
outcome also have an impact on a bidder’s current emotional state. Examples of such
salient events are to become the current high bidder in an auction and to be outbidden
(Ehrhart et al., 2008). However, as indicated in the framework for emotional bidding,
the current emotional state can also directly be affected by the employed auction system.
For instance, Malhotra et al. (2008) denote that “a ticking clock [. . . ] can overwhelm
people with the desire to win,” indicating that a high degree of time pressure in auctions
can directly increase bidders’ levels of arousal.
Finally, it is important to note that both the development of an optimal bidding strat-
egy as well as the emotional processing both depend on a bidder’s individual personality
and expertise. The personality comprises psychological concepts like personality traits
(e.g. McCrae and Costa, 1999), as well as (rather) economic concepts like the individual
risk preference and product valuation. Further, bidders may have different levels of both
product domain expertise and online auction expertise (e.g. Ariely and Simonson, 2003).
2.1.2. Auction Fever
Auction fever is a phenomenon which is frequently observed in traditional and in Internet
auctions and is usually associated with an increased emotionality. The controversy
over auction fever is probably as old as auctions. Apparently, legal scholars in ancient
Rome already debated whether auctions would be void if the winner was infected by
“bidder’s heat” (Malmendier, 2002). Generally, the term auction fever, sometimes also
referred to as bidding fever (Malmendier and Szeidl, 2008), bidders’ heat (Malmendier,
2002), bidding frenzy (Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2004), or bidding war (Johns
and Zaichkowsky, 2003), is used to describe objectively irrational decision-making in
auctions. However, there is no consensus on a uniform definition of auction fever in
the literature at this stage. Definitions range from overbidding an analytically optimal
bidding strategy to mere descriptions of an intense emotional state. An overview of
selected auction fever definitions is provided in Table 2.1.
A key element of many definitions is overbidding, which takes the observation that
market participants sometimes place bids in excess of their preset bidding limits into
account. While the assumption that bidders set themselves a bidding limit ex ante seems
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Table 2.1.: Selected Auction Fever Definitions from the Literature
Author(s) Published Auction fever descriptions and definitions
Prince (1999) Monograph “When the competition swings into high gear, emotion really comes
into play [. . . ]. In the beginning, you might feel it as an affront,
almost offensive, when someone else bids on something you want
[. . . ]. But you decide you wont back down. Come hell or high
water, you’re going to stand triumphant.”
Ku (2000) Kellogg Journal of
Organization Behavior
“Auction fever, by its very name, is not a completely cognitive
phenomenon. Individuals who are caught up in auction fever do not
think strategically and methodically; instead, they are emotionally
stimulated.”
“Auction Fever is viewed as bidding over one’s preselected limit
and is often accompanied by increased arousal.”
Malhotra and Murnighan
(2000)
Working Paper “We suggest that the auction fever of folk wisdom is due to these
two elements (competition and time pressure) and that they result
in a state of competitive arousal that causes bidders to lose sight
of their limits and bid past them.”
Murnighan (2002) Journal of Management
Education
“Long-held folk wisdom on auctions suggests that people occasion-
ally get caught up in auction fever; that is, their adrenaline starts
to rush, their emotions block their ability to think clearly, and they
end up bidding much more than they ever envisioned.”
Gilkeson and Reynolds
(2003)
Psychology and Marketing “[. . . ] when the number of bidders increases, bidders can get caught
up in the bidding or develop auction fever, and ultimately bid more
than they had originally intended.”
Johns and Zaichkowsky
(2003)
Psychology and Marketing “The thought of competition also increases arousal in consumers




Advances in Consumer Research “[. . . ] bidders may experience a mental state, which we refer to as
bidding frenzy, that is characterized by a high level of arousal or
excitement, a sense of competition, and a strong desire to win.”
“[. . . ] we hypothesize that, all else being equal, greater levels of
bidding frenzy will cause consumers to value an auctioned product
more highly.”
Dholakia (2005) Marketing Theory “[. . . ] ‘bidding frenzy’, in other words, getting caught up in the
excitement of the auction and bidding multiple times on the same
item, often overpaying for it [. . . ]”
Ku et al. (2005) Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes
“auction fever - the emotionally charged and frantic behavior of
auction participants that can result in overbidding”
Walley and Fortin (2005) Journal of Business Research “[. . . ] consumers become involved in the price-setting process and
they can experience the thrill of winning a product, potentially a
bargain, as opposed to the typically relatively tedious notion of
buying it.”
Abele et al. (2006) Group Decision and Negotiation
Conference Proceedings
“Auction fever is usually defined as a ‘disease’ that induces bidders
to bid over their preselected bidding limit.”
Ockenfels et al. (2006) Book chapter “In general, auction fever is thought to be an excited and compet-
itive state-of-mind, in which the thrill of competing against other
bidders increases a bidders’ willingness to pay in an auction, be-
yond what the bidder would be willing to pay in a posted-price
setting.”
Gimpel (2007) Monograph “Auction fever or bidding fever means that bidders get caught by
the dynamics of an auction and outbid their initial upper limit
price”
“Auction fever can roughly be defined as bidders outbidding their
initial reservation price in an auction where this cannot be ex-
plained by information gathered during the auction.”
Hou (2007) Journal of Electronic Commerce
Research
“With auction fever, bidders become caught up by the competitive




Working Paper “During the heat of the auction, bidder i perceives an additional
payoff πi if she acquires the object in the auction. Once the auction
is over, the player realizes that πi = 0, i.e. that the utility from
obtaining the same object at a fixed price is identical.”
Cui et al. (2008) Electronic Markets “[. . . ] empirical findings on the online behaviour of bidders have
suggested that many of them bid in excess of their pre-set limits,
which is called ‘bidding fever’.”
Delgado et al. (2008) Science “The fear of losing the social competition inherent in an auction
may lead people to pay too high a price for the good for sale.”
Ehrhart et al. (2008) Working Paper “[. . . ] we see auction fever as a phenomenon, whose appearance can
be influenced by the auction format and that induces bidders to bid




Working Paper “[. . . ] auction participants sometimes bid too much, due to psy-
chological mechanisms such as bidding fever [. . . ]”
Haruvy and Popkowski
Leszczyc (2009)
Decision Analysis “Frenzy refers to a mental state induced by the dynamic interaction
among bidders in an ascending bid auction and [is] characterized
by a high level of excitement, a strong sense of competition, and
an intense desire to win”
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in line with classical auction theory, the question as to whether if and how this limit is
set remains. In a rather game theoretical approach, overbidding can be defined with re-
spect to an optimal bidding strategy, which often assumes bidders to be risk-neutral (e.g.
Cooper and Fang, 2008; Delgado et al., 2008). However, bidders may be “insufficiently
sophisticated to discern the equilibrium-point strategy” (Vickrey, 1961). Further, it is a
well-known fact that subjects do not behave in a risk-neutral way (e.g. Holt and Laury,
2002) and often neither know the number of competing bidders (e.g. Heshmat, 1996) nor
the probability distribution of their valuations. In a more behavioral approach, one can
argue that bidders may set themselves a limit by evaluating the commodity subjectively
and then heuristically deriving a corresponding bidding strategy (Ariely and Simonson,
2003).4 Smith (1990) argues that bidders may even be uncertain regarding their own
product valuation and Lucking-Reiley (1999) notes that this uncertainty inherently in-
creases in Internet auctions, where the bidders’ information regarding product quality
and seller reliability is rather limited and biased. In an Internet survey, Ku et al. (2005)
find that 82% of the survey respondents set themselves a limit prior to bidding. Sim-
ilarly, in Section 5.4, I will present the results of a self-report questionnaire regarding
a Dutch auction experiment, in which subjects strongly agree to setting themselves a
bidding limit before the auction starts.
The definition of overbidding in the context of auction fever is particularly difficult in
field studies, in which fixed-price offers listed on retail sites are often chosen as reference
prices (e.g. Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Lee and Malmendier, 2010). While the literature
reports higher prices in Internet auctions in comparison to fixed-price offers, it remains
unclear whether these high prices can be fully explained with auction fever. Partially,
this overbidding may also be explained by rational behavior when taking into account
additional parameters. First, as Carare and Rothkopf (2005) pointed out, it can in fact
maximize a bidders expected utility to accept a higher price in a slow Dutch auction
in order to avoid waiting and transactions costs. Second, bidders may not be aware of
cheaper offers on retail sites or want to avoid the search costs for finding the cheaper
price.
A second element often associated with auction fever is increased emotionality expe-
rienced by bidders. In the literature, this emotional state is usually characterized by a
4Note that developing this bidding strategy is also subject to the cognitive abilities of each bidder, her
risk preferences, and her general personality.
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high level of arousal, increased excitement, and a strong desire to win or not to lose,
respectively. Auction dynamics, along with anticipated feelings and perceived compe-
tition, are frequently listed as elicitors of this state. This intense emotional state can
“block [bidders’] ability to think clearly” (Murnighan, 2002), which results in an excess
of the preselected bidding limit and ultimately higher final prices. Abele et al. (2006)
even characterize this process as a “disease,” referring to the literal meaning of the term
auction fever. With respect to the conceptual framework for emotional bidding proposed
in Section 2.1.1, I define auction fever as:
Definition (Auction Fever). Auction fever is defined as an intense current
emotional state elicited in the course of one or more auctions that distorts a
bidder’s preselected bidding strategy.
This definition not only comprises overbidding in ascending auctions, but also un-
derbidding in Dutch auctions, repeated bidding, and other changes in the preselected
bidding strategy. While some definitions understand excitement as a sufficient condition
for auction fever (e.g. Ku et al., 2005), the definition above identifies both excitement
and a change in the bidding strategy as necessary conditions. As outlined before, over-
bidding alone can also be explained, to a certain extent, by bounded rationality as well
as transaction, waiting, and search costs.
The remaining sections of this chapter each focus on one specific aspect of the frame-
work for emotional bidding. Based upon the derived definition of auction fever, Section
2.2 provides a literature overview regarding prominent inducers of auction fever. In
contrast, Section 2.3 focuses on the processing of immediate and anticipated emotions.
Section 2.4 outlines the impact of heterogeneities among bidders, in particular regarding
their personality and expertise.
2.2. Inducers of Auction Fever
In the context of the framework for emotional bidding, this section focuses on how the
process of an auction can affect a bidder’s current emotional state. In particular, I focus
on the phenomenon of auction fever.
As pointed out in the last section, auction fever is an intense current emotional state
elicited in the course of one or more auctions that distorts a bidder’s preselected bidding
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strategy. In the context of auctions, the literature identifies three major factors that can
trigger an intense current emotional state: perceived competition, previous investment,
and perceived ownership. Further, in electronic auctions, the experience of emotions
is mediated through the interaction with the auction system. Therefore, the design of
the auction system plays an important role as well. The three major factors and their
interactions will be discussed in this section.
However, a bidder’s current emotional state is subject to anticipated emotions regard-
ing salient future events as well. Anticipated and immediate emotions are discussed in
Section 2.3.
2.2.1. Perceived Competition
The degree of perceived competition, subjectively experienced by bidders, is frequently
characterized as one of the main inducers of auction fever. Malhotra et al. (2008) and Ku
et al. (2005) refer to the triggered emotional state as “competitive arousal” and identify
time pressure, rivalry, and social facilitation as its main driving forces.
Salient evidence for the perceived competition in auctions is the terminology which
bidders use to describe the course of action. Contrary to retail websites, bidders do not
just buy commodities, they win or lose them. In an Internet survey, Ariely and Simonson
(2003) find that 76.8% of the survey respondents perceive other bidders as “competitors”
and refer to auction outcomes as “winning” and “losing.” Therefore, auction participants
seem to be very sensitive concerning the presence of other bidders. This terminology is
also systematically used by marketing departments of Internet auction platforms. For
instance, in 2007, the industry leader eBay launched an advertisement campagin titled
“shop victoriously” stating that “it’s better when you win it” (eBay.com, 2007). In
the corresponding television commercials, bidding in an eBay auction is compared to
sport events, such as football matches or dog races. This general development can be
interpreted as a paradigm shift to “entertainment shopping” or “auctainment” (Glänzer
and Schäfers, 2001).
Time Pressure
Time pressure is one of the main factors that drive auction fever (e.g. Ku et al., 2005).
Generally, time pressure is known for fueling arousal and increasing decision-makers’
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willingness to take risk (Maule et al., 2000). Particularly in auctions, bidders often
have to take quick decisions and respond to market events within a limited period of
time. With respect to time pressure, Ku (2000) denotes: “bidders are highly aroused
and unable to think clearly, and since decisions need to be made quickly, bidders keep
bidding.” In an eBay field study, Roth and Ockenfels (2002) show that in hard close
auctions, i.e. auctions with a fixed ending time and date, a large part of final bids is
placed within the last 5 minutes. Thus, while the actual auction is conducted over a
time period of up to 10 days, the final price is often determined in the last few minutes,
leaving bidders only very limited time to respond to bids of their competitors. Haruvy
and Popkowski Leszczyc (2009) analyze empirical field data from a local auction site.
The authors report that short auctions lead on average to higher jump bidding, i.e. more
aggressive bidding, and eventually to higher prices.
Contrary to hard close auctions, the ending times of soft close auctions can be extended
by bidding activity. Ku et al. (2008) analyze the impact of arousal in auctions by
manipulating time pressure and stakes in a soft close auction. In particular, the authors
investigate bidding behavior in a dollar auction with two bidders competing in each
auction. In a dollar auction, the highest bidder pays her own bid and receives the
commodity for sale. However, the second highest bidder also has to pay her own bid but
does not obtain the commodity (cf. Shubik, 1971). Both time pressure and stakes are
either set to a low or to a high level. The authors report that significantly more bids
are submitted in high stakes auctions in comparison to low stakes auctions, while time
pressure did not directly affect bidding. However, the self-report levels of arousal are
generally higher in high time pressure auctions.
In the context of Dutch auctions, time pressure may be induced by high clock speeds.
In a Dutch auction, an initial high standing price is consecutively decreased by a decre-
ment δ after each time interval τ until one of the bidders claims the good by accepting
the current standing price. The clock speed θ is defined as the quotient of δ and τ , i.e.
θ = δ/τ . When the clock speed is increased, bidders have less time to accept the current
standing price and are forced to take quick decisions. In order to analyze the impact
of clock speeds on bidding behavior, Katok and Kwasnica (2008) conduct a laboratory
experiment and show that fast clock speeds yield lower prices in Dutch auctions than
slow clock speeds. Thus, bidders tend to wait on average more price decrements when
the clock speed is fast. This effect is commonly explained by the fact that auction par-
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ticipants experience a “utility of suspense” (Cox et al., 1983), which is stronger in fast
auctions. Chapter 5 discusses an experiment which provides physiological evidence for
utility of suspense in Dutch auctions.
Social Facilitation
Another factor leading to perceived competition is social facilitation (Malhotra et al.,
2008). The term social facilitation refers to the impact of the sheer presence of other
individuals upon human behavior. Social facilitation literature distinguishes between
two major paradigms: audience effects and co-action effects (cf. Zajonc, 1965).
Audience effects designate the influence passive spectators have on human behavior.
In the context of auctions, audience effects are elicited by individuals who observe the
course of bidding but are not actively participating. For instance, this may be an
audience watching a charity auction or the media attention on spectrum license auctions.
Co-action effects designate the influence the presence of other individuals has, who are
engaged in the same activity (cf. Zajonc, 1965). In the context of auctions, co-action
effects are elicited by the presence of other bidders, who are currently participating in
the same auction or waiting for another auction. In a live auction, for instance, these
individuals may be bidders who are bidding on the same item or just observing the
current auction, waiting for a specific item following up. Social facilitation is leveraged
by the spotlight effect. The spotlight effect describes the phenomenon that individuals
tend to overestimate the attention gained from the audience, believing that “the social
spotlight shines more brightly on them than it really does” (Gilovich et al., 2000).
Particularly in the final stages of an auction, when only few active bidders remain, the
perception of being in the spotlight may become more intense than it actually is.
Social facilitation seems to be less prominent in Internet auctions than in live auctions.
Malhotra et al. (2008) attribute this to the higher degree of privacy in Internet auctions
and denote that the “spotlight is dimmer” in this environment. In a field study, Ku et al.
(2005) report lower revenues in Internet auctions in comparison to simultaneously con-
ducted live auctions for the same commodity - fiberglass cows auctioned off for charities.
The authors partially explain these results with an increased spotlight and media atten-
tion in the live auctions. The auction site 1-2-3.tv is an example of how the spotlight
in Internet auctions can be increased. This platform consecutively conducts multi-unit
uniform price Dutch auctions on the Internet, which are simultaneously broadcasted
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on Austrian and German national television. The bidders can either submit their bids
online or via telephone. When a bidder places a bid, this bid will be listed along with
the bidder’s pseudonym on television. This feature is also specifically addressed in the
platform’s advertisement campaign. Presumably, simultaneously broadcasting the auc-
tions on television does not only increase the number of active and passive observers,
but also bidders’ awareness of the audience.
Rivalry
It is important to highlight that audience and co-action effects already occur without
strategic interaction. Accordingly, social facilitation only refers to the sheer presence of
other individuals, i.e. the awareness of being observed by passive observers and other
bidders. In contrast, the concept of rivalry addresses the fact that the commodities for
sale in an auction are rivalrous. A good is considered as rivalrous if its consumption
fully eliminates any utility other individuals may derive from it (cf. Cornes and Sandler,
1986; Romer, 1990). Rivalry is an inherent characteristic of live and of Internet auctions,
as “each bidder competes against others who want the same item” (Stern and Stafford,
2006).5 Therefore, the presence of other bidders induces not only co-action effects, but
also rivalry.
The literature identifies rivalry as another important factor leading to perceived com-
petition. Ockenfels et al. (2006) argue that the “thrill of competing against other bid-
ders” can cause an excited and competitive state of mind. Heyman et al. (2004) refer
to this phenomenon as the “opponent effect” and Delgado et al. (2008) argue that ac-
tually the fear of losing the “social competition,” inherent in auctions, is responsible for
overbidding. The major influencing factors for rivalry identified in the literature will be
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Number of bidders. In his seminal paper, Vickrey (1961) shows that a larger num-
ber of bidders decreases the expected payoff for each bidder. For instance, in first-price
auctions the optimal degree of bid shading decreases when the number of bidders in-
creases. Therefore, the degree of rivalry increases ceteris paribus along with the number
of bidders in an auction.6
5Similarly, bidders compete for a limited stock of identical items in multi-unit auctions (e.g. 1-2-3.tv).
6It is important to note, however, that the number of bidders also increases audience and co-action
effects.
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Heyman et al. (2004) manipulate the degree of rivalry by increasing the number of
bidders. In a survey based experiment, individuals have to imagine taking part in a
sealed-bid auction. The authors report higher (hypothetical) bids when bidders observe
more bidders who take part in the same auction. In a follow up laboratory experiment,
Heyman et al. keep the number of competing bidders constant and manipulate the
bidding behavior of the competitors. While bidders believe to bid against other human
bidders, they actually bid against computerized agents, which either bid more or less
aggressive. The authors report significantly higher bids when bidders face more aggres-
sive bidders. Additionally, Heyman et al. conduct an eBay field study and find that the
number of active bidders correlates positively with final bids. The authors concentrate
on auctions for which they exactly know the final bid and not only the second highest
bid. Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2004) conduct a laboratory experiment, in which
participants bid against computerized agents, in order to manipulate the frequency of
competitors’ bids and the perceived number of bidders.7 Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc
(2004) confirm the results of Heyman et al. (2004) and conclude that higher rivalry leads
to higher final prices.
In real auctions, in which the number of bidders is endogenous, the number of bidders
is directly affected by the starting price of an auction. Ku et al. (2006) analyze how
low starting prices attract an entry of new bidders and affect final prices. Based on
eBay field data and survey experiments, the authors find that low starting prices attract
more bidders and thereby result in higher final prices. Walley and Fortin (2005) confirm
in their controlled field experiment that lower starting prices increase the number of
bidders and eventually final prices. Ariely and Simonson (2003) also confirm the results
of Ku et al. (2006), stating that low starting prices attract more bidders, with data from a
controlled field experiment on eBay. However, and in contrast to Ku et al. (2006), Ariely
and Simonson (2003) find that these auctions yield on average less bids and lower final
prices. The authors argue that this can be explained by an anchoring effect: starting
prices may serve as a value signal for bidders, with higher starting prices indicating a
higher product value.
Therefore, low starting prices have at least two opposing effects on final prices. On the
one hand, low starting prices decrease entry barriers and, therefore, attract more bidders:
7Similar to Heyman et al. (2004), Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2004) deceive the subjects. The
bidders are told that they are bidding against other human individuals, while they are actually
bidding against computerized agents.
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anyone who is interested in obtaining the commodity for sale can enter an eBay auction
with a starting price of one dollar. Further, placing a bid with a low starting price is
associated with a low degree of commitment. Entering an auction does not necessarily
result in obtaining the good, but opens the possibility of receiving the commodity for a
low price.8 On the other hand, low starting prices can serve as an anchor for bidders,
i.e. as a signal for the true value of the auctioned commodity.
Moreover, the number of bidders can also be directly affected by the duration of an
auction. Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) analyzes eBay auctions of collectible United States
one-cent coins and finds that longer auction durations increase the number of bidders
and final prices. Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc (2009) show in their controlled field
experiment on eBay that three day auctions yield a larger number of bidders, and also
larger final bids, compared to one day auctions. However, the authors also conduct a
controlled field experiment on a local auction site and find that auction duration does
not affect the number of bidders and that longer auctions can even result in lower final
prices. Hou (2007) analyzes field data from eBay China and eBay US. The author
reports that the duration of an auction has no significant effect on final prices. The
author argues that the duration of an auction has only a positive impact on the number
of bidders, if the degree of the commodity’s scarcity is not too low. According to Hou
(2007), there is no effect of auction duration on the number of bidders, if bidders have
“more options at any point of time.”
In summary, the experimental evidence for a potential linkage between final prices
and the number of bidders is mixed. This indicates that other factors come into play
as, for example, product characteristics and anchor effects.
Interdependent utilities. Rivalry can also become more intense when a bidder’s
utility does not only depend on her own individual monetary gains and losses, but
also on the utilities of other bidders. This concept of utility is usually referred to as
“interdependent utilities” (e.g. Schall, 1972; Bault et al., 2008). For instance, subjects
may develop personal rivalries with other individuals and perceive feelings of envy or
gloating (Smith et al., 1996). In the context of auctions, the literature has identified,
in particular, “spitefulness” and (non-monetary) “joy of winning” as sources for such
interdependencies.
8See Section 3.3 for how repeated bidding can lead to an escalation of commitment.
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A bidder is spiteful, if she derives an additional negative utility in case her opponent
wins an auction, which depends on the monetary profit of the competitor (cf. Morgan
et al., 2003). For instance, firms may gain a competitive disadvantage from losing an
auction, which eventually results in monetary losses (e.g. Brandt et al., 2007). Mor-
gan et al. (2003) show that symmetric equilibrium bidding becomes more aggressive in
various auctions, if bidders are spiteful. Therefore, if an agent’s utility depends on the
outcomes of other agents, it can be a (rational) best response to place higher bids. In
contrast, a bidder experiences a non-monetary joy of winning if she derives an additional
positive utility from the “uniqueness of being first” in the social competition of an auc-
tion (Ku et al., 2005). Morgan et al. (2003) refer to this non-monetary component of
the joy of winning as the “love of winning.”9
Bidders’ utility functions, which exhibit such interdependencies, can result in “head-
to-head battles” (Ku et al., 2008) among a small (sub-)group of bidders. In a survey
among bidders participating in live auctions, Johns and Zaichkowsky (2003) observe
a U-shaped dependency between the number of bidders and the degree of rivalry. In
auctions with only two active bidders, the authors state that “the bidding war was more
personal.” However, when an auction attracts a large number of active bidders, there is
a “race to bid on and win the item.” Murnighan (2002) observes an extreme case of how
a head-to-head battle between two bidders can result in gross overbidding. The author
conducts dollar auctions (cf. Shubik, 1971) in his management classes and observes how
two individuals get caught up in a “bidding war,” with the winner paying almost 2000
dollars for a 20 dollar bill. Ku et al. (2005) argue that rivalry is particularly intense
when only two bidders compete in a single auction. Based on data from a laboratory
experiment, the authors report that bidders experience higher levels of self-report arousal
and place higher bids in high rivalry treatments, i.e. when they face one single opponent
in comparison to eight opponents. The authors conclude that rivalry and arousal seem
to be higher with few rather than with many bidders. Following this argumentation,
there may also be an interaction between the degree of utility interdependencies and the
number of bidders.
From an economic perspective, the concept of rivalry does not make a distinction be-
tween human competitors and computerized competitors. However, the decision-makers’
arousal and behavior change when human counterparts are involved. Based on data from
9Section 4.2 focuses specifically on the “joy of winning” in auctions.
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a laboratory experiment, Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2004) argue that for the expe-
rience of auction fever, it is a necessary condition “that an auction participant competes
directly with other human bidders.” In particular, utility interdependencies based on per-
sonal rivalries can develop only among human bidders. For instance, Bosman and Riedl
(2004) describe such dynamics between human decision-makers as “emotional spillover
effects between subjects,” which comprise feelings of anger and envy.10 Van’t Wout et al.
(2006) analyze how human decision-makers respond to unfair offers by human or com-
puterized counterparts in the ultimatum game. The authors show that decision-makers’
physiological responses are stronger and the rejection rate is higher in case the unfair
offers are made by a human counterpart. In another laboratory experiment including
physiological measurements, Bault et al. (2008) show that the participants’ behavior
and physiological processing is already affected by the mere presence of another human
agent, although there is, from a game theoretical perspective, no strategic interaction.
In their theory of interdependent utilities, the authors identify the feelings involved as
“envy” and “gloating.” The results of Bault et al. (2008) may also serve as an indicator
that co-action effects comprise an increase of physiological arousal.
2.2.2. Previous Investments
Previous investments have been identified in the literature as another elicitor for auction
fever. The underlying concept is commonly referred to as the “sunk cost fallacy” (e.g.
Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Friedman et al., 2007) or “escalation of commitment” (e.g. Staw,
1976; Ariely and Simonson, 2003). These terms describe the observation that a human
decision-maker usually places too much emphasis on recouping previous investments
for which she feels personally responsible. Following economic theory, a decision-maker
should ignore sunk costs associated with previous investments and only consider future
costs and benefits.
Staw and Ross (1989) describe escalation of commitment as “situations in which losses
have resulted from an original course of action, but where there is the possibility of turn-
ing the situation around by investing further time, money, or effort.” In the context of
auctions, bidders invest in particular auction fees (Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon, 2004b),
10Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) conjecture with respect to spitefulness: “However, such the-
ories [of spitefulness] require inter-personal comparisons and, therefore, cannot explain similar be-
havior by subjects who were bidding against computerized rather than human competitors.”
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search costs (Ariely and Simonson, 2003), transaction costs (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005),
and waiting costs (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005). These investments all become sunk costs
in the course of the auction and can be converted into a payoff if the auction is won.
The Multi-Stage Process of Bidding
In a fixed-priced market, a consumer only faces the decision to accept or decline a
given price. However, taking part in an auction comprises several stages of decision-
making. For instance, Ariely and Simonson (2003) outline three major phases of hard
close English proxy auctions: choice of entry, the middle phase, and the end phase.
First, each bidder has to decide individually whether it is rational for her to take part
in the auction. Second, bidders place bids and observe bids placed by other bidders.
Third, close to the fixed ending of an auction, bidders have to take quick decisions
under time pressure, as a large part of bidding activity is usually observed in this phase.
As the phenomenon of escalation of commitment is only possible within a situation of
repeated decision-making with personal responsibility, the multi-stage process, inherent
in auctions, provides the actual basis for escalation of commitment.
This is particularly applicable for auctions in which bidding is not restricted to placing
a single sealed-bid. Cox et al. (1982) argue that it is as a matter of fact the “real-time”
element that distinguishes sealed-bid auctions from other auctions, such as English auc-
tions or the English proxy auction employed on eBay.11 In ascending auctions, this
real-time element allows bidders to repeatedly place bids and observe the bidding be-
havior of their rivals. In order to clearly distinguish between sealed-bid auctions and
auctions with a multi-stage process after auction entry, the terms static and dynamic
auction, respectively, are used in the following. Ariely and Simonson (2003) note that
the multi-stage process of dynamic auctions requires consumers to be “highly involved,”
i.e. commit themselves when participating in a dynamic auction.
From a consumer perspective, entering a dynamic ascending auction seems to involve
only a small degree of commitment, as it does not necessarily result in obtaining the
good, but opens the possibility of receiving the commodity at a low price. However, by
placing a bid in such an auction, a bidder commits herself to an amount of money she
has to pay in the case of winning the auction. This commitment, in combination with
11Seifert (2006) outlines that the English auction and the English proxy auction employed on eBay are
theoretically equivalent.
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the general uncertainty about a bidder’s willingness to pay (e.g. Lucking-Reiley, 1999),
can later on serve as a self-justification for placing another bid: if the bidder is already
willing to pay an amount x, why not a little bit more? This self-justification bias has
been identified in the literature as the major reason for escalation of commitment (e.g.
Staw and Ross, 1989). Park et al. (2008) analyze escalation of commitment in consumer
auctions by collecting survey data from online bidders. The authors show that sunk
costs and self-justification have a major impact on the willingness to continue bidding.
However, there is a debate going on whether this cognitive impairment alone is suf-
ficient to fully explain the phenomenon of escalation of commitment or whether it also
comprises increased levels of arousal and, thus, a change in the bidder’s current emo-
tional state. For instance, Ku et al. (2005) report that high sunk costs lead to increased
self-report levels of arousal and higher bidding activity. The authors conduct a survey
experiment. Students are asked to imagine themselves taking part in an Internet auc-
tion, in which they had already invested low, medium, or high search efforts, i.e. sunk
search costs. In another paper, Ku et al. (2008) argue that if bidding itself is arousing,
this can “feed a vicious cycle of bidding and overbidding.”
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the starting price and the duration of an auction have an
impact on the number of bidders and, thus, on perceived competition. However, these
factors also influence the commitment bidders incur in the course of an auction. Placing
a bid in an auction with a high starting price involves a higher initial commitment and,
therefore, a higher reference point for self-justification. As argued before, a high starting
price can serve as a quality signal, as bidders often do not know their willingness to pay
(Ariely and Simonson, 2003). A longer auction duration involves higher waiting costs
and, therefore, increases a bidder’s commitment. Accordingly, the starting price and the
duration of an auction have an impact on both perceived competition and previous in-
vestments. A low starting price increases the number of bidders, while it simultaneously
decreases a bidders’ initial commitment. A long auction duration increases the number
of bidders and also increases sunk costs in terms of waiting time.
Auction Fees
In addition to the indirect costs that originate from waiting, bidding, and search effort,
some auction sites entail direct monetary costs on bidders by charging auction fees, e.g.
entry and bidding fees. While entry fees are charged for the right to actually participate
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in an auction, bidding fees are charged for every single bid a bidder submits.
Meyer (1993) analyzes the effect of entry fees in a laboratory experiment. The author
reports that 59% of the participants did not consider the entry fee as sunk costs. 93%
of these bidders increased their bids in order to “increase their chances of winning the
auction.” However, Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004b) show that bidders avoid auc-
tions with entry fees and are even willing to give up expected surplus in order to do
so. The authors argue that entry fees particularly deter bidder entry in case an auction
site faces competition with other providers. This may also explain the observation that
currently no major consumer auction site charges entry fees.
While entry fees are only seldomly observed in consumer auctions, bidding fees, how-
ever, have turned out to be a quite successful business model. One of the most prominent
sites in this context is the platform swoopo.com.12 The platform operates an ascending
auction with fixed price increments. Each auction starts from zero dollars and bidders
can place bids in fixed increments of 12¢. Jump bids are not possible and the auction
ends when no bids are submitted within a predefined period of time (soft close). After
the end of the auction, the highest bidder obtains the commodity and has to pay the
amount of her bid.13 In order to place a bid, however, a bidder has to pay a bidding
fee of 60¢. Therefore, placing a bid on Swoopo involves a comparatively high degree of
commitment.
Particularly with respect to the debate as to whether escalation of commitment is
a purely cognitive phenomenon or whether it also comprises arousal, it is interesting
to observe that Swoopo advertises with “pulse up, price down” (swoopo.de, 2009) and
promotes itself as an “entertainment shopping” platform (swoopo.com, 2009).
The Dollar Auction
Shubik (1971) introduces the dollar auction as a stylized model of an auction which
elicits an increased commitment. In the original setting, a dollar bill is auctioned off
at an initial starting price of 5¢. The first bid has to be 5¢. From then on, bidders
can only bid in increments of 5¢, i.e. jump bidding is not permitted. The auction ends
when no one bids for a predefined period of time (soft close). After the end of the
12Swoopo has started off under the name “telebid” in Germany. Today, the company Swoopo operates
auction sites in Austria, Canada, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the US.
13In contrast to the dollar auction, the second highest bidder does not have to pay her own bid.
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auction, the highest bidder obtains the commodity and has to pay the amount of her
bid. However, the second highest bidder also has to pay her bid, without obtaining the
commodity. With this twist, placing a bid in a dollar auction is associated with a higher
degree of commitment. Bidders face the possibility of paying their bid without receiving
anything in return. Therefore, this auction is frequently utilized to analyze escalation
of commitment in auctions (e.g. Murnighan, 2002; Ku et al., 2006).
Teger (1980) analyzes the dollar auction in a series of laboratory and classroom exper-
iments. The author finds that almost half of the auctions receive final bids which exceed
the value of the auctioned item.14 In these auctions, the author observes head-to-head
bidding: as soon as the current highest bid reaches the value of the auctioned bill, all but
two bidders drop out of the bidding. According to Teger (1980), these bidders have “too
much invested to quit.” Ku et al. (2008) analyze escalation of commitment by varying
the stakes in a dollar auction. While holding the relative amounts in experimental mon-
etary units (MU) constant, the authors manipulate the conversion rate between MUs
and real money. Ku et al. (2008) show that bidders place higher bids in case conversion
rates are high, i.e. when placing a bid is associated with a higher degree of commitment.
Ku (2008) analyzes whether bidders are able to learn out of escalation situations and
improve their decision-making behavior. In the study, participants experience regret
associated with escalation of commitment in an anagram task. One week later, the same
individuals participate in a dollar auction. Ku (2008) found that post-escalation regret
in the first task reduces subsequent escalation in the dollar auction task, with more regret
predicting less escalation. In a follow up survey experiment, the author shows that even
just imagining regret in an escalation situation can result in less bidding activity in the
dollar auction. Therefore, experiencing regret in one task may help auction participants
to refrain from auction fever in a subsequent bidding task.
Although the dollar auction is frequently used to analyze escalation behavior in auc-
tions, the generalizability of results is limited with regard to several aspects. First, it
remains unclear which pattern of behavior in a dollar auction can actually be interpreted
as irrational, as there is no theoretical benchmark.15 Second, in case that there are more
than two bidders participating in a dollar auction, the own bid is not necessarily sunk.
14Note that the exact value of the auctioned bill is known to all bidders before the auction starts.
15As long as the bid increment is smaller than the value of the auctioned bill, there is no optimal equi-
librium bidding strategy in the dollar auction. However, note that Murnighan (2002) also observes
bidding increments of $50 for a $20 bill.
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Third, the dollar auction is a rather stylized auction model which is hardly employed
outside of the laboratory. It seems more appropriate to focus on auction mechanisms
that are implemented in real markets. Therefore, future research should rather focus on
confounding effects between perceived ownership and previous investments for auctions
which are in fact used in the field.
2.2.3. Perceived Ownership
Apart from perceived competition and previous investments, the literature has identified
perceived ownership as another elicitor for auction fever. The term perceived ownership
refers to the conjecture that being the high bidder in an ascending auction can make a
bidder “feel like already owning the item” (Ehrhart et al., 2008) and, thus, can provoke
a shift of the bidder’s reference point. The term reference point describes a decision-
maker’s status quo, from which she measures gains and losses (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979).
Pseudo-Endowment and Attachment Effect
Thaler (1980) introduces the term “endowment effect” for the observation that a human
decision-maker usually values a commodity more if it is part of her individual endow-
ment, i.e. if she owns the item. Kahneman et al. (1990) argue that this phenomenon is
contradictory to the neoclassical Coase theorem, which states that as long as “market
transactions are costless,” the allocation of resources is independent of property rights
(Coase, 1960). The authors analyze the endowment effect by conducting an experiment,
in which coffee mugs are randomly assigned to one half of the participants (sellers),
while the other participants (buyers) receive no coffee mugs. Sellers and buyers can
then exchange the coffee mugs in a double-sided auction. The authors report that the
average price a seller is willing to accept (WTA) for a coffee mug is significantly larger
than the average price a buyer is willing to pay (WTP). Kahneman et al. (1990) argue
that the endowment effect can be explained with the prospect theory of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) and a shift of the decision-maker’s reference point: while buying an item
is regarded as a gain, selling the same item is regarded as a loss. Following this reason-
ing, buyers and sellers have different reference points in their decision-making. As losses
are experienced stronger than gains, the WTA is larger than the WTP.
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However, the endowment effect described by Thaler (1980) only focuses on actual
ownership. In contrast, the terms “pseudo-endowment effect” and “quasi-endowment
effect” refer to situations in which an individual develops a psychological ownership of
an item, although there is actually no real ownership.16 For instance, in the context of
auctions, no bidder owns the commodity before the auction has finished. However, the
current high bidder in an ascending auction can get more attached to an item, as the item
becomes “a part of his or her psychological endowment” (Ariely and Simonson, 2003).
Similar to the endowment effect, this psychological ownership can induce a shift of the
bidder’s reference point and, in combination with loss aversion, increase her valuation
for the commodity.
A concept closely related to the pseudo-endowment effect is the “attachment effect”
(Köszegi and Rabin, 2006). Köszegi and Rabin (2006) argue that the reference point of
a decision-maker is affected by her subjective “probabilistic beliefs” about the outcome
of a situation. In the context of auctions, the attachment effect refers to the observation
that the current high bidder in an auction can perceive an “increase in the expected
[subjective] probability of winning” the auction (Ehrhart et al., 2008). In contrast, the
pseudo-endowment effect refers to an increased attachment with an item due to psycho-
logical ownership. Therefore, as argued by Ehrhart et al. (2008), both effects comprise
a reference point shift, which is originated in perceived ownership - psychological or
probabilistic.
While perceived ownership has been identified in the literature as an elicitor for auction
fever (e.g. Heyman et al., 2004; Ehrhart et al., 2008), pseudo-endowment and attach-
ment effects are concepts which are not directly related to an intense emotional state.
However, following the definition of Section 2.1, an intense emotional state is an inherent
characteristic of auction fever. At this stage, the conjecture that perceived competition
also induces such a current emotional state turns out to be an open research issue. One
could argue, however, that an increased emotional attachment with the item increases a
bidder’s personal involvement and, thus, arousal. Further, becoming the high bidder in
an auction presumably induces an immediate emotion of joy, which affects the current
emotional state.
16The terms pseudo-endowment effect and quasi-endowment effect are used interchangeably in the
literature. In the following, only the term pseudo-endowment effect will be used.
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Perceived Ownership in Auctions
As argued before, the current high bidder in an ascending auction can perceive ownership
of the commodity. Wolf et al. (2005a) analyze this perceived ownership in a series of
survey auction experiments. The survey participants are asked to imagine being the
high bidder in an eBay auction, in which a single numbered certificate for a portable
music device, in particular an Apple iPod, is auctioned off. One group of the participants
is informed that they have been outbidden. Then, they are given the opportunity of
placing a subsequent bid. The other group gets the information that the auction has
to be canceled, but that they can place a bid on another, identical certificate with a
different number instead. The authors report that the outbidden bidders place higher
(hypothetical) bids than those bidders who could only place a bid on another certificate.
Wolf et al. explain these results with the pseudo-endowment effect and argue that
bidders develop a “desire to win a specific item.”17
Ehrhart et al. (2008) conduct a laboratory experiment and show that bidders place
higher bids in a Japanese auction in case the auctioneer declares a high bidder. The
authors argue that those bidders who are the high bidders in an auction develop a
perceived ownership of the commodity. Further, Ehrhart et al. observe even higher bids,
if bidders have a direct influence on becoming the high bidder: auctions in which bidders
can become the high bidder by placing bids faster than other bidders have higher final
prices than auctions in which the high bidder is selected randomly. The authors explain
this observation by a “source-dependence effect” (Loewenstein and Issacharoff, 1994) and
argue that bidders obtain the status of being high bidder due to a “better performance”
in the bidding task. The source-dependence effect describes the observation that subjects
value goods more if “those objects were obtained through exemplary performance” in
comparison to receiving the objects by chance (Loewenstein and Issacharoff, 1994).
17However, parts of these results may also be explained by learning about the value of the iPod, as the
authors do not control for valuations. Generally, hypothetical auction scenarios in survey studies
have fundamental drawbacks. In this regard, Falk and Heckman (2009) note: “Whereas surveys
can generate large and representative data sets that provide statistical power, experiments allow
the elicitation of preferences and attitudes in a controlled and incentive-compatible way because
participants have to make choices with real money at stake.”
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Auction Duration and Perceived Ownership
Ariely and Simonson (2003) conjecture that perceived ownership is positively affected
by the high bidder duration, i.e. by the period of time a single bidder is the high bidder
in an ascending auction. The authors argue that the pseudo-endowment effect is “more
pronounced,” if an individual bidder “had the highest bid for a longer period.” Heyman
et al. (2004) analyze the interaction of high bidder duration and perceived ownership in
a survey experiment regarding a hypothetical auction scenario. Survey participants are
asked to imagine being the high bidder in an auction for a long (5 days) or short (1 day)
duration and then face the event of being outbidden. Subsequently, they can submit
another bid. The authors observe significantly larger (hypothetical) bids in case bidders
have been the high bidder for a longer period of time. In a second study, the authors
confirm the results of the survey in a laboratory experiment. Again, a longer duration of
perceived ownership results in higher bids. Wolf et al. (2005b) conduct a field study with
data collected from eBay Motors auctions. The authors report that both the duration
of auction participation and the high bidder duration significantly affect the probability
of re-bidding, i.e. placing a subsequent bid after being outbidden.
Bramsen (2008a) conducts a field study based on Danish furniture auctions and ob-
serves a logarithmic dependency between the high bidder duration and the probability
to rebid. Additionally, the author interprets the distance between a bidder’s maximum
bid and the current price as a proxy for her “subjective probability to win.” Similar to
the high bidder duration, the author observes a logarithmic dependency between the
distance and the probability to rebid. Bramsen (2008a) highlights that this effect is an
“entirely additional component” that cannot be explained by the high bidder duration.
In the spirit of Köszegi and Rabin (2006), the proxy of subjective probability can be
interpreted as an indicator for an “attachment effect.”
Wolf et al. (2008) analyze how physical contact with the auctioned commodity affects
bidding behavior independent of high bidder duration and auction duration. The authors
conduct a laboratory experiment, in which coffee mugs are sold to participants in English
and first-price sealed-bid auctions. Participants have either 10 (short) or 30 (long)
seconds to examine the coffee mugs with their hands prior to the auction. In both
auction formats, the authors observe higher bids if bidders had more time to examine
the coffee mugs. Wolf et al. conclude that perceived ownership can already be elicited
by a “relatively short period of time of tactile exposure.”
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2.2.4. System Design
Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.3 outlined the three major factors that have been identified
in the literature as triggers for a current emotional state of auction fever: perceived
competition, previous investments, and perceived ownership. However, particularly in
electronic auctions, the experience of emotions and, thus, the elicitation of auction fever
is mediated through the interaction of the bidders with the auction system. The design
of an auction system comprises the user interface design and the auction mechanism
design.18
User Interface Design
In electronic auctions, the interaction of a bidder with the auction system is well-defined
through the user interface. Although some bidders use software agents to avoid a direct
interaction with the user interface and place bids in the last few seconds of an auction,
an overwhelming majority of bidders interacts with the auction system through the user
interface (cf. Roth, 2002).
Kolitz (2007) analyzes how the user interface design of an auction system affects
bidding behavior and final prices. The author conducts a laboratory experiment in
which the same auction mechanism is implemented with two different user interface
implementations. Kolitz reports stronger bidding activity and higher final prices if new
auction events can be observed instantly, without a manual refresh of the current display.
The author explains this result by the fact that a fast reacting user interface can mediate
the emergence of an intense emotional state and eventually induce auction fever. As
a matter of fact, many Internet auction sites automatically update their user interface
when new auction events occur. These fast reacting user interfaces can induce a stronger
involvement of participants with the auction and, therefore, increase arousal.
Specifically, elements affecting the degree of perceived competition are frequently em-
ployed on Internet auction sites. Malmendier and Szeidl (2008) note that “eBay often
use[s] salient warning messages informing the bidder that he has been outbid, which
can strengthen bidding fever.” Further, platforms usually display the current number
of bids placed in the auction and the number of active bidders (e.g. ebay.com, 2009;
18As outlined before, the design of an auction system may also comprise the business structure and
further aspects of the technical infrastructure (Weinhardt et al., 2003). However, in this thesis, an
auction system is well-defined through the auction mechanism design and the user interface design.
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1-2-3.tv, 2009). Some platforms additionally display the pseudonyms of active bidders
(e.g. swoopo.com, 2009).19 Displaying the number of bidders and their pseudonyms
directly increases bidders’ awareness of other bidders in an auction and, therefore, lever-
ages co-actor effects and rivalry. It is important to recall, however, that in some auc-
tion mechanisms the number of bidders also directly affects a bidders optimal bidding
strategy (e.g. Vickrey, 1961; McAfee and McMillan, 1987a). In contrast, other design
elements exclusively address bidders’ emotionality. Salient examples are, particularly,
ticking clocks that display the remaining time in an auction. In the last few seconds of
an auction, the platform swoopo.com even displays the time in red characters and the
information “Just a few seconds to go!” is flashed. This design facet seems to specifically
pronounce the time pressure inherent in auctions, which has been discussed as another
influencing factor of perceived competition.
In a field study, Stern and Stafford (2006) show that the number of pictures in an
eBay auction increases the number of first day bids and subsequently final prices. The
authors argue that the “presence of more pictures captures initial attention and engen-
ders positive attitudes to the item.” Even more so, pictures may increase psychological
attachment with the item and, thus, foster the pseudo-endowment effect. Wolf et al.
(2008) show that bidders get more psychologically attached with an item if they can
examine it properly. At the same time, the presence of pictures also serves as a quality
signal and reduces quality uncertainty.
Auction Mechanism Design
A large body of economic literature analyzes how changes in the market mechanism
affect bidders’ optimal bidding strategy (e.g. McAfee and McMillan, 1987a; Krishna,
2002). However, there has only been little research on how different auction mechanisms
are emotionally processed by bidders.
Smith and Dickhaut (2005) conduct a laboratory experiment and compare bidders’
physiological processing as well as their bidding behavior in Dutch auctions with those
in Japanese auctions.20 In particular, the authors compare heart rate data in these two
auction mechanisms. Smith and Dickhaut conclude that the Japanese auction, as a
19Interestingly, eBay changed its policy in this regard and no longer displays the complete pseudonym
of a bidder due to anonymity reasons. To the contrary, the Internet auction site 1-2-3.tv even
broadcasts the pseudonyms of its bidders on national television.
20The authors use the term “English clock auction” for a Japanese auction.
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collection of all relevant stimuli, induces less emotional arousal than the Dutch auction.
However, the authors do not address which specific features of the Dutch auction are
responsible for the reported increased emotionality. The literature conjectures that
bidders derive a “utility of suspense” from participating in Dutch auctions (Cox et al.,
1983; Katok and Kwasnica, 2008). In Chapter 5, I will provide physiological evidence
for a utility of suspense in Dutch auctions.
Different auction mechanisms can generate different auction events, which in turn in-
duce different immediate and anticipated emotions. For instance, some auctions allow
for multiple rounds of bidding with one bidder being the current high bidder, while other
auctions only allow bidders to place one single sealed-bid. As outlined in Sections 2.2.2
and 2.2.3, previous investments and perceived ownership are inherent characteristics of
dynamic auctions, while they are less pronounced in static auctions. According to the
definitions listed in Table 2.1, auction fever is a phenomenon which is particularly ob-
served in dynamic auctions (e.g. Ockenfels et al., 2006; Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc,
2009).
The immediate emotions triggered in the process of an auction can be anticipated by
bidders. For instance, the regret and joy associated with losing and winning an auction,
respectively, are salient future emotions that can influence bidders’ decision-making (e.g.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008). These emotions will be discussed in detail in
Section 2.3.
2.2.5. Conclusions
In the context of the framework for emotional bidding, this section focused on how the
process of an auction can affect a bidder’s current emotional state. In particular, I fo-
cus on the phenomenon of auction fever. The literature on auction fever has identified
perceived competition, previous investments, and perceived ownership as the main influ-
encing factors for a bidder’s current emotional state. Selected literature on these factors,
along with the particular focus and methodology, is listed in Table 2.2. As argued in
Section 2.1, the outlined influencing factors can induce an intense current emotional
state that distorts a bidder’s preselected bidding strategy. This phenomenon is inter-
preted as auction fever. Summarizing results from the relevant literature, the following
conclusions can be drawn:
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1. Perceived competition: Competition is an inherent characteristic of auctions. The
degree of perceived competition is particularly affected by time pressure, social fa-
cilitation, and rivalry (e.g. Malhotra et al., 2008). Time pressure can induce more
aggressive bidding in ascending auctions (e.g. Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc,
2009). The presence of other bids and passive spectators can increase the percep-
tion of being in the spotlight and, therefore, cause bidders to place higher bids
(e.g. Ku et al., 2005). Field studies have shown that low starting prices and long
auction durations can increase the number of bidders and, thus, rivalry. Further,
a (sub-)group of bidders may develop personal rivalries, which induce interdepen-
dencies between bidders’ individual utility functions. This means, a bidder can
derive an additional positive or negative utility from winning or losing an auction,
respectively. However, the degree of these interdependencies seems to depend on
the number of bidders. Particularly when there are only two active bidders in an
auction, so called “head-to-head battles” can arise (cf. Johns and Zaichkowsky,
2003; Ku et al., 2005).
2. Previous investments: The terms escalation of commitment and sunk cost fallacy
describe the observation that human decision-makers often put too much emphasis
on recouping previous investments, for which they feel personally responsible, by
investing further effort. The multi-stage bidding process is the actual basis for
this effect in dynamic auctions. Various studies observe stronger bidding activity
and higher final prices in consequence to accumulated sunk costs in the form of
auction fees, search, transaction, and waiting costs. Particularly, high starting
prices, auction fees, and long auction durations induce higher commitments.
3. Perceived ownership: Although no bidder actually owns the item before the end
of an auction, being the high bidder in an ascending auction can make a bidder
feel like already owning it. This perceived ownership can be evoked by an in-
creased psychological attachment to the item (pseudo-endowment effect) and/or
an increased probabilistic belief about winning the auction (attachment effect).
Various studies have shown that a longer duration of being high bidder can in-
crease the probability of placing subsequent bids. Ehrhart et al. (2008) show that
this effect can be amplified, if bidders have a direct influence on becoming the high
bidder by placing bids faster than other bidders.
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4. System design: Particularly in electronic auctions, the elicitation of auction fever is
mediated through the auction design, i.e. the user interface design and the auction
mechanism design. Auction sites can increase perceived competition through user
interface design elements. Photos of the commodity for sale can increase a bidder’s
psychological attachment with the item. Different auction mechanisms typically
induce different auction events and, thus, emotionality. The phenomenon of auc-
tion fever seems to be a phenomenon particularly observed in dynamic auctions
(e.g. Ockenfels et al., 2006).
It is important to note, however, that the outlined influencing factors of auction fever
are not isolated components. On the contrary, they interact with each other! First,
auction mechanism parameters, such as the starting price or the auction duration, can
have opposing effects. For instance, a long auction duration in an ascending auction
can increase the average high bidder duration and, thus, perceived ownership, while at
the same time, the degree of time pressure decreases and previous investments in terms
of waiting costs increase. As argued in Section 2.2.2, the starting price of an auction
diametrically affects perceived competition and previous investments. Second, there is
little research to what extent one influencing factor leverages the impact of another
influencing factor. For instance, Heyman et al. (2004) qualitatively report that the
pseudo-endowment effect is “stronger” in case the degree of perceived competition is high.
In an eBay field study, Wolf et al. (2005b) report that the effect of high bidder duration
and the number of bidders on final prices are multiplicative, while the effect of auction
duration and the number of bidders are additive. I believe that the unified framework for
emotional bidding in auctions can help to identify the interdependencies better and more
concise. Moreover, in combination with the methodology of physioeconomics introduced
in Chapter 3, these interdependencies can also be physiologically measured.
Product Characteristics. Ariely and Simonson (2003) argue that the interaction of
the outlined influencing factors is subject to the specific characteristics of the auctioned
item, e.g. “whether the product offered is such that the allure of its low starting price
has the potential to generate emotional involvement.” At this stage, there has been little
research on how the phenomenon of auction fever depends on product characteristics.
This research question is particularly important, however, because the literature on auc-
tion fever analyzes auctions ranging from retail products, such as electronic equipment,
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Table 2.2.: Selected Literature on Elicitors of Current Emotional States in Auctions
(PC = perceived competition, PI = previous investment, PO = perceived ownership)
(TH = theory, LE = lab experiment, CFE = controlled field experiment, FS = field study, SV = survey, RV = review)
Author(s) Published in PC PI PO TH LE CFE FS SV RV
Teger (1980) Monograph X X X
Thaler (1980) Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization
X X X
Meyer (1993) The Quarterly Review
of Economics and Finance
X X X
Ku (2000) Kellogg Journal of
Organization Behavior
X X
Murnighan (2002) Journal of Management Education X X X
Ariely and Simonson (2003) Journal of Consumer Psychology X X X X X
Johns and Zaichkowsky
(2003)
Psychology and Marketing X X X X





Advances in Consumer Research X X
Heyman et al. (2004) Journal of Interactive Marketing X X X X
Ku et al. (2005) Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes
X X X X X
Walley and Fortin (2005) Journal of Business Research X X
Wolf et al. (2005a) Working Paper X X
Wolf et al. (2005b) Working Paper X X
Ku et al. (2006) Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology
X X X X X
Hou (2007) Journal of Electronic
Commerce Research
X X X
Katok and Kwasnica (2008) Experimental Economics X X X
Bramsen (2008a) Working Paper X X
Ehrhart et al. (2008) Working Paper X X X
Ku (2008) Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes
X X
Ku et al. (2008) Working Paper X X X X
Malhotra et al. (2008) Harvard Business Review X X
Park et al. (2008) EMCIS Proceedings X X X
Wolf et al. (2008) Judgement and Decision Making X X
Haruvy and Popkowski
Leszczyc (2009)
Decision Analysis X X
to collectibles, such as one-cent coins and fiberglass cows (cf. Ku et al., 2005; Lucking-
Reiley et al., 2007). It seems sensible to conjecture that particularly a product’s value,
scarcity, and public interest play an important role in this regard. First, if the value of
the item is high, it affects bidder’s individual involvement. For instance, Ku et al. (2008)
show that bidding behavior is more aggressive if stakes are high. Second, a product’s
scarcity ceteris paribus affects rivalry among bidders. Hou (2007) argues that a long auc-
tion only positively affects the endogenous number of bidders, if scarcity is sufficiently
high and bidders do not have “more options at any point of time.” Lynn (1992) reports
that an item becomes more desirable for consumers if it is scarce. Peters and Bodkin
(2007) observe that eBay bidders derive “joy in finding rare or unusual items.” Third,
a high public interest can increase a bidder’s prestige when obtaining the auctioned
item, e.g. a charity auction or a unique collectible. Ku et al. (2005) observe charity auc-
tions and conjecture that the intense media attention may also have “increased arousal
and facilitated higher bidding.” Lee and Malmendier (2010) report that the amount
of overbidding in eBay auctions depends on the product category, with proportions of
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overbidding ranging “between 30% and 60% for most categories.”
Inducing a Current Emotional State. The literature discussed so far focuses on
how characteristics of bidders, the auction mechanism, and the product can induce an
intense emotional state in auctions. However, a change in a bidder’s current emotional
state may also be induced by a task completely unrelated to the bidding task. In this
regard, the experimenter may also induce a specific current emotional state by means
of videos (Rottenberg et al., 2007), pictures (Bradley and Lang, 2007), music (Eich
et al., 2007), or tasks proceeding the actual experiment (Roberts et al., 2007). For
instance, Ku (2008) conducts a survey experiment that comprises two stages. In the
first stage, participants are asked to write a self-report on a competitive incident in
the past, in which they either felt “aroused, stirred up, and excited” (high arousal) or
“quiet, peaceful, and calm” (no arousal). In the second stage, subjects participate in
an hypothetical auction scenario. The author shows that subjects in the high arousal
treatments place significantly higher bids.
Methodological Discussion. The literature on auction fever comprises many exam-
ples of laboratory experiments in which participants are intentionally deceived in order
“not to disturb the emergence of auction fever” (Ockenfels et al., 2006). In particular,
participants are told that they bid against other human individuals, while they are actu-
ally competing against computerized agents (e.g. Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2004;
Ku et al., 2008). While deception of participants has turned out to be common practice
in experimental psychology, it violates established paradigms of experimental economics
(cf. Guala, 2005). With respect to auction fever experiments, Ockenfels et al. (2006)
criticize that it remains unclear to what extent participants “will actually believe any
part of the information they are given,” if the subject pool has been exposed to deception
in experiments before. Other studies focus on surveys in which bidders place hypothet-
ical bids in an artificial auction scenario (e.g. Heyman et al., 2004; Ku, 2008). Again,
this is not in line with established paradigms of experimental economics. In particular,
the induced value theory states that subjects need to be incentivized through a proper
reward medium, e.g. money, in order to observe economic decision-making behavior that
is actually related to the focus of investigation (cf. Smith, 1976).
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2.3. Immediate and Anticipated Emotions
Section 2.2 discussed how the characteristics of the auction system, the bidders, and
the product can induce an intense emotional state of auction fever. This section focuses
specifically on immediate emotions in response to a single auction event and on the
anticipation of future emotional processing. As outlined in the framework for emotional
bidding in Section 2.1.1, the elicitation of an intense emotional state is also subject to
immediate and anticipated emotions experienced in the course of an auction. Partic-
ularly the “frequency and magnitude of anticipated post-auction feelings” can have a
major impact on bidding decisions (Ariely and Simonson, 2003). The literature has













Figure 2.2.: Immediate Emotions Induced by Auction Outcome
In a single-unit auction, the auction outcome reveals which bidder obtains the com-
modity for sale and how much she has to pay for it. This bidder is referred to as the
“winner” and all other bidders as the “losers” of an auction. Figure 2.2 schematically
depicts the main immediate emotions a bidder may experience in consequence to the
revelation of the auction outcome.
If the bidder wins an auction, she may experience a “joy of winning” (e.g. Goeree and
Offerman, 2003). This joy does not only comprise her utility from monetary payoffs,
but also the utility from winning the social competition inherent in an auction. This
non-monetary component of the joy of winning is also referred to as “love of winning”
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(e.g. Morgan et al., 2003; Kogan and Morgan, 2009). However, the winner of an auction
may at the same time suffer from “winner regret.” For instance, in a first-price sealed-bid
auction, the winner of an auction may still have won the auction by placing a lower bid
and, thus, won the auction with a higher monetary payoff (e.g. Engelbrecht-Wiggans,
1989). Even more so, she may also experience winner regret in an auction in which she
gained a negative monetary payoff.21
In contrast, if the bidder loses an auction, she can experience “loser regret” with
regard to the missed opportunity of achieving a monetary payoff and because of losing
the social competition (e.g. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007).22 The following subsections
will discuss these three immediate emotions along with results from the literature.
2.3.1. Winner and Loser Regret
Regret can be defined as an aversive emotion, a decision-maker experiences upon the
discovery that she could have gained a higher level of utility if she had taken a dif-
ferent choice in the past (Humphrey, 2004). Emphasizing the importance of regret in
human emotional processing, Levinson (1978) argues that “regret is a common, possibly
a universal, human experience.” Because regret is an aversive emotion, human decision-
makers tend to anticipate future regret and consequently seek to avoid this emotion by
changing their behavior. Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) argue that even if “feel-
ings of regret” are considered irrational from a theoretical perspective, this “does not
preclude their existence.” Gilovich and Medvec (1995) show that regret is an essential
experience in order to learn how to take advantageous decisions in the future. In terms of
the somatic marker hypothesis of Bechara and Damasio (2005), the auction outcome is a
primary inducer of regret, while thinking about the auction outcome during the process
of decision-making is regarded as a secondary inducer.23 Crone et al. (2004) show that
those individuals, who have a stronger emotional processing of secondary inducers, take
on average more advantageous decisions.
21The literature on winner regret does not consider regret from winning the social competition. This
emotion seems counterintuitive, as the love of winning is generally assumed to be non negative.
22Joy of winning and loser regret are sometimes also referred to as “excitement of winning” and “frus-
tration of losing,” respectively (e.g. Ding et al., 2005; Peters and Bodkin, 2007). Ding et al. (2005)
argue that “anticipated regret is similar to [the] concept of anticipated frustration.”
23The somatic marker hypothesis of Bechara and Damasio (2005) states that advantageous decision-
making is only possible in consequence of a prior accurate emotional processing of primary and
secondary inducers (cf. Section 3.4.1).
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Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) introduces a model of post-auction regret for first-price
sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions. In this model, a bidder’s utility does not only depend on
her monetary profit, but also on winner and loser regret. The author argues that a
winner can experience winner regret if she is told the amount of the second highest
bid upon winning. Engelbrecht-Wiggans refers to this feeling as “money left on the
table” regret, because ex post the winner of a FPSB auction could have gained a higher
profit by shading her bid.24 In contrast, the loser of an auction can suffer from loser
regret if she is told the amount of the highest bid upon losing. Engelbrecht-Wiggans
refers to this feeling as “missed opportunities” regret, because ex post the loser of a
FPSB auction may have gained a profit by raising her bid. If bidders know that they
will receive post-auction information on the highest and second highest bid, they can
anticipate winner and loser regret during decision-making and reflect this concern in
their bidding strategy. Engelbrecht-Wiggans analytically shows that a bidder’s utility
maximizing bidding strategy is independent of regret, if she puts equal weights on winner
and loser regret. However, bidders place higher (lower) bids in equilibrium, if they put
more weight on loser (winner) regret.
Vickrey (1961) introduces a risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bidding strategy,
for which a bidder maximizes her expected payoff in FPSB auctions. However, it is a
well-established result of experimental economics that human individuals place higher
bids than the RNNE bidding strategy of Vickrey suggests (cf. Kagel, 1995). In order to
explain this observation, Cox et al. (1988) introduce a model of constant relative risk
averse (CRRA) bidders. Following the argumentation of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989),
however, bidding above the RNNE can also be explained with anticipated loser regret.
Kagel (1995) argue that “risk aversion is one element, but far from the only element,
generating bidding above the RNNE.” Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2009) explicitly
test the CRRA model against the regret model in a laboratory experiment. They find
“virtually no support for the risk aversion model,” but strong support for the regret
model. Emphasizing the importance of regret in economic decision-making in general,
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) show that regret theory can also explain con-
tradictory results of various studies, which cannot be explained with risk aversion.
24Recall that in a FPSB auction, the highest bidder receives the commodity for the amount of her bid.
As long as her bid is slightly higher than that of the second highest bidder, she still wins the auction.
Therefore, it can ex post be a better strategy to place a lower bid. In other words, “what seems the
best action ex ante may not turn out to be the best one ex post” (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007).
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Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) conduct a laboratory experiment in order to analyze
the impact of winner and loser regret in FPSB auctions. In a between-subject design,
individuals participate in a FPSB auction, in which either the highest bid (loser regret),
the second highest bid (winner regret), or no such information (no feedback) is revealed.
In order to exclude learning effects, the authors decided for a one-shot design, in which
bidders simultaneously place bids for a couple of auctions out of which only one is
randomly chosen and conducted. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay find support for anticipated
loser regret, as bidders place significantly higher bids under this condition. However,
subjects do not seem to anticipate winner regret, as these bids are not significantly
different from those in the no feedback treatment. Based on a post-auction questionnaire,
in which subjects subjectively report their individual feelings of regret, Filiz-Ozbay and
Ozbay conclude that loser regret is significantly stronger than winner regret. However,
although winner regret is not reflected in the bidding behavior, it is still experienced as
soon as the auction outcome is revealed.
In contrast to Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008)
explicitly include learning effects in their laboratory experiment by letting bidders con-
secutively take part in a series of FPSB auctions. Additionally, the authors introduce
a both regret treatment, in which the highest as well as the second highest bid are re-
vealed. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok also find support for the theory of loser regret.
Further, the authors report a significant decrease of bids over time in the winner re-
gret treatment and a slight decrease in the both regret treatment. Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok conclude that individuals can only reflect winner regret in their behavior, if
they have “actually experienced it several times.” However, although winner regret can
supposedly be learned over time, individuals still “put more weight on the loser’s regret
than on the winner’s regret.”
Sujarittanonta and Cramton (2009) analytically show that anticipated loser regret can
also affect bidding behavior in an ascending clock auction. In particular, two pricing
rules are compared, for which auction theory actually predicts equivalent seller revenues:
lowest accepted bid (LAB) and highest rejected bid (HRB). While profit maximizing
bidders truthfully bid their valuation in the HRB auctions, the LAB auction induces
them to shade their bids in equilibrium. Therefore, bidders “face the risk of losing at
profitable prices” in LAB auctions. Sujarittanonta and Cramton (2009) conclude that
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revenues are higher in LAB auctions if the “fear of losing is sufficiently strong.”25 In
order to test these theoretical predictions, Cramton et al. (2009) conduct a laboratory
experiment. In line with the theoretical predictions of Sujarittanonta and Cramton
(2009), Cramton et al. (2009) also find support for the theory of loser regret and observe
higher revenues in LAB auctions in comparison to HRB auctions. The authors conclude
that subjects shade their bids less rigid than auction theory predicts, because they
“anticipate the regret of losing at a profitable price.”
It is important to note, however, that the studies discussed in this section so far
all model regret exclusively as a function of the additional monetary payoff an ex post
optimal bidding strategy would have achieved (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1989). In other
words, this particular concept of regret does not comprise aversive feelings of losing the
social competition.26 In contrast, Delgado et al. (2008) take these social aspects in a
neuroeconomic experiment into account. The authors analyze two different scenarios: a
lottery and a FPSB auction with one human competitor. Delgado et al. find that losing
a FPSB auction induces a similar activation of brain regions as known from actual
monetary losses. This, however, is not the case in the almost identical lottery setting.27
The authors conclude that the “fear of losing the social competition” is responsible for
overbidding in FPSB auctions and that the “the anticipation of the unpleasant state
associated with loss” leads participants to increase their bids. In terms of regret, this
can be interpreted as anticipated loser regret regarding the social competition.
2.3.2. Joy of Winning
The expected utility from winning an auction is the actual reason for bidders to par-
ticipate. The immediate emotion triggered by the event of winning an auction and
receiving a positive monetary payoff is referred to as “joy of winning” (e.g. Goeree and
Offerman, 2003). Traditionally, the utility gained from winning an auction depends only
25In line with the argumentation above, Sujarittanonta and Cramton (2009) use the terms “fear of
losing” and “anticipated loser regret” interchangeably.
26Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) deliberately exclude effects related to the social competition
by letting bidders compete against computerized agents. In contrast to the auction fever literature
discussed in Section 2.2, subjects are explicitly informed that they compete against computers.
27A brain region referred to as “striatum” is the focus of the investigation. The authors report a
decrease in BOLD (blood oxygen level dependency) signal in the case of losing an auction, but not
when receiving no payoff in a lottery. However, there is an increase if the bidder wins an auction or
if she receives a payoff in a lottery.
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on monetary payoffs (cf. Vickrey, 1961). However, bidders may also derive a utility from
winning the social competition of an auction that is “over and beyond any monetary
payoffs” (Cooper and Fang, 2008). Fliessbach et al. (2007) argue that “outperforming
someone else” can induce a joy of winning in addition to mere monetary reward. This
non-monetary component is also referred to as “love of winning” (e.g. Morgan et al.,
2003; Kogan and Morgan, 2009). In the following, the term joy of winning will be used
to refer to its non-monetary component.
There are contradictory results in the literature regarding the impact of anticipated
joy of winning. Cooper and Fang (2008) conduct a laboratory experiment in order to
analyze how the anticipation of joy of winning affects bidding behavior in a second-price
sealed-bid (SPSB) auction. Although Vickrey (1961) has shown that bidders have a
weakly dominant strategy in a SPSB auction to truthfully bid their individual valuation
for the item, it is a common observation in experimental economics that up to 60%
of the bidders place bids which exceed their valuation (cf. Kagel and Levin, 1993).
Cooper and Fang report that one main explanation for such overbidding is bounded
rationality, as bidders learn how to avoid costly overbidding over time. According to
the authors, another part of overbidding can be explained with interdependent utilities
associated with joy of winning and spite. In another study, Andreoni et al. (2007) find
that anticipated joy of winning is only responsible for at most 10% of the observed
overbidding. Goeree and Offerman (2003) find no support for the theory of anticipated
joy of winning in their experiment and explain their results with loss aversion. Delgado
et al. (2008) argue that it is actually anticipated loser regret and not anticipated joy
of winning that is responsible for overbidding. Based on neurological data, the authors
show that there is virtually no difference between winning a lottery or a FPSB auction
as regards emotional processing.
It is important to note, however, that the literature on joy of winning (1) mainly fo-
cuses on static auctions and that (2) the results of these studies are based on experiments
in a neutral laboratory environment. It may be worthwhile analyzing whether the joy
of winning is stronger in dynamic auctions and in the case of personal rivalries among
bidders. Further, the literature on auction fever frequently conjectures that love of win-
ning, and its anticipation, is strongly intertwined with auction fever (e.g. Häubl and
Popkowski Leszczyc, 2004; Walley and Fortin, 2005; Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc,
2009). As outlined above, however, auction fever is particularly observed in dynamic
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auctions (e.g. Gimpel, 2007; Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2009).
2.3.3. Conclusions
In the context of the framework for emotional bidding, this section focused on the
major immediate emotions a bidder can experience upon learning the auction outcome.28
Selected literature on immediate and anticipated emotions in auctions, along with the
particular focus and methodology, is listed in Table 2.3. Summarizing results from the
literature, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. Winner and loser regret: Regret is an aversive emotion an individual experiences
upon realizing ex post that she could have taken a better decision in the past. In
auctions, bidders can experience in particular loser regret, i.e. by realizing upon
losing that one could have won the auction at a profitable price, and winner regret,
i.e. by realizing upon winning that one could have achieved an even higher profit.
In case bidders anticipate loser regret, they tend to raise their bids. In case they
anticipate winner regret, they shade their bids. While anticipated loser regret can
instantly be observed in bidding behavior, this is not the case for winner regret.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) conjecture that the anticipation of winner
regret needs to be learned through experience.
2. Joy of winning: The joy of winning an auction comprises utility gained from
both monetary profits as well as outperforming other bidders. However, there
is only weak evidence in the literature that the anticipation of this non-monetary
component of joy of winning is responsible for placing higher bids in static auctions.
Delgado et al. (2008) report that the joy of winning a FPSB auction is virtually
the same as winning a lottery. The authors argue that it is in fact anticipated
loser regret that causes bidders to place higher bids. However, love of winning, i.e.
the non-monetary component of joy of winning, may be strongly intertwined with
auction fever, which is particularly observed in dynamic auctions (e.g. Gimpel,
2007; Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2009).
28Moreover, Greenleaf (2004) demonstrates that not only the behavior of the bidders, but also the
behavior of the seller is subject to processing of immediate and anticipated emotions. Based on a
theoretical model and a laboratory experiment, the author shows that sellers reflect “anticipated
regret and rejoicing” when setting a reserve price for an auction. However, this thesis focuses
particularly on the emotions experienced by the bidders.
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3. Auction mechanism design: The immediate emotions experienced upon winning
or losing an auction also depend on the mechanism design of the auction. As
described in Section 2.1.1, the auction system limits the set of possible immediate
emotions. Therefore, such emotions can only be anticipated in certain auctions.
Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) argue that winner and loser regret cannot explain
overbidding in SPSB auctions, as overbidding is a dominated strategy in this case.
In ascending clock auctions, the experience of loser regret depends on the pricing
rule (cf. Sujarittanonta and Cramton, 2009). Ivanova-Stenzel (2008) argues that
“subjects prefer ascending auctions because there is never any regret in them.”
As argued in the framework for emotional bidding in Section 2.1.1, the impact of
immediate emotions is twofold. First, bidders can anticipate future immediate emotions
and reflect this in their bidding strategy. Second, the processing of anticipated and
immediate emotions also directly affects a bidder’s current emotional state.
Table 2.3.: Selected Literature on Immediate and Anticipated Emotions
(TH = theory, LE = lab experiment, CFE = controlled field experiment, FS = field study, SV = survey, RV = review)
Author(s) Published Emotion TH LE CFE FS SV RV
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) Management Science loser & winner regret X
Goeree and
Offerman (2003)
European Economic Review loser regret, joy of winning X X
Bosman and Riedl (2004) Working Paper economic shock X X X
Greenleaf (2004) Journal of Consumer Research seller joy & regret X
Ding et al. (2005) Management Science loser regret, joy of winning X X X
Andreoni et al. (2007) Games and Economic Behavior joy of winning X X
Filiz-Ozbay
and Ozbay (2007)
American Economic Review loser & winner regret X X X
Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok (2007)
Economic Theory loser & winner regret X X
Cooper and Fang (2008) The Economic Journal joy of winning X X
Delgado et al. (2008) Science loser regret, joy of winning X
Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok (2008)
Management Science loser & winner regret X X
Cramton et al. (2009) Working Paper loser regret X X
Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok (2009)
Decision Analysis loser & winner regret X
Sujarittanonta and
Cramton (2009)
Working Paper loser regret X
Bosman and van Winden (2002) analyze how the emotional processing of a sudden
“economic shock” affects a bidder’s current emotional state. The emotional state is
assessed with self report questionnaires. After a first sequence of auctions, the authors
randomly induce either a positive economic shock, i.e. doubling the accumulated profit of
a bidder, or a negative shock, i.e. dividing it by two. The authors report a direct influence
of the economic shock on the emotional state. Further, Bosman and van Winden find
that the “emotional state systematically influences bidding behavior.” Those bidders who
are in a negative emotional state increase their bids in the second auction series, whereas
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the other bidders do not change their bidding behavior. The authors conclude that “a
bad emotional state significantly increases the likelihood to bid more aggressively.” In
another study, Ding et al. (2005) investigate how winning or losing in one auction affects
bidding behavior in the following auction. The authors derive an analytical model in
which bidders revise their bidding strategy “each time as his/her emotional state changes
due to the outcome of previous bidding.” This model is then tested in a laboratory
experiment. Consistent with the model, Ding et al. report that bidders tend to change
their bidding strategy after each auction. If a subject lost the previous auction, she
gets more excited about winning the current auction. In contrast, if a subject won
the previous auction, she gets more frustrated about losing the current auction. The
authors conclude that “emotions are an integral component of a bidder’s decision state
and bidding strategy.”
At this stage, the literature focuses particularly on immediate emotions induced by
the auction outcome. However, especially in dynamic auctions, there are several auction
events other than the auction outcome that can also trigger immediate emotions. As
outlined in Section 2.1, the event of becoming the current high bidder and the event of
being outbidden have been identified to be essential with regard to inducing an intense
emotional state, which is comprised in the effects of pseudo-endowment and escalating
commitment. Therefore, the study of immediate and anticipated emotions regarding
auction events and their interaction with a bidder’s current emotional state seem worth-
while for future research.
2.4. Bidder Heterogeneity
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discussed how emotions can generally affect bidding behavior in the
framework for emotional bidding, without taking into account heterogeneities among
bidders. However, as outlined in the framework for emotional bidding in Section 2.1.1,
the elaboration of a bidding strategy and the emotional processing of an auction are
also subject to a bidder’s individual characteristics. Therefore, this section specifically
addresses how a bidder’s personality and expertise can affect her bidding behavior and
emotional processing.
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2.4.1. Sensitivity to Heterogeneities Among Bidders
It is a common assumption in auction literature that bidders are homogeneous and have
the cognitive abilities to derive an optimal bidding strategy (e.g. McAfee and McMil-
lan, 1987a).29 In contrast, already Vickrey (1961) argues that some of the bidders may
be “insufficiently sophisticated to discern the equilibrium-point strategy.” Highlighting
the importance of heterogeneities among bidders, Cox et al. (1982) state that “free-
ing bidding theory from dependence on identical bidders assumption is an important
generalization.”30
Auctions are particularly sensitive to heterogeneities among consumers, as they “sys-
tematically pick those buyers as winners” who have a tendency to overbid (Lee and
Malmendier, 2010). Therefore, if a small (sub)group of bidders is particularly liable for
auction fever, their behavior is disproportionally pronounced in the auction outcome.
With respect to this special characteristic, Malmendier and Szeidl (2008) describe auc-
tions as “tool[s] to search for fools.” The authors theoretically analyze how a compara-
tively small number of “fools,” i.e. agents with a behavioral bias to overbid, affect the
auction outcome. The other agents are assumed to be “rational agents,” i.e. agents
who place bids according to a given optimal bidding strategy. The authors analytically
show that already a small number of behavioral agents can have a large impact on the
auction outcome. For instance, under the assumption that there are 20% fools in the
general population and 10 bidders in an auction, the “share of overbid auctions with at
least two fools is 62%.” Further, the authors argue that the impact of behavioral agents
also depends on the particular auction mechanism. While second-price auctions need at
least two such agents to observe overbidding, only one of them is needed in first-price
auctions.
Based on these theoretical considerations, Lee and Malmendier (2010) analyze field
data from eBay auctions and fixed price offers for a popular board game. The authors
define overbidding in auctions as placing bids beyond fixed price offers, which are simul-
taneously listed on the same computer screen. Overbidding is observed in 42% of the
auctions, taking into account the differences in shipping costs this proportion even is
29In this respect, Falk and Heckman (2009) note: “The evidence that people are different clashes sharply
with the widely used ‘representative agent’ model that assumes that agents are homogeneous or can
be represented as if they are homogeneous.”
30It is important to note, however, that abandoning the “assumption of homogeneity among bidders”
can turn out to be an “intractable” problem in theoretical models (Vickrey, 1961).
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73%. In contrast, the share of bidders who overbid is only 17%.31 The authors conclude
that due to the “nature of auctions,” the presence of this comparatively small number
of bidders has a “disproportionate influence” on final auction prices.
Malmendier and Szeidl (2008) highlight that this amplification effect of auctions is not
restricted to a particular behavioral bias, i.e. the underlying psychological phenomenon
for overbidding. The important aspect is that auctions are particularly sensitive to
such biases. Such behavioral biases are subject to a bidder’s individual personality and
expertise, which will be discussed in the following subsections.
2.4.2. Personality
In the context of Internet auctions, the literature identifies different personality cate-
gories of auction participants. For instance, Weinhardt and Schmidt (2001) distinguish
the “serious shopper,” the “collector,” and the “bargain hunter” as the main categories
of online auction consumers. Lee et al. (2008) categorize bidders into “impulse buyers,”
“variety seekers,” “risk-averse economists,” and “auction lovers.” This terminology in-
dicates a wide spectrum of auction participants, ranging from price sensitive customers
to sensation seeking bidders.
Möllenberg (2004) conducts an Internet survey among eBay auction participants.
Each subject is either categorized as an “auctainer” or a “smart bidder.” An auctainer is
characterized as an experiential-oriented customer, who is attracted by emotional stimuli
and tends to aggressive bidding. In contrast, a smart bidder is a result-oriented cus-
tomer, who is attracted primarily by cognitive stimuli and strictly adheres to preselected
bidding limits. Altogether, 48% of the bidders are categorized as auctainers and 52%
as smart bidders. Therefore, a substantial part of auction participants is attracted by
emotional aspects of Internet auctions. In another survey study, Lee et al. (2009) inves-
tigate how consumer characteristics are related to their utilitarian and hedonic values
of online auctions. While utilitarian value refers to the utility gained from obtaining
the desired commodity, hedonic value is gained from “perceived entertainment and emo-
tional worth” of auction participation. The authors find that hedonic value is positively
affected by compulsive buying behavior and variety seeking, while it is negatively af-
31Note that overbidding is defined in this case relative to the fixed price offer. However, a bidder’s
preselected bidding limit may be well below this fixed price and, therefore, the actual fraction of
overbidders may be even higher.
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fected by price sensitivity. Lee et al. conclude that “thrill of bidding, excitement of
winning, stimulation of beating competitors, and enjoyment of finding rare or unusual
items” play an important role as to why these consumers participate in auctions.
While these studies only focuses on bidders who are already customers of Internet
auction sites, Stafford and Stern (2002) outline which consumer characteristics determine
auction participation. The authors conclude that in particular acceptance of technology,
affinity with computers, and “involvement” in auctions affect the propensity to bid in
Internet auctions. Involvement describes the emotional aspects of auctions, for instance
the “game-like action and bidding frenzy characteristic” (Stafford and Stern, 2002).
Similarly, Stern et al. (2008) identify “impulsiveness” as a personality dimension, which
is attracted by hedonic value of Internet auctions.
Peters and Bodkin (2007) analyze whether emotionality in auctions can even lead
to an addiction. The authors conduct one-on-one interviews with eBay customers and
define habitual use, negative consequences, psychological distress, and dependency as
characteristics of an online auction addiction. In particular, elements associated with
auction fever, i.e. perceived competition, previous investments, and pseudo-endowment,
are described to be the cause of an intense emotional state of psychological distress.
Further, immediate emotions elicited by the auction outcome play an important role as
well. Peters and Bodkin conjecture that “the highs of winning and the lows of losing
may lead to [. . . ] a dependency on online auctions.” The authors observe that 12% of the
interviewees exhibit all four characteristics and that a large proportion exhibits at least
one. Although this result is difficult to generalize, addictive behavior in combination
with the amplificiation effect of auctions may explain a part of the observed overbidding
on eBay.
Bapna et al. (2001) and Bapna et al. (2003) categorize bidders based on their objec-
tively observable bidding behavior into “evaluators,” “opportunists,” and “participators.”
This categorization is further refined in Bapna et al. (2004). In a field study, the authors
analyze bidding behavior in multi-unit discriminatory price auctions on Onsale.com by
assessing three objective parameters of each bidder: time of entry (TOE), time of exit
(TOX), and number of bids (NOB).32 “Early evaluators,” “middle evaluators,” and “op-
portunists” are bidders who only place a single bid in the early, middle, or late stages of
an auction. Those bidders categorized as “sip-and-dippers” strategically place one bid
32This particular mechanism is also referred to as “Yankee auction.”
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at the beginning and another bid at the end of an auction. In contrast, “participators”
place multiple bids in all stages of an auction. Bapna et al. conjecture that these bid-
ders “gain satisfaction from the bidding and participation process” and, thus, are also
motivated by emotional components of bidding. Analyzing behavior of bidders on eBay,
Hayne et al. (2003) categorize bidders in a quite similar way: early, in-between, and late
bidders only place a single bid. In contrast, “probe bidders” place consecutive incre-
mental bids in order to eventually reveal the maximum bid of the proxy agent. “Sentry
bidders” quickly place additional bids every time they are outbid. Hayne et al. (2003)
argue that “making consecutive incremental bids is irrational” in eBay proxy auctions.
With 25% probe bidders and 9% sentry bidders, the proportion of such bidding activity
is substantial.
Other studies focus on cultural, regional, and gender differences among bidders. For
instance, Hou (2007) compares bidding behavior on eBay China and eBay US. The
authors report that a high starting price “helps building bidding momentum” on eBay
China, which is not the case on eBay US. Further, the authors report that experienced
bidders, as assessed through feedback score, pay lower prices on eBay US, while there is
no such effect on eBay China. In another eBay field study, Black (2005) analyzes bidding
behavior of different regions in the US. The author reports higher bidding activity in
rural in comparison to urban areas, and that females are more likely to place bids on eBay
than males.33 At this stage, however, the actual cause for differences in bidding behavior
remains generally unclear in studies on cultural, regional, and gender heterogeneities.
Personality heterogeneities are also observed in laboratory experiments. For instance,
Andreoni et al. (2007) report in a laboratory study that some subjects overbid due to
joy of winning, while others are motivated by spite, and again another group is affected
by bounded rationality. Therefore, subjects can have different interdependencies in their
utility functions. Cooper and Fang (2008) observe that some subjects decide “almost
completely in line with the standard theoretical predictions,” while other subjects consis-
tently overbid. The authors conclude that “bidder heterogeneity is playing an important
role” in their data and that “some subjects are more rational than others.”
33With respect to gender differences, Black (2005) conjectures: “many women like to shop, and the
excitement of the auction may replace the satisfactions of the brick-and-mortar shopping experience.”
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2.4.3. Expertise
Bidders can also be categorized according to their level of expertise. Ariely and Simonson
(2003) distinguish in particular between “product domain expertise” and “online auction
expertise.” Product domain expertise positively affects the “evaluation of the auction
items” and, thus, reduces uncertainty regarding the item’s value. In contrast, online
auction expertise refers to the experience a bidder has with auctions and the abilities to
derive a bidding strategy.
On average, experienced bidders seem to be less prone for auction fever, as these
bidders have a tendency to place only a single bid in dynamic ascending auctions.34
Murnighan (2002) conjectures that “with luck, experience, and insight, people can avoid
[such] mistakes.” For instance, Bramsen (2008a) observes that on average the pseudo-
endowment effect seems to diminish for experienced bidders. In a field study, Wilcox
(2000) reports that more experienced bidders on eBay are more likely to snipe and less
likely to submit multiple bids. Similarly, Gilkeson and Reynolds (2003) and Borle et al.
(2006) observe a tendency of experienced eBay bidders to place single bids at the end
of auctions. These studies define experience as the net number of positive and negative
feedback provided by eBay. While this proxy only accounts for auctions a bidder has
actually won, Wang and Hu (2009) also take into account the number of all auctions a
bidder actively participated in, including those she did not win. The authors conclude
that “winning experiences [. . . ] can be counterproductive.” To the contrary, bidders
actually learn to refrain from placing multiple bids from the losing experiences, i.e.
those auctions that are not reflected in the feedback score. Therefore, the immediate
emotions induced from losing an auction seem to play an important role in a bidder’s
learning process.
Most of the papers discussed in this literature review address consumer auctions. This
leads to the question of how important emotions actually are for professional traders in
business auctions. Johns and Zaichkowsky (2003) conjecture that “it may be psycho-
logically easier for bidders at a business-oriented auction to drop out of the bidding,”
because these bidders are less emotionally involved in the auction process.35 The so-
ciologist Charles W. Smith (1990) observes that the “high predictability of prices and
34Recall that one characteristic of auction fever is that bidders place multiple bids in dynamic ascending
auctions.
35Johns and Zaichkowsky (2003) observe that many bidders in art auctions “actually send an agent to
buy for them due to the emotional involvement and competitive nature of the sale.”
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lack of personal involvement” at business auctions sometimes seems to cause bidders to
“fall asleep.” In a laboratory experiment, Sokol-Hessner et al. (2008) show that decision
behavior and emotional processing can even be changed if subjects are told to “think
like a trader.” The authors observe that subjects behave less loss averse and have limited
physiological responses to actual losses in the context of lottery decisions. Sokol-Hessner
et al. conclude that “taking a perspective similar to that of a trader can alter choice and
arousal responses related to loss aversion.” In a controlled field experiment comprising
physiological measurements, Lo and Repin (2002) observe that physiological responses
to market events depend on the expertise of the trader. In particular, the authors find
that senior traders show a different pattern of emotional arousal than junior traders.
2.4.4. Conclusions
The last sections discussed how heterogeneities among bidders can affect their individual
bidding behavior. In particular, a bidder’s personality and expertise have been identified
to be of importance.
Table 2.4.: Selected Literature on Bidder Heterogeneity and Emotional Bidding
(TH = theory, LE = lab experiment, CFE = controlled field experiment, FS = field study, SV = survey, RV = review)
Author(s) Published TH LE CFE FS SV RV
Wilcox (2000) Marketing Letters X
Bapna et al. (2001) Communications of the ACM X
Stafford and Stern (2002) International Journal of
Electronic Commerce
X
Bapna et al. (2003) Information Systems Research X
Gilkeson and Reynolds
(2003)
Psychology and Marketing X
Bapna et al. (2004) MIS Quarterly X
Möllenberg (2004) Electronic Markets X
Black (2005) SAM Advanced Management
Journal
X
Borle et al. (2006) Statistical Science X
Hou (2007) Journal of Electronic
Commerce Research
X
Peters and Bodkin (2007) Journal of Retailing and
Consumer Services
X
Bapna et al. (2008) Decision Support Systems X
Malmendier and
Szeidl (2008)
Working Paper X X
Lee et al. (2008) Journal of Customer Behaviour
Stern et al. (2008) Psychology and Marketing X
Lee et al. (2009) Journal of Retailing and
Consumer Services
X
Lee and Malmendier (2010) American Economic Review X X
Selected literature on bidder heterogeneity in auctions, along with the particular
methodology is listed in Table 2.4. Summarizing results from the literature, the fol-
lowing conclusions can be drawn:
1. Sensitivity: Auctions are particularly sensitive to heterogeneities among bidders,
as they systematically select those bidders as winners who have a tendency for
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overbidding. This amplification effect leverages behavioral biases among bidders
and disproportionally pronounces the behavior of even a small group of bidders
(cf. Malmendier and Szeidl, 2008; Lee and Malmendier, 2010).
2. Personality: There is a wide personality spectrum with regard to Internet auction
participants, ranging from price sensitive customers to sensation seeking bidders.
For a substantial part of bidders, e.g. “auctainers,” “participators,” the hedonic
values derived from auction participation are an important reason to attend In-
ternet auctions. As pointed out by Bapna et al. (2004), such bidders also tend to
perform bidding behavior similar to auction fever. Further studies identify differ-
ences in bidding behavior related to a bidder’s culture, region, and gender. At this
stage, however, the actual reason for such differences in behavior remains unclear.
3. Expertise: On average, bidding behavior becomes more sophisticated with grow-
ing experience. Particularly, those auctions a bidder did not win are an important
experience for learning. As a consequence, experienced bidders also tend to be
less prone to auction fever (e.g. Bramsen, 2008a). Further, physiological process-
ing and decision behavior can already change if subjects take the perspective of
a professional trader. In particular, those subjects who are told to “think like a
trader” behave less loss averse and their physiological response to actual losses is
smaller (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2008). At this stage, however, the literature concern-
ing emotionality in auctions focuses particularly on consumer auctions. Therefore,
emotional processing of professional bidders, seems to be an interesting avenue for
future research.
2.5. Conclusion
This chapter proposed a unified framework for emotional bidding in electronic auctions.
The framework serves as a first element of a structured methodology for systematically
analyzing emotions in electronic auctions and their impact on human bidding behavior.
Furthermore, the chapter provides detailed literature reviews regarding specific parts of
the framework.
First, I discuss literature regarding the main inducers of auction fever: perceived com-
petition, previous investments, and perceived ownership. Thereby, a new definition of
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auction fever is derived from the framework for emotional bidding. I define auction
fever as an intense current emotional state elicited in the course of one or more auctions
that distorts a bidder’s preselected bidding strategy. Second, I focus on immediate and
anticipated emotions bidders can experience in auctions. In particular, bidders can expe-
rience joy of winning, loser regret, and winner regret with respect to the auction outcome.
The set of possible immediate and anticipated emotions in a specific auction is limited
by the respective auction system. Third, the impact of heterogeneities among bidders
is discussed with focus on their personality and expertise. Auctions systematically pick
those bidders as winners, who have an behavioral bias for overbidding. Therefore, the
impact of such biases is disproportionally pronounced in auctions (cf. Malmendier and
Szeidl, 2008; Lee and Malmendier, 2010).
The proposed framework allows to systematically analyze the interactions between its
single elements. For instance, future research can focus on how changes in the auction
system are reflected in immediate and anticipated emotions the bidders experience. In
order to actually measure this emotional processing, Chapter 3 proposes the method-
ology physioeconomics. More specifically, I will outline how physiological proxies of
human emotional processing can be measured in economic experiments. Thereby, phys-
ioeconomics serves as the second element of a structured methodology for systematically




Measuring Emotions in Economic
Experiments
How do emotions affect human decision-making behavior and how can the study of emo-
tions help economists to better understand decisions of human individuals? In his fore-
cast on the future of economics, Thaler (2000) claims that the well-known and perfectly
rational “homo economicus will become more emotional,” indicating that economists
will devote more attention to the study of emotions and include emotional factors in
their models of decision-making.
While economic theory provides a highly elaborate methodology for analyzing organi-
zational behavior and complex macroeconomic interrelations, economic models, though
highly sophisticated and rich, often fail to capture the complexity of individual (human)
decision-making. Economic models tend to understand decision-making as a single ra-
tional maximization of expected utility, rather than as a dynamic process involving both
cognitive reasoning and emotional processing.1 Camerer (2003b) argues that “most eco-
nomic theories minimize the influence of human emotions” and Sanfey et al. (2003)
even claims that economic models “idealize the decision-maker as a perfectly rational
cognitive machine.” While the assumption of a perfectly rational decision-maker seems
sensible for organizational entities, it does not hold for explaining individual behavior
of human agents (Lee et al., 2009).
1In contrast, Camerer (2003a) provides a thorough review of behavioral game theory, including ana-
lytical models which comprise emotional elements.
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3.1. Experimental Economics
The methodology of experimental economics provides experimenters with a well-
established procedure to analyze economic decision-making of human individuals in
the laboratory.2 Thereby, it is a complementary approach to economic theory, as it
allows to systematically analyze the predictions of economic models in a controlled en-
vironment. As proposed by Smith (1976, 1982), an economic experiment comprises a
standardized economic environment, on which the experimenter establishes a controlled
microeconomic institution.
Economic Environment. The standardized economic environment comprises a set
of well-established rules (paradigms) for experimenters. By adhering to these rules, the
experimenter ensures (1) that the observed behavior is directly related to the established
microeconomic institution and (2) that her experiment is conducted in an environment,
which is identical to those of other experiments. Therefore, these rules are essential to
guarantee control and replicability in economic experiments. In particular, it is a major
paradigm of experimental economics that subjects must not be deceived.3 Another
important paradigm is the induced value theory by Smith (1976).4
“Control is the essence of experimental methodology, and in experimental
exchange studies it is important that one be able to state that, as between
two experiments, individual values (e.g. demand or supply) either do or do
not differ in a specified way. Such control can be achieved by using a reward
structure to induce prescribed monetary value on actions.” (Smith, 1976)
The induced value theory states that subjects of economic experiments need to be
incentivized through a proper reward medium, e.g. money, in order to observe human
decision-making behavior, which is actually related to the focus of investigation. Accord-
ing to Smith (1976), the reward medium has to meet three requirements: monotonicity,
2For thorough overviews on the methodology of experimental economics, please refer to Davis and
Holt (1993), Kagel (1995), and Guala (2005).
3With respect to deceiving participants in economic experiments, Davis and Holt (1993) criticize:
“Moreover, even if subjects fail to detect deception within a session, it will jeopardize future exper-
iments if the subjects ever find out they were deceived and report this information to their friends.”
4The focus on human decision-making in microeconomic institutions, the non deception of participants,
and the performance depending payment are the main factors that distinguish the methodology of




salience, and dominance. First, monotonicity means that a subject prefers more of the
reward medium over less. Second, there has to be a salient relation between the subject’s
actions and her reward, which is implemented in the reward structure of the microeco-
nomic institution. Third, changes in a subject’s utility have to come predominantly from
gains and losses concerning the reward medium. Usually, the experimenter choses real
money as the reward medium.
Microeconomic Institution. Based on the standardized economic environment, the
experimenter establishes a controlled microeconomic institution. The microeconomic
institution is the actual focus of a specific experiment. It comprises a set of rules, which
describe how subjects can interact with each other and how their individual payoffs are
computed. One such institution, for instance, is an electronic auction. The rules of an
auction describe when and how bidders can place their bids, who obtains the commodity
for sale, how much each bidder has to pay, etc.
Together, the standardized economic environment and the microeconomic institution
define a microeconomic system (Smith, 1982). Over the past decades, the investigation
of such microeconomic systems in economic experiments has turned out to be an in-
sightful source of economic research (Falk and Heckman, 2009). Most important, the
methodology of experimental economics allows to observe “real” human behavior in a
controlled environment.5
“In this sense, behavior in the laboratory is reliable and real: Participants in
the lab are human beings who perceive their behavior as relevant, experience
real emotions, and take decisions with real economic consequences.” (Falk
and Heckman, 2009)
The focus of this chapter is to extend the methodology of experimental economics
in order to gain a deeper insight regarding the emotional aspects of human decision-
making in microeconomic institutions. More specifically, I will discuss physiological
measurements as proxies for emotional processing for their use in economic experiments.
5With respect to realistic human behavior, Plott (1982) notes: “While laboratory processes are simple
in comparison to naturally occurring processes, they are real processes, in the sense that real people
participate for real and substantial profits and follow real rules in doing so. It is precisely because
they are real that they are interesting.”
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3.2. Physioeconomics
This chapter starts from the intuition that decision-making is both a cognitive and
affective process rather than a single, indivisible maximization of utility. This dynamic
process comprises strategic considerations of the agents concerning the maximization
of their expected payoff on the one hand; these aspects are the main focus of game
theory today and are fairly well understood. On the other hand, however, there is an
inevitable influence of affective or emotional factors that also have an impact on the
decision-making process (e.g. Elster, 1998; Loewenstein, 2000). Bechara and Damasio
(2005) even argue that taking advantageous decisions is only possible in consequence of
a prior accurate emotional processing.
Research Question 2: How can economic laboratory experiments be aug-
mented to allow for physiological measurements as proxies for emotional pro-
cessing?
In order to provide another element for the aim of systematically analyzing emotions
in electronic auctions and their impact on human bidding behavior, this chapter focuses
specifically on Research Question 2, i.e. on the question of how physiological correlates
of human emotional processing can be utilized to measure emotions and their impact
in economic decision-making. More specifically, I propose a structured methodology
denoted as physioeconomics.
Definition (Physioeconomics). Physioeconomics extends existing methods
of experimental economics by measuring autonomic nervous system activity
using well-established psychophysiological methodology, in order to gain a
profound understanding of the dynamic process of human economic decision-
making.
While experimental economics provides a highly reliable and sophisticated method-
ology for analyzing economic behavior in the laboratory, research in the field of psy-
chophysiology focuses on the complex interrelationship of physiological states, percep-
tual, cognitive, or emotional processes, and human behavior. This chapter suggests
that the appropriate adaptation of psychophysiological parameters, e.g. skin conduc-
tance and heart rate, to traditional methods of experimental economics can contribute
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to a better understanding of human decision-making. In contrast to the mere use of
questionnaires and interviews, which often have to deal with the problem of subjectivity
and social-desirability bias, the analysis of physiological parameters offers the intriguing
opportunity to complementary examine objective parameters that show robust correla-
tions to emotional processes of human agents. In contrast to the field of neuroeconomics,
physioeconomics focuses on activation of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) only, as
this can be achieved with a comparatively low amount of measurement overhead and,
thus, allows for collecting empirical data for much larger samples. Moreover, this allows
for analyzing emotional processing in strategic interaction of two or more deciders in a
wider range of experimental environments.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.3 takes a closer look
at the methodology of psychophysiology and evaluates physiological parameters for their
adequate use in experimental economics. Section 3.4 provides an overview on experi-
ments in the laboratory and the field which already apply physiological parameters with
a focus on economic decision-making. Section 3.5 discusses methodological implications
for the experimental environment when applying physiological parameters. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.3. Evaluation of Physiological Parameters for
Economic Experiments
3.3.1. Emotions, Feelings, and Somatic States
In order to measure the impact of emotions on human behavior in electronic auctions,
it is crucial to properly define what emotions and feelings actually are, as these terms
are often used interchangeably in the literature. Unfortunately, elaborating a general
definition of the term emotion turns out to be a complex task, which can lead to the
impression that there “seem to be as many definitions as investigators” (Bradley, 2000).
As a matter of fact, an immense body of psychological literature defines, depending on
the particular context, emotions and feelings from various perspectives (cf. Panksepp,
1982; Ortony and Turner, 1990). Reflecting a rather general understanding of emotions
in psychological literature, the term emotion is defined in this thesis as: “a subjectively
experienced state that can be described qualitatively and is accompanied by changes in
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feeling, physiology, and expression” (cf. Section 2.1.1). Thus, a subjectively experienced
feeling is only a part of the broader concept of emotion, which also comprises objectively
observable changes, e.g. in physiology. As described in Chapter 2, emotions can be
further distinguished into immediate emotions, anticipated emotions, and the ongoing
current emotional state.
This chapter concentrates specifically on the physiological aspects of emotions. There-
fore, it follows a more psychophysiological perspective and also takes into account the
definitions of Bechara and Damasio (2005). Psychophysiology is both a psychological,
as well as a physiological discipline and, therefore, an interdisciplinary field of research.
Based on the assumption that human perception, thought, emotion, and action are em-
bodied and embedded phenomena (cf. Cacioppo et al., 2007b), its major focus is to gain
a profound understanding of the dynamic interaction of human behavior, physiological
processes, and perceived feelings.
Bechara and Damasio (2005) define an emotion as “a collection of changes in the body
and brain states triggered by a dedicated brain system [. . . ] relative to a particular ob-
ject or event.” Thereby, the authors focus in particular on the physiological aspects of
emotions, which are also reflected in the general definition of emotion applied in this the-
sis (cf. Section 2.1.1). The specific object or event which can cause an emotion is defined
as an “emotionally competent stimulus.” In the context of electronic auctions, a stimulus
translates into the term auction event.6 Such an auction event are for instance the start
and the end of an auction or the event of being outbidden by another participant. In
contrast to the physiological term emotion, Bechara and Damasio (2005) define a feeling
as a rather psychological construct: “The ensemble of signals as mapped in somatosen-
sory regions of the brain itself provide the essential ingredients for what is ultimately
perceived as a feeling, a phenomenon perceptible to the individual in whom they are en-
acted.” Finally, the emotion caused by the stimulus triggers responses to the body that
are “proper enacted in a body (somatic) state” involving “physiological modifications.”
These modifications comprise for instance changes in heart rate and skin conductivity.
The observed physiological parameters, e.g. skin conductance and heart rate, are either
under control of the sympathetic, the parasympathetic, or both branches of the ANS,
and therefore cannot directly be influenced by free will (cf. Cacioppo et al., 2007b). In
the following, some of these physiological parameters typically used in psychophysiology
6See the framework for emotional bidding in Chapter 2.1.1.
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will be discussed and evaluated for their use in physioeconomic experiments.
3.3.2. Physiological Parameters
A large body of psychophysiological research relies on the interpretation of measures
that reflect the activity of the autonomic nervous system (ANS). This system that
normally acts outside conscious awareness is necessary for adjusting visceral functions
to match environmental demands. It can be roughly partitioned into the sympathetic
and the parasympathetic (vagal) nervous system that typically function in opposition to
each other. The sympathetic nervous system activates the organism for “fight or flight,”
while the parasympathetic nervous system promotes digestion and recreation. Although
both branches of the ANS typically have antagonistic effects on a number of internal
organs, they seem to be regulated rather independently (cf. Berntson et al., 1991). Thus,
the whole system acts in functional synergy and sympathetic as well as parasympathetic
activity can be modulated by adjusting environmental conditions.
Skin Conductance. Skin conductance is one of the most frequently used measures
in psychophysiological research. It reflects sympathetic activity and corresponds to the
electrical conductivity of the human skin, which in turn is driven by sudomotor activity
of eccrine sweat glands. The density of these glands is highest at palmar and plantar
sites and it is therefore recommended to use these areas for measurement (cf. Fowles
et al., 1981). Figure 3.1 depicts common measurement sites for skin conductivity in
psychophysiological literature. Particularly the thenar and hypothenar eminences of the
non-dominant hand are frequently used for measurement.7 The skin conductance signal
can be decomposed into tonic and phasic components with the former reflecting the
general arousal level of the examinee (skin conductance level, SCL), i.e. the ongoing
current emotional state, and the latter representing short bursts of sympathetic activity
(Wallin, 1981), which are usually elicited by an external or internal stimulation (cf.
Boucsein, 1992; Dawson et al., 2007), i.e. immediate or anticipated emotions. These
monophasic skin conductance responses (SCR) typically occur 1 to 3 seconds after a
discrete event, but they can also be observed in absence of an identifiable stimulus
(non-specific SCR). Especially the amplitude of SCRs, commonly denoted as SCR.amp,
7The Society for Psychophysiological Research (SPR) has published internationally well-established
guidelines for electrodermal measurements in Fowles et al. (1981).
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seems to be a valid index of personal significance and arousal (Lang et al., 1993). Thus,
biologically relevant stimuli such as the own name typically elicit larger SCRs than
irrelevant information (Ben-Shakhar et al., 1975).
Figure 3.1.: Skin Conductance Measurement Sites of the Human Hand
(As depicted in Venables and Christie, 1980)
Cardiovascular Activity. The cardiovascular system has also been in the central
focus of psychophysiological research during the last decades.8 It comprises the heart
and the vasculature which distributes the blood to all tissues of the body. The electric
activity of the heart can easily be measured by means of an electrocardiogram (ECG).
For most research questions, it is sufficient to quantify heart rate by measuring the
time between successive R-waves in the ECG (cf. Jennings et al., 1981). This measure
is modulated by both, the sympathetic and parasympathetic branch of the autonomic
nervous system. However, the vagal system exerts a much wider range of control over
cardiac chronotropy and it responds faster to external events (Berntson et al., 2007).
Similar to the electrodermal activity, heart rate can either be averaged across longer
periods of time to reflect tonic arousal, or changes in heart rate following discrete events
can be quantified by measuring slight variations in successive heart periods (Velden
and Wölk, 1987). This latter phasic measure was shown to be correlated with the
valence of external events. Thus, negative events typically elicit a heart rate decrease
8Publication guidelines of the SPR for measurement of cardiovascular activity are published in Jennings
et al. (1981).
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whereas positive events are more likely to be accompanied by heart rate accelerations
(e.g. Bault et al., 2008; Lang et al., 1993). Again, tonic emotional processing refers to
a subjects ongoing current emotional state, while phasic responses relate to immediate
and anticipated emotions.
Pupil Diameter. Another proxy for ANS activity is the absolute change in pupil
diameter in response to a stimulus. Pupil width is regulated by two groups of smooth
muscles: sphincter pupillae and dilator pupillae. These muscles are innervated by the
vagal and the sympathetic nervous system, respectively. Post-stimulus dilatation, how-
ever, was found to be highly correlated with skin conductance responses. Thus, pupil
changes varying with perceived arousal largely reflect sympathetic activation (Bradley
et al., 2008). As pupil width is very sensitive to changes in luminance, it is important
to control for a uniform average luminance of the user interface. Pupil size is typically
recorded with an eye-tracking-system that additionally allows for measuring which part
of information is perceived by the subject at what time. Therefore, such devices can be
very useful in psychophysiological research as they allow for measuring cognitive aspects
of stimulus evaluation (eye movements) in addition to autonomic responses.
Artifact Detection. Other measures that are routinely recorded in psychophysiolog-
ical research are respiratory and musculature activity. With respect to the framework
of physioeconomics, however, these measures are not directly relevant for inferring ANS
activity. These parameters are particularly used in clinical psychophysiology and re-
veal only few information regarding a subjects emotional processing compared to the
other parameters (Cacioppo et al., 2007a). It might be useful, however, to record such
responses in order to identify artifacts in other channels, that are associated with ab-
normal breathing patterns or body movements.
3.3.3. Evaluation for Physioeconomics
The physiological parameters discussed so far particularly allow for identifying two di-
mensions of emotional processing: arousal and valence (cf. Lang et al., 1993). Thus, skin
conductance level and the amplitude of skin conductance responses are sensitive indexes
for the general level of arousal and the degree of arousal associated with a single stimulus,
respectively. Phasic heart rate, on the other hand, allows for evaluating the perceived
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valence of a certain stimulus with negative stimuli typically eliciting decelatory responses
and positive stimuli relative heart rate accelerations. Pupil responses are less suitable
for economic experiments for at least two reasons. First, such a measurement always
has to face the problem of controlling the average degree of luminance. In contrast to
picture analysis (e.g. Bradley et al., 2008), the average luminance of the user interface in
experimental economics changes continuously when new information is being displayed.
A stringent control of display luminance is, thus, difficult. Second, pupil responses are
highly correlated with skin conductance responses and are, therehence, redundant to
some degree.
Therefore, this chapter proposes to particularly focus on skin conductance and heart
rate changes in physioeconomic experiments, as these measures first allow for simultane-
ously assessing arousal and valence of emotional processing. Second, these physiological
changes occur in the very moment of human information processing and decision-making.
Third, it is possible to utilize such physiological responses in economic decision-making
comprising strategic interaction of two or more participants. With a clear experimental
structure and complementary questionnaires, the perceived feelings, e.g. joy or anger,
associated with a single emotion can be further isolated.
3.4. Emotions in Economic Decision-Making
This section provides a literature overview on experiments in the laboratory and the
field which already apply physiological measurements and have a focus on economic
decision-making. It will first concentrate on decision-making comprising no strategic
interaction, and then continue with decision-making in strategic interaction of two or
more individuals.
3.4.1. Decision-Making without Strategic Interaction
One of the most prominent experiments combining economic decision-making with the
measurement of physiological parameters is the Iowa gambling task by Bechara et al.
(1997). In the Iowa gambling task a single decision-maker is given four decks of cards,
from which she continuously has to draw cards without knowing how many cards have
to be drawn until the game ends. Each card results either in a gain or a loss for the
decision-maker. While decks A and B are disadvantageous in the long run and lead to an
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overall loss, the advantageous decks C and D lead to an overall gain. In a clinical study,
Bechara et al. (1997) report that normal participants, i.e. subjects without any diagnosed
brain damage, had higher SCRs prior to selecting from disadvantageous in comparison
to advantageous decks even before the participants had reported a “hunch” which decks
might be better. Even in this “pre-hunch” period, the regular participants decided more
often for the advantageous decks. To the contrary, patients with bilateral damage of the
ventromedial part of the prefrontal cortex did not show higher SCRs when deciding for
disadvantageous decks. Even more striking, the patients who correctly described which
were the good and bad decks still chose disadvantageously. Based on the results of the
Iowa gambling task experiment, Bechara and Damasio (2005) proposed in their somatic
marker hypothesis that advantageous decision-making is only possible in consequence of
a prior accurate emotional processing. Therefore, emotions are beneficial for decision-
making if they are integral to the task, but may be disruptive if they are unrelated
to the task. Crone et al. (2004) analyze differences in emotional processing of healthy
individuals playing the Iowa gambling task by categorizing them ex post in three per-
formance groups: bad, moderate, and good. The authors demonstrate that there are no
differences in emotional processing of participants in response to immediate punishment
(primary inducer). However, Crone et al. (2004) show that bad performers turn out to
have significantly lower SCRs generated by secondary inducers (i.e. thoughts regarding
future losses in the moment of decision-making) than good performers. Again, the au-
thors find that an accurate emotional processing seems to be essential for advantageous
decision-making.
Bault et al. (2008) analyze the influence of social ranking on decision-making. In their
experiment, participants have to continuously choose between two lotteries with different
levels of risk. In the two player setting, participants can observe the choice and result of
one other player, while in the one player setting, participants decide without observing
the behavior of another participant. Skin conductance and heart rate of the participants,
as well as a self-report scale indicating their subjective feeling from extremely negative to
extremely positive were recorded. In comparison to regret (losses) and relief (gains) in
the one player setting, Bault et al. (2008) report overall stronger SCRs when experiencing
envy and gloating, i.e. the feeling associated with a loss when the other wins and vice
versa. To the contrary, the authors report lower SCRs when participants experience
shared-regret and shared-relief. Most interestingly, participants’ behavior seems to be
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affected by emotional experience, as their behavior turns out to be more risk averse in
later trials when playing with a risk loving counterpart and less risk averse when playing
with a highly risk averse counterpart - although, from a game theoretic perspective, there
clearly is no strategic interaction. Bault et al. (2008) conclude that human deciders have
“interdependent utilities.”9 This means that a subject’s utility does not only depend on
her own gains and losses, but also on the utilities of other bidders (e.g. Schall, 1972).
Analyzing the subjective and objective parameters of arousal, Bault et al. (2008) report
a high correlation between self-reported arousal in the questionnaire and physiological
SCRs.
In another laboratory experiment on lottery choice, Sokol-Hessner et al. (2008) analyze
how decision-making behavior and emotional processing change, when subjects are told
to “think like a trader.” The authors observe that subjects tend to behave less loss
averse on average. Even more interesting, SCRs in response to actual losses are on
average smaller under this condition. The authors conclude that the mere cognitive
act of taking the perspective of a professional trader can alter choice and physiological
response related to loss aversion. Sokol-Hessner et al. categorize those subjects who are
capable to perform this mental transfer as “emotion regulators.” The theory of emotion
regulation states that human deciders have some degree of control over their affective
state and consequently amplify or attenuate the emotional impact of a stimulus (e.g.
Gross, 1998; Ochsner et al., 2004).
Although the precise functional role of autonomic responses in information processing
and decision-making is still debated (Bechara et al., 2005; Maia and McCelland, 2004), it
has been repeatedly shown that SCRs systematically vary with the outcome of a choice
even before feedback is given (e.g. Bechara et al., 1997; Biermann et al., 2005). These
results demonstrate that autonomic responses are modulated by economic decisions and
are thus capable to reveal a deeper insight into human information processing in such
situations.
3.4.2. Strategic Interaction of Two Individuals
Another economic experiment applying physiological parameters is based on the power-
to-take game (cf. Bosman and van Winden, 2002). In the power-to-take game two
9Section 2.2.1 discusses interdependent utilities in the context of electronic auctions.
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players, the take authority and the responder, are initially endowed with an equal amount
of money. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much money, denoted as the
take rate, she takes from the responder. In the second stage, the responder can decide to
destroy any percentage of her own money. By doing so, she reduces her own payoff and
the payoff of the take authority. Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) analyze the power-to-take
game while continuously recording the responders’ SCL. Additionally, the authors assess
the perceived arousal of participants by using self-report questionnaires. The authors
report that those responders who had a stronger increase in arousal measured by SCL
destroyed larger amounts of their initial endowment. Furthermore, they find a strong
correlation between self-reported anger in the questionnaire and the physiological arousal
level. Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) also tested for effects of the measurement equipment on
participants’ behavior and found no such influence. Therefore, participants do not seem
to change their economic decision-making when physiological responses are recorded.
In the ultimatum game two players, a proposer and a responder, have to agree on
how to split up a given amount of money (cf. Güth et al., 1982). The proposer suggests
how much money each of the two players receives and the responder can either accept
or reject the offer. If the responder rejects, neither the proposer nor the responder will
receive any money. Otherwise the money will be split in exactly the way the proposer
suggested. Van’t Wout et al. (2006) analyze responders’ SCRs upon receiving offers
and report higher SCRs for unfair offers in comparison to fair offers.10 When playing
against a computer counterpart though, this pattern of emotional response could not be
observed. Further, the rejection rate of unfair offers by humans was significantly higher
than for unfair offers generated by a computer. Additionally, van’t Wout et al. (2006)
show that higher SCR rates are associated with higher rejection rates, which again is not
the case when facing a computer counterpart.11 This correlation between physiological
arousal and economic behavior fits to the above mentioned link between somatic states
and decision-making (Bechara and Damasio, 2005) and indicates that emotions can serve
as a sensitive predictor of economic behavior. In another ultimatum game experiment,
Xiao and Houser (2005) give responders the opportunity of sending a textual message
10The authors define unfair offers as offers in which the amount of money is unequally split between
the proposer and the responder.
11The emotional arousal observed by van’t Wout et al. (2006) is very similar to the activation pattern
of a brain region referred to as anterior insula as reported in a neuroeconomic experiment by Sanfey
et al. (2003).
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to the proposer when deciding on accepting or rejecting her offer. The authors refer to
these messages as “emotion expression.” Responders who are given the opportunity of
emotion expression tend to accept unfair offers far more often than responders who are
not. Thus, emotions do not only play an important role in economic decision-making,
but may also be controlled or regulated by means of emotion expression.
In another study concerning the ultimatum game, Civai et al. (2010) compare subjects’
behavior and emotional processing when either playing for themselves or for a third party.
While the authors observe no change in rejection rates, SCRs in response to unfair offers
are stronger when subjects are playing for themselves. Civai et al. (2010) conclude that
emotions in fact “do play a role in the ultimatum game,” but that “emotions are not
always the key-mechanism underlying the responder’s rejections.” However, the authors
highlight that these results “do not exclude that other emotional responses” may have
come into place here, e.g. altruism or the feeling of being part of a group. Another
explanation are carry over effects, as the study is based on a within-subject design.
3.4.3. Strategic Interaction in Markets
The influence of emotions on decision-making of financial traders is a highly controver-
sial topic. In a controlled field experiment, Lo and Repin (2002) measure physiological
parameters of professional security traders during live trading sessions. A large variety
of physiological parameters is subject of their analysis: skin conductance, finger pulse
amplitudes, heart rate, electromyographical12 signals, respiration, and body tempera-
ture. The authors analyze the impact of market events, e.g. changes in the spread or
the volatility, on the physiological parameters recorded. In their results, Lo and Repin
(2002) report significant physiological responses to various market events. This indi-
cates that the decision-making process of financial traders seems to be accompanied by
emotions. Most interestingly, the authors find that physiological responses to market
events depend on the expertise of the trader, i.e. senior traders show a different pattern
of emotional arousal than junior traders.
Focusing on the design of (electronic) auctions, Smith and Dickhaut (2005) analyze
the impact of different economic institutions on the arousal of market participants. In
particular, they compare for each bidder the average heart rate while participating in a
12Electromyography is a technique to measure the electrical skeletal muscle activity.
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sequence of Dutch and English auctions. The authors conclude that the English auction,
as a collection of all relevant stimuli, induces less emotional arousal than the Dutch
auction. However, the authors do not address which specific features of the Dutch auction
are in fact responsible for the reported increased emotionality. Thus, as the design
of electronic auctions has a significant impact of participants’ emotional processing,
there is a need for further research on the emotional impact of single facets of market
design. Also focusing on the emotional facets of decision-making in auctions, Adam
et al. (2008) analyze skin conductance and heart rate of bidders during common value
Dutch auctions.13 The authors discuss a framework of dynamic decision-making, linking
the classical perspective of Vickrey (1961) to emotional components. In particular, the
authors hypothesize that bidders ex ante cognitively set a price at which they intend
to end the auction, but - as soon as this price is reached - the competitive environment
creates a thrill of suspense, tempting the bidders to wait just a little bit longer in
order to increase their nominal payoff. In their laboratory experiment comprising skin
conductance measurement, Adam et al. (2008) find empirical support for this framework
and report a significantly higher degree of arousal once the standing price has reached a
certain level. Additionally, Smith and Dickhaut (2005) analyzed whether the fact that
participants were attached to cardiovascular recording equipment had an an influence
on their economic decision-making. Consistently with Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007), the
authors did not find such an effect.
3.4.4. Conclusions
The economic experiments discussed in this section show the potential of psychophysio-
logical parameters for experimental economics and, thus, for a structured methodology
here denoted as physioeconomics. Selected literature along with the particular focus
and methodology is listed in Table 3.1. Summarizing results from the literature, the
following conclusions can be drawn:
1. Emotions play a significant role in economic decision-making and physiological
parameters reflecting the activity of the autonomic nervous system are reliable
proxies for assessing arousal and valence in the very moment these emotions occur.
13This is an experiment, which I conducted, but which is not part of this thesis.
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Further, as Bechara and Damasio (2005) argue, a correct emotional processing can
even be essential for taking advantageous decisions.
2. While questionnaires and interviews generally have to deal with the problem of
subjectivity and social desirability bias, the complementary measurement of phys-
iological parameters allows for observing objective proxies of deciders’ emotional
processing, in the very moment decisions are actually taken.
3. Decision-making induces a stronger degree of arousal when human counterparts
are involved (cf. Bault et al., 2008; van’t Wout et al., 2006). Physiological arousal
as well as economic behavior is significantly different when human deciders face
computerized agents. Therefore, when strategic interaction is the main focus of
investigation, the experimental design should comprise human counterparts. The
results of Bault et al. (2008) show that participants’ behavior may even be affected
by the presence of another human agent, when there is, from the a game theoretic
perspective, no strategic interaction involved. One possible explanation for this
observation is that human deciders have “interdependent utilities” (e.g. Schall,
1972).
4. Physiological arousal can in some cases even be predictive for human decision-
making. Higher degrees of arousal often result in different patterns of behavior
(e.g. van’t Wout et al., 2006; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007; Bechara and Damasio,
2005). As Crone et al. (2004) and Lo and Repin (2002) point out, physiological
processing may also vary with the performance of individual deciders. The theory
of emotion regulation suggests that human deciders can amplify or attenuate the
impact of emotions and consequently change their behavior (Gross, 1998). Based
on skin conductance measurements, Sokol-Hessner et al. (2008) show that some
deciders are actually able to perform this mental transfer.
5. Smith and Dickhaut (2005) and Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) have shown that the
presence of recording devices itself does not affect participants’ behavior. There-
fore, physiological parameters can be recorded in economic experiments without
affecting economic parameters.
However, in order to guarantee experimental control for replicable results, it is es-
sential to stress the need for a structured and standardized methodology that is called
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Table 3.1.: Selected Literature on Economic Decision-Making
and Psychophysiological Parameters
(Inter. = strategic interaction, Env. = environment)
(EDA = electrodermal activity, HR = heart rate, Other = other parameters)
Author(s) Published Scenario Inter. Env. EDA HR Other
Bechara et al. (1997) Science Iowa gambling task no lab X
Lo and Repin (2002) Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience
financial market market field X X X
Crone et al. (2004) Psychphysiology Iowa gambling task no lab X
Bechara and Damasio (2005) Games & Economic Behaviour Iowa gambling task no lab X
Smith and Dickhaut (2005) Games & Economic Behaviour auctions market lab X
van’t Wout et al. (2006) Experimental Brain Research ultimatum game two lab X
Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) Journal of Economic
Psychology
power-to-take game two lab X
Adam et al. (2008) ECIS Conference Proceedings Dutch auction market lab X X
Bault et al. (2008) PlosONE lottery game no lab X X
Sokol-Hessner et al. (2008) PNAS lottery game no lab X
Civai et al. (2010) Cognition ultimatum game two lab X
physioeconomics here. The studies presented so far show that the applied methodologies
are not consistent at this early stage. Some experimenters deceive subjects (e.g. Bault
et al., 2008), others do not (e.g. Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007; Lo and Repin, 2002). Some-
times participants are incentivized by a performance-based payment scheme, sometimes
they participate for a fixed flat fee. These methodological differences are in large parts
also attributed to the fact that with psychophysiology and experimental economics, two
different disciplines with differing backgrounds come together when analyzing economic
decision-making by taking into account physiological parameters. Therefore, the next
section will outline implications for extending the methodology of experimental eco-
nomics by the measurement of physiological parameters.
3.5. Methodological Implications
As physioeconomics is an extension of the methodology of experimental economics, a
standardized economic and experimental environment is essential to guarantee control
for replicable results. A standardized economic environment, as described in Section 3.1,
is the basis on which the experimenter establishes a controlled microeconomic institution,
which is the actual focus of a specific experiment. This economic environment comprises
the non-deception of participants as well as a performance depending payment scheme.
The adequate and correct use of psychophysiological parameters in economic exper-
iments imposes a variety of methodological implications for the experimental environ-
ment, in particular for the session structure and the environmental conditions of an ex-
periment. In experimental economics, a session is defined as a “group of trials conducted
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on the same day and the same set of subjects”, with a trial being “an indivisible unit
of observation” (Friedman and Sunder, 1994). A period is defined as a “self-contained
unit of time for observation, e.g., a single auction.” These methodological implications
are now discussed along with a session framework for physioeconomic experiments.
3.5.1. Implications for the Session Structure
The methodological implications for the session structure are summarized in a physioe-
conomic session framework, which is depicted in Figure 3.2. The physioeconomic session
framework comprises four phases: a preparation phase, a decision-making phase, a per-
ception phase, and a rest phase. The following subsections each focus on one phase of
the framework.
































































Figure 3.2.: Session Framework for Physioeconomic Experiments
(A) Preparation Phase
The first phase of a physioeconomic session is used for preparation. This phase comprises
the electrode attachment, the reading of participant instructions, a quiz regarding the
participant instructions, a practice period, and an initial rest period.
Electrode Attachment. The placement and attachment of the measurement elec-
trodes should follow a standardized routine (e.g. Boucsein, 1992; Gramann and Schandry,
2009). Such a standardized routine does not only enhance the signal quality, but also
ensures a similar treatment for all participants. The problem of signal quality is less se-
rious for ECG measurement, as such measurement comprises a comparatively low signal
amplification and the use of single-use electrodes. To the contrary, signal amplification
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is much higher for skin conductance measurement, and such measurement is often con-
ducted with reusable electrodes. To prepare the skin for measurement, Gramann and
Schandry (2009) recommend to wash hands with warm water without soap.14
Instructions and Quiz. Some authors argue that physiological measurements cannot
be conducted right after the measurement electrodes were attached to the participants,
because electrodes are in general not ready for use right away. For instance, it is not
guaranteed that the electrode paste used for SC measurement exactly matches the skin’s
ion concentration (Schmidt and Walach, 2000). Therefore, Boucsein (1992) recommends
to attach the electrodes about 15 to 20 minutes before the beginning of measurement.
Gramann and Schandry (2009) argue that this waiting time is particularly important
if the temperature difference between the laboratory and the external environment is
comparatively large. However, it is important to note that this procedure is by far not
applied in all psychophysiological experiments. In order to efficiently utilize time while
conducting the actual experiment, it seems sensible to use the recommended waiting
time of 15 to 20 minutes to read aloud the participants instructions and let the subjects
participate in a short comprehension quiz regarding the instructions. A comprehension
quiz is common practice in experimental economics and contributes to ensure that the
subjects understand the rules of the respective microeconomic institution. Furthermore,
this waiting time can be used for a practice period.
Practice Period. In general, autonomic measures are very sensitive to novelty and
bodily movements (Dawson et al., 2007). In order to reduce the impact of novelty,
it is very important to introduce the decision-making situation to participants before
actually measuring physiological parameters. This can either be achieved by introducing
a practice period in the beginning, in which gains and losses are not considered, or by
removing the first few decision periods from the data set.15 As an additional benefit,
introducing a practice decision period also contributes to an increased comprehension
14The soap can cause maceration of the skin, which in turn leads to a decrease of overall skin con-
ductivity (cf. Boucsein, 1992). This can drastically distort skin conductance values if some subjects
wash their hands with soap and others do not.
15Whether a practice round should be introduced or rather the first few rounds be cut off largely
depends on the focus of the individual experimental design. In particular, wealth effects, strategical
inferences, and learning effects can play an important role (e.g. Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Neilson,
1998; Guala, 2005).
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regarding the rules of the experiment.
Initial Rest Period. Control and replicability are the essence of experimental eco-
nomics. Therefore, as physiological parameters tend to have a high degree of inter-
subject variability, it is important to introduce an initial rest period prior to the actual
economic decision-making in physioeconomic experiments and thus control for an indi-
vidual basic level of physiological arousal. For at least two reasons, it seems sensible
to explicitly inform participants that this rest period is necessary for calibrating the
physiological measurement for each participant. First, it is an important paradigm of
experimental economics to provide subjects a trusted environment that is enriched with
information. Second, subjects can then conclusively be asked to use this rest period to
relax. This is particularly important, because cognitive tasks can have substantial effects
on the physiological parameters and can, therefore, distort the baseline assessment.
Usually, an initial rest period of 5 minutes is used in psychophysiological literature
(cf. Vossel and Zimmer, 1990; Schmidt and Walach, 2000). Therefore, it seems sensible
to comply with this 5 minute initial rest period in physioeconomic experiments. The
individually assessed basic level of arousal can then be used in order to reference the
level of arousal during economic decision-making, e.g. the tonic SCL and heart rate.16
(B) Decision-Making Phase
After the preparation phase, participants take part in a first period of economic decision-
making. A period of decision-making is followed by either another period of decision-
making, a perception period, or a rest period. Depending on the focus of investigation,
decisions as well as information and results are displayed in timed intervals. Figure 3.2
depicts the decision-making phase in a rather conceptual fashion. In contrast, Section
4.1 discusses one particular instance for the case of ascending auctions. Section 5.3.3
outlines another instance for the case of Dutch auctions.
In order to reduce the impact of bodily movements on the recorded physiological
parameters, user interaction with the experimental software has to be minimized. In
particular, keyboard inputs should be avoided wherever possible and replaced with sim-
ple mouse inputs. If keyboard inputs are not needed at all, it can be considered to
16As proposed by Vossel and Zimmer (1990), the initial rest period can also be used to asses the




completely avoid them during the experiment. Vossel and Zimmer (1998) recommend
to provide participants with a soft pad for their non-dominant hand to further reduce
bodily movements and measurement artifacts. The amount of information displayed to
subjects has be minimized as well. I propose to display results, e.g. prices and payoffs,
and other information, which is subject of investigation, in timed intervals of at least 5
seconds (cf. Sanfey et al., 2003). By doing that, the experimenter allows for identifying
the stimulus responsible for a single physiological response. This would not be possible
if all information was presented simultaneously or in too short intervals of time.
(C) Perception Phase
Physiological measurements allow for identifying a subject’s general level of arousal, as
well as the intensity of single emotional responses and, to a certain extent, the valence of
emotional processing (cf. Section 3.3.2). However, they do not allow to further specify
which feelings a subject ultimately perceives. In order to identify specific feelings, e.g.
joy and anger, the experimenter can control the set of possible feelings by a sophisti-
cated experimental design and successive revelation of information. Furthermore, the
physiological measurements can be enriched with complementary questionnaires. Such
questionnaires can be conducted (1) after each period of decision-making or (2) after
all periods of decision-making have finished. However, it is important to recall that
questionnaires always have to deal with subjectivity and social desirability bias.
Research in psychology provides several standardized questionnaires to (subjectively)
identify specific feelings and their intensity. Prominent examples of such questionnaires
are the the affect grid (Russel et al., 1989) and the self-assessment-manikin (SAM)
(Bradley and Lang, 1994). Furthermore, the experimenter can design own question-
naires, which specifically focus on her individual experiment. For instance, the degree
of perceived competition in an auction can be assessed on a Likert scale. However, it
is important to note that a perception questionnaire in between two periods of eco-
nomic decision-making can also have an impact on the behavior of the subjects and
their emotional processing. For instance, the experiment described in Chapter 5 com-
prises perception questions regarding a bidder’s behavior. Therefore, in this particular
experiment, the questionnaire is conducted after all auctions have finished.
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(D) Rest Phase
If a change of the subject’s (tonic) current emotional state during decision-making is
focus of the investigation, each period of economic decision-making should be followed
by a rest period of at least 1 minute. This rest period is necessary in order to evaluate
the degree of physiological arousal during one single decision-making period, because it
allows for the physiological parameters to return to an individual baseline of arousal.
3.5.2. Implications for the Control of Environmental
Conditions
The measurement of physiological parameters and their interpretation strongly require to
monitor and control environmental conditions, i.e. room temperature, relative humidity,
and background noise. In general, these environmental conditions should be kept as
constant as possible (cf. Dawson et al., 2007).
Temperature and Relative Humidity
Boucsein (1992) recommends to keep temperature in the thermoneutral zone of 25–
26 ◦C (77–78.8 ◦F). Schmidt and Walach (2000) report a use of 23–24 ◦C (73.4–75.2 ◦F)
in psychophysiological experiments, while Vossel and Zimmer (1998) recommend a tem-
perature between 21 and 23 ◦C (69.8–73.4 ◦F). For relative humidity, both Schmidt and
Walach (2000) as well as Vossel and Zimmer (1998) recommend to ensure a level of 45–
55%. Further, even seasonal changes (Venables and Mitchell, 1996) and the time of day
(Hot et al., 1999) can significantly influence SC measurement. Therefore, I propose to
conduct physioeconomic experiments within a period of 2–3 weeks, control for the time
of day throughout the different treatments, keep a temperature of approximately 23 ◦C
(73.4 ◦F) and a relative humidity of approximately 50% throughout all sessions. These
environmental conditions should also be reported along with the experimental results.
Background Noise
Background noise during the experiment should be avoided, as any perceived noise
can potentially cause a physiological response (cf. Berntson et al., 2007; Dawson et al.,
2007). Further, even the sound of mouse-clicks elicited by other participants of the
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experiment can cause a physiological as well as a behavioral response. As a matter of
fact, the author observed a change in behavior during trial Dutch auction experiments
when subjects could hear the mouse-clicks of other participants. In particular, when one
group finished a Dutch auction, the subjects of the other group heard the mouse-clicks
and finished their auction within milliseconds, too. This behavior could not be observed
when subjects were equipped with ear-muffs.
However, this problem does usually not arise in psychophysiological or neuroeconomic
experiments so far, as these studies typically only measure one subject at a time, while
the strategic interaction analyzed in physioeconomic experiments inherently imposes
simultaneous measurement of at least two subjects. Further, if subjects can hear mouse-
clicks of other participants, their decision-making turns from simultaneous to quasi-
simultaneous. This imposes another problem, as Abele and Ehrhart (2005) have shown
that participants behave economically different when deciding simultaneously or only
quasi-simultaneously. Therefore, in order to avoid the problems of measurement arti-
facts and changes in economic decision-making, subjects of physioeconomic experiments
should be equipped with ear-muffs or seated in separated soundproof cabins.
Time Synchronization and Data Protection
Finally, physioeconomic experiments require additional software and data protection
plans. In particular, the experimental software should provide a sophisticated logging
mechanism and all subject and measurement computers should be continuously time
synchronized. For instance, the experimental software environments z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) and meet2trade (Weinhardt et al., 2006) provide this kind of functionality.17 As
physiological data is regarded as sensitive in many countries, all physiological data should
be recorded and processed anonymously. Participants should be sufficiently informed
about the physiological parameters recorded as well as about the fact that their data is
processed anonymously.
17For further information on the z-Tree and meet2trade experimental software environments, please
refer to http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree and http://www.meet2trade.com/, respectively.
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3.6. Discussion
In this chapter, a structured methodology denoted as physioeconomics for analyzing the
dynamic process of decision-making in electronic auctions was proposed. In particular,
methodological implications were outlined for extending the traditional methodology of
experimental economics by measuring autonomic nervous system activity using well-
established psychophysiological methodology. Neuroeconomics analyzes economic deci-
sions without or with limited strategic interaction using brain imaging technology. In
contrast, physioeconomics focuses on activation of the autonomic nervous system (ANS)
only, as this can be achieved with a comparatively low amount of measurement over-
head and thus allows for collecting empirical data for much larger samples. Therefore,
physioeconomics is particularly well suitable for analyzing decision-making in strategic
interaction, e.g. auctions and negotiations. Further, Lo and Repin (2002) show that
physioeconomic experiments also allow for collecting empirical data in controlled field
experiments. Since brain imaging technologies are much more sophisticated in terms of
identifying distinct brain regions involved in decision-making, I understand neuroeco-
nomics and physioeconomics as complements and not as substitutes.
Adequately interpreting skin conductivity and cardiovascular activity allows for assess-
ing emotional valence and arousal in response to a single information event (stimulus).
With respect to the framework for emotional bidding proposed in Chapter 2.1.1, these
physiological parameters provide proxies for a bidder’s (tonic) ongoing current emotional
state, as well as her (phasic) immediate and anticipated emotions. However, it is im-
portant to note that recording physiological measures alone is not sufficient in order to
accurately identify specific perceived feelings. This can only be achieved with a clear
experimental structure (e.g. Bault et al., 2008) and the complementary use of self-report
questionnaires (e.g. Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007).
Most of the literature analyzing economic decision-making using physiological mea-
sures so far does not fully comply with the paradigms of experimental economics. This
seems to be largely attributed to the respective focus of investigation. In psychological
experiments, economic decision-making itself may only play an inferior role. However,
when economic decision-making is the main focus of analysis, for instance in order to
enrich or stress-test economic models, I propose to fully comply with the well-established
methodological paradigms of experimental economics, foremost the induced value theory
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and non-deception of participants (cf. Smith, 1982; Kagel, 1995). I discussed physio-
logical measures along with their methodological implications and proposed a session
framework for accurately applying these measures in economic experiments.
Finally, I strongly believe that physioeconomics as well as neuroeconomics will con-
tribute to improve our understanding of economic decision-making. However, speaking
in the words of Thaler (2000), the traditional homo economicus is not dead, he will only
“become more emotional.” Therefore, from an economic perspective, applying physi-
ological measures as well as brain imaging technologies will always have to primarily
focus on how to eventually contribute to enriching or stress-testing existing economic
models of decision-making. This goal can only be achieved by utilizing well-established
paradigms of experimental economics.
Based on the framework for emotional bidding in auctions and the methodology of
physioeconomics, Chapter 4 will now focus on how the phenomenon of auction fever can
be systematically investigated in electronic ascending auctions. Chapter 5 then focuses
specifically on emotions in Dutch auctions, i.e. descending auctions, and seeks to provide




Measuring Emotions in Electronic
Ascending Auctions
This chapter introduces a physioeconomic framework for systematically analyzing bid-
ders’ emotional processing in ascending auctions. As outlined in Chapter 2, even slight
variations in the auction design may result in large disparities in the bidding behav-
ior, and, subsequently, in auction outcome and seller revenue. Therefore, this chapter
concentrates on the research question of how the role of emotions in human bidding
behavior can be systematically investigated with the methodology of physioeconomics
in electronic ascending auctions (cf. Research Question 3). In particular, based on the
unified framework for emotional bidding introduced in Chapter 2, the phenomenon of
auction fever and its elicitors are focus of the analysis.
Research Question 3: Is the newly developed physioeconomic methodology
suitable to measure emotional processing in electronic auctions?
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 introduces a frame-
work for physioeconomic ascending auction experiments. In order to systematically
investigate single elicitors of auction fever, variations of the framework are discussed
in Section 4.2. Based on the proposed experimental framework, Section 4.3 presents a
proof-of-concept study that analyzes the impact of time pressure on bidders’ arousal and
behavior. Section 4.4 concludes and discusses lessons learned from the proof-of-concept
study.
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4.1. A Basic Ascending Auction Framework for
Physioeconomics
Chapter 2 defines auction fever as an intense current emotional state elicited in the
course of one or more auctions that distorts a bidder’s preselected bidding strategy. In
order to better understand phenomena such as auction fever and systematically analyze
diverse variations in the design of ascending auctions, and their impact on bidders’ emo-
tional processing and bidding behavior, an experimental framework for physioeconomic
auction experiments will now be discussed. This auction framework is an instance of
the decision-making phase of the physioeconomic session framework discussed in Section
3.5.1. While Chapter 3 discusses general methodological implications for physioeconomic
experiments and provides a general session framework, this chapter focuses specifically
on systematically measuring emotions in electronic ascending auctions.
The auction framework is based on an ascending auction which is frequently referred
to as the Japanese auction (e.g. Klemperer, 1999; Lavi and Nisan, 2005). In a Japanese
auction, the auctioneer starts the auction at a reservation price (which is usually set
to zero), and then gradually raises the standing price pst (Klemperer, 1999).1 At each
increment of pst, each bidder has to decide whether she intends to leave the auction or
not. Once a bidder decides to drop out of the auction process, she cannot rejoin again
later. In the single-unit case, which is the main focus of this thesis, the auction ends
when only one bidder remains in the auction. This bidder acquires the commodity for
the standing price at which the last but one bidder left the auction.
In the proposed auction framework, which is depicted in Figure 4.1, the Japanese
auction is extended by dividing the auction process into a sequence of consecutive price
stages and introducing a fixed price increment δ for each price stage. Further, every price
stage is followed by an optional information stage in which the information set2 of each
bidder can be updated. For instance, this information stage can be used to proclaim the
current high bidder, or the number of participants who did not drop out of the bidding
1As pointed out by the sociologist Charles W. Smith, the term Japanese auction is sometimes am-
biguously also used to describe an ascending auctions in which bids are submitted publicly and
simultaneously, allowing other bidders to rapidly adjust their bids in response (Smith, 1990).
2The term information set is frequently used in game theory. The information set of a player comprises
all relevant information she has regarding the state of the game she is playing. Rasmusen (2007)
define an information set as “as the set of different nodes in the game tree that he knows might be
the actual node, but between which he cannot distinguish by direct observation.”
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Figure 4.1.: Auction Framework for Physioeconomic Experiments
process yet. Additionally, and in contrast to the Japanese auction, each bidder has to
explicitly decide in every single stage to stay in the auction or to drop out. As depicted
in Figure 4.1, the auction framework is an instance of the decision-making phase of the
physioeconomic session framework discussed in Section 3.5.1. In the auction summary
stage, bidders are consecutively informed about the auction outcome.3
Dividing the auction process into a sequence of consecutive price and information
stages allows for individually analyzing changes in physiological measures in response
to single auction events, because the experimenter is able to control the number of
simultaneous stimuli perceived by the bidders. With these timed information events,
single facets of bidders’ emotional processing can be analyzed separately. This applies
in particular for immediate emotions triggered by auction events. This kind of bidding
behavior analysis cannot be conducted for proxy-auction platforms such as eBay.com.
In a proxy-auction, almost all bidding activity is observed in the very last minute of
an auction (e.g. Roth, 2002; Ariely et al., 2005). Therefore, physiological responses to
single auction events, e.g. being outbidden, cannot be analyzed, as time intervals between
these events are too short. Further, as bidders only have to decide whether to stay in the
3Recall that the auction outcome can trigger immediate emotions as “joy of winning,” “winner regret,”
and “loser regret.”
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auction or drop out in the proposed auction framework, measurement artifacts caused
by bodily movements due to keyboard inputs are largely avoided.
Finally, the impact of changes in the auction mechanism on immediate emotions can
be analyzed, which are triggered by the auction outcome. In this vein, the intensity of a
bidder’s “joy of winning” or “loser regret” can be measured depending on auction design
parameters. For instance, the “joy of winning” may be stronger for an auction which
was perceived more competitive by the bidders. The presented basic auction framework
allows for a series of auction design parameters, which will be discussed in the context
of auction fever in the following section.
4.2. Auction Framework Variations
The main focus of this chapter is to provide a framework that allows for systematically
analyzing and measuring the phenomenon of auction fever in electronic ascending auc-
tions. As outlined in Section 2.2, the literature identifies three major factors that can
trigger an intense current emotional state: perceived competition, previous investment,
and perceived ownership. The following subsections will outline how these three factors
can be manipulated in the ascending auction framework for physioeconomics.
4.2.1. Perceived Competition
First, the impact of time pressure on bidders’ physiological arousal and bidding behavior
can be analyzed by introducing one of the following decision time rules:
1. Time Pressure In (TPI): Bidders only have a limited decision time τ for their
decision in each stage. If a bidder does not decide within that decision time, this
will be interpreted as if she declared to accept the current standing price and stay
in the auction.
2. Time Pressure Out (TPO): Again, bidders only have a limited decision time τ
for their decision in each stage. Moreover, if a bidder does not decide within that
decision time, this will be interpreted as if she declared to not accept the current
standing price and drop out of the auction.
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3. No Time Pressure (NTP): In this setting, there are no time restrictions im-
posed on the bidders to take their decision. Therefore, bidders actively have to
decide to stay in the auction or to drop out.
Ku et al. (2005) and Malhotra et al. (2008) identify time pressure, along with rivalry
and social facilitation, as one of the main driving forces for perceived competition and,
thus, as an elicitor for auction fever. Time pressure, so Malhotra et al. (2008), “can
overwhelm people with the desire to win.” While the intensity of time pressure can be
varied by adjusting the decision time τ , the two different ways of interpreting the case of
a bidder not deciding within τ allow for analyzing how often bidders accept the default,
or conversely, actively decide for themselves.
While time pressure can be investigated with the decision time rule, the influence of
rivalry and social facilitation can be analyzed by varying the size of bidders’ individual
information sets.4 While in the basic auction framework the information set of a bidder
is limited to the information that the auction is still ongoing and whether, depending
on the high bidder rule, she is currently the high bidder or not, the information set can
be extended by the following elements:
1. Number of Bidders (NoB): The number of bidders who participate in the
auction.
2. Bidder Count (BC): The number of bidders who accepted the current standing
price in this stage.
3. Bidder Identity (BI): The identity of bidders who accepted the current standing
price in this stage. The bidder identity may for instance be announced by the use
of pseudonyms.
4. High Bidder Identity (HBI): The identity of the high bidder in this stage.
This element depends on the employed high bidder rule.
It is important to note here, however, that information on the number of bidders does
not only affect the degree of perceived competition. For instance, Milgrom (2004, pp.
4Murnighan (2002) describes how intense the influence of rivalry and social facilitation can turn out
to be in auctions conducted in small groups, in which bidders are very well known to each other.
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195-200) analytically shows that, when bidders’ valuations for the product are affili-
ated, the seller revenue is higher when bidders receive information about other bidders
dropping out of the bidding processes.5
Further, with respect to social facilitation, the impact of audience effects can be inves-
tigated by gradually increasing the spotlight.6 This can be accomplished, for instance,
by letting an audience observe bidders’ behavior through their anonymous screen names
or even through video cameras.
4.2.2. Previous Investments
As outlined in Section 2.2.2, another elicitor for auction fever are accumulated previ-
ous investments and a phenomenon called escalation of commitment (cf. Ariely and
Simonson, 2003). These terms describe the observation that a human decision-maker
usually places too much emphasis on recouping previous investments for which she feels
personally responsible. Following economic theory, a decision-maker should actually ig-
nore sunk costs associated with previous investments and only consider future costs and
benefits.
In the context of electronic auctions, bidders are lured into participation by low entry
costs and a small degree of commitment: entering an auction does not necessarily result
in obtaining the good, but opens the possibility of receiving the commodity for a low
price. In order to increase the commitment associated with each bid and, thus, intensify
the escalation situation, four different fee models are introduced as variations of the
auction framework:
1. Participation Fee (PF): In every stage, each bidder has to pay a participation fee
ϕ to stay in the auction.7 If a bidder declares to leave the auction, the participation
fees paid so far are lost. The auction ends if either only one bidder declares to
stay in the auction, or all bidders declare to leave the auction. In the latter case,
the winner is determined depending on the winner determination rule (see below).
The classic Japanese auction is a special case of the participation fee auction with
ϕ being set to zero.
5I would like to thank Stefan Seifert for this insightful comment.
6As outlined in Section 2.2.1, social facilitation can be distinguished into two major paradigms: audi-
ence effects and co-action effects (cf. Zajonc, 1965).
7For instance, the transactions and waiting costs incurred by auction participation can be interpreted
as indirect participation fees.
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2. Bidding Fee8 (BF): In every stage, depending on the winner determination rule
(see below), one of the bidders who accept the current standing price is chosen
as high bidder and has to pay a bidding fee β. The bidder is then the current
high bidder and wins the auction if no bidder accepts the price in the next stage.
In contrast to the traditional Japanese auction and the participation fee auction,
bidders may rejoin the auction process at any stage and the auction only ends if
no bidder accepts the current standing price in a single stage.
3. Entry Fee (EF): In order to take part in an auction in the first place, a bidder has
to pay an entry fee η prior to the first stage of bidding (cf. McAfee and McMillan,
1987b). If she refuses to pay the entry fee, she cannot participate in the auction.
4. No Fee (NF): Bidders do not have to pay a fee in the auction.
At this stage, there has been only little research regarding participation fees and
bidding fess, and the experimental results on entry fees are mixed (cf. Section 2.2). Based
on the physioeconomic ascending auction framework, future research should, therefore,
take additional (emotional) aspects into account.
4.2.3. Perceived Ownership
In the literature, a phenomenon called the pseudo-endowment or attachment effect is
often identified as another elicitor for auction fever (e.g. Heyman et al., 2004; Gimpel,
2007). These terms are usually used interchangeably9 to describe the effect that some-
times a bidder, who is the current high bidder in an auction, feels like already owning
the commodity and, therefore, does not want to lose it again. In order to analyze the
bidding behavior associated with the pseudo-endowment effect, Ehrhart et al. (2008)
propose three different high bidder rules, which are also applicable to the proposed
physioeconomic auction framework:
1. High Bidder First (HBF): After each stage, the first bidder that declared to
accept the current standing price is chosen as the current high bidder. If no bidder
accepts the standing price in the next stage, this bidder wins the auction.
8The mechanism described here is very similar to the mechanism employed by the Internet auction
platform swoopo.com.
9Ehrhart et al. (2008) points out that the pseudo-endowment effect and the attachment effect are
caused by two different psychological phenomena which both result in a reference point change.
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2. High Bidder Random (HBR): After each stage, one of the bidders accepting
the current standing price is randomly declared as the current high bidder. If no
bidder accepts the standing price in the next stage, this bidder wins the auction.
3. No High Bidder (NHB): During the whole auction, no bidder is chosen as the
current high bidder. After all bidders decided to leave the auction, the winner will
be randomly chosen from the bidders who accepted the standing price in the last
stage.
In a laboratory experiment, Ehrhart et al. (2008) show that bidders place higher bids
in the HBR in comparison to the NHB setting. Moreover, the effect that bidders place
higher bids when the auctioneer declares a high bidder is even stronger in the HBF
setting. The authors explain this observation through an “source-dependence effect”
(Loewenstein and Issacharoff, 1994). In particular, bidders may value the status of being
high bidder more, when they performed well in the task of clicking first in comparison
to being randomly chosen as high bidder.
Further, the literature frequently argues that perceived ownership in auctions is
stronger when the period of time a bidder has been high bidder is comparatively large
(cf. Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Heyman et al., 2004). This high bidder duration may be
manipulated by a changing the increment δ or the scaling of the experimental currency
unit. Further, the duration of the decision and information stages may be manipulated.10
4.2.4. Discussion
The proposed auction framework, along with its variations, allows for systematically
analyzing single facets of auction design and the emotional processing induced. In par-
ticular, various elicitors for the phenomenon of auction fever discussed in the literature
can be analyzed individually and in combination. So far, the existing literature on auc-
tion fever (1) usually only focuses on manipulating one elicitor of auction fever, without
accounting for interaction effects between the elicitors, and (2) often attributes auction
fever to an increased degree of physiological arousal, without actually assessing it.
Based on the framework for emotional bidding introduced Chapter 2, the physioe-
conomic auction framework proposed in the present chapter allows for analyzing single
10It is important to note, however, that changing the duration of the decision stage also changes the
degree of time pressure.
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elicitors of auction fever, isolated as well as in combination. Therefore, interaction ef-
fects between these elicitors can be investigated. Further, the auction framework is
characterized by timed information events and is, therefore, suitable for the analysis
of physiological parameters. In particular, physiological responses can be directly ref-
erenced to single auction events, which is not possible when the time between single
events is too short. The next section presents a proof-of-concept study for the proposed
physioeconomic ascending auction framework.
4.3. A Proof-of-Concept Study
This section presents a proof-of-concept study for the proposed physioeconomic ascend-
ing auction framework. The main aim is to show (1) that the framework allows for
measuring physiological differences regarding the auction design, and (2) that the auc-
tion design parameters of the framework can induce a change in bidding behavior.
4.3.1. Design of the Study
The proof-of-concept study focuses on the the impact of time pressure on bidders’ be-
havior and levels of arousal in an ascending single-unit auction. In each session, four
subjects participate as bidders in a sequence of auctions with either a high or low degree
of time pressure. Based on the TPO (time pressure out) decision time rule of the auction
framework, the degree of time pressure is controlled by setting the decision time τ either
to 5 seconds (high) or 15 seconds (low). Therefore, bidders have to actively decide for
accepting the price. The proof-of-concept study is based on a between-subject design.
Thus, all participants of one session take part in either a sequence of high or low time
pressure auctions, respectively. The price increment δ is set to 10 monetary units (MU),
which is equivalent to €0.20 in cash. In order to adjust session times to a comparable
level, the high and low time pressure treatments comprise a sequence of six and four
auctions, respectively. The HBR (high bidder random) rule is chosen in combination
with minimal bidder information sets, in order to avoid the source-dependence effect
and to reduce the degree of perceived competition.
As a slight modification of the classic Japanese auction, bidders are allowed to rejoin
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the auction.11 Therefore, bidders are given the opportunity of changing their previous
course of action and taking part in the bidding process again. The resale value of
the auctioned off commodity in a single auction is the same for all bidders (common
value). However, the resale value is ex ante unknown to the bidders, and determined
from a uniform distribution with support on the discrete interval interval [170 MU, 270
MU] after the auction ends. Participants receive an initial lump sum of €15 plus their
accumulated gains and losses in the auctions. The participant instructions are provided
in Appendix A.1.
During the whole proof-of-concept study, participants’ skin conductance values are
recorded with a constant-current amplifier measurement system and Ag/AgCl (sil-
ver/silver chloride) electrodes.12 The electrodes are attached on the thenar and hy-
pothenar eminences of the palm of the non-dominant hand by use of standard EDA
electrode paste (cf. Boucsein, 1992). As recommended before in Section 3.5.1, subjects
participate in a practice period, have to successfully complete a comprehension quiz,
and are equipped with ear-muffs. The auction system of the proof-of-concept study is
implemented using the z-Tree experimental software environment (Fischbacher, 2007).13
The experimental environment, comprising the experimental laboratory and the exper-
imental software, is documented in Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2, respectively.
All sessions were conducted at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) in Karls-
ruhe, Germany, within a period of two weeks. Subjects were randomly recruited from a
pool of undergraduate students with an academic background in economics. Altogether,
9 female and 23 male students (32 in total, mean age = 22.13 years) participated in 8
sessions. All sessions were conducted within the period of three weeks with an average
room temperature and relative humidity of 21.45 ◦C (70.61 ◦F) and 49.90%, respectively.
4.3.2. Results
The proof-of-concept study aims at inducing differences in physiological processing and
bidding behavior due to different degrees of time pressure. The results of the experiment
11This is equivalent to the BF (bidding fee) fee model with the bidding fee β being set to zero. Thus,
the auction does not end until in one single stage all bidders do not accept the current standing
price.
12For further information on the measurement system see Gharbi et al. (2008) and Appendix B.1.3.
13The website http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree provides further information on the z-Tree experimental
software environment.
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are presented in the following.
Final Prices Number of Bids 
Average 227.50 MU 213.75 MU 19.64 14.00 
3rd Quartile 230.00 MU 220.00 MU 22.00 19.25 
2nd Quartile 230.00 MU 210.00 MU 20.00 16.00 
1st Quartile 220.00 MU 210.00 MU 18.00 12.00 
high low high low 
Table 4.1.: Auction Final Prices and Number of Bids
Bidding Behavior. The analysis starts with the differences in bidding behavior in-
duced by the auction design. The final prices of the auctions and the number of bids
placed by a single bidder are presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2, respectively. The
final prices in the high time pressure auctions are significantly higher than in the low
time pressure auctions (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < .001). In Table 4.1, one can ob-
serve that all quartiles of the low treatment are consistently below the quartiles of the
high treatment. Moreover, while in low time pressure auctions, average final prices are
slightly below the expected resale value of 220 MU, prices in high time pressure auc-
tions are slightly above this value. Thus, because the common resale value is ex ante
unknown to the bidders, it can be interpreted that participants’ bidding behavior turns
from slightly risk averse to slightly risk loving when time pressure increases.
The average number of bids in high time pressure auctions are significantly higher
than in low time pressure auctions (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < .001). It is important
to point out that the number of bids is not equivalent to the final auction price, because
bidders can rejoin the auction process at any stage. The accumulated distribution of the
number of bids, as depicted in Figure 4.3, shows that only in 5% of the cases a bidder
submitted 15 bids or less in high time pressure auctions, while in low time pressure
auctions this value is almost 50%. Thus, the influence of time pressure on bidding
behavior is even more salient when observing the individual bidding behavior of every
single bidder.
Physiological Processing. After pointing out the differences in bidding behavior in-
duced by the auction design, the analysis now focuses on the changes in physiological
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Figure 4.2.: Auction Final Prices and Number of Bids
processing. For the analysis, skin conductivity is decomposed into its tonic and phasic
components with the Ledalab analysis software (Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010).14 The
(tonic) skin conductance level (SCL) reflects the general arousal level of the examinee,
whereas a (phasic) skin conductance response (SCR) represents a short burst of emo-
tional processing in response to a single stimulus (cf. Section 3.3.2). The amplitude
of this response (SCR.amp), is a measure for the intensity of the emotional processing.
∆SCL and (transformed) SCR.amp values of the proof-of-concept study are depicted in
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5.15
For each subject, the SCL values for all price stages are averaged for every single
auction. These values are then referenced to an individual basic level of skin conductivity
(∆ to base period). This basic level is assessed in the initial 5 minute rest period before
the sequence of auction starts. As an SCR usually occurs 1 to 3 seconds after the
stimulus (e.g. Boucsein, 1992; Schmidt and Walach, 2000), only amplitudes are taken
into account, which are observed in that specific time frame. Furthermore, amplitudes
have to comply with a predefined amplitude criterion, i.e. amplitudes have to be greater
or equal to 0.01µS (cf. Fowles et al., 1981). All amplitudes smaller than 0.01µS are
transformed to a value of 0µS in the analyses. Following the recommendation of Venables
14The website http://www.ledalab.de provides further information on the Ledalab skin conductance
analysis software.
15Technical problems in the proof-of-concept study made it impossible to collect skin conductivity data
for all subjects. Altogether the data of 26 subjects could be analyzed.
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Figure 4.3.: Accumulated Percentages of the Number of Bids
and Christie (1980), all SCR.amp values are then transformed log(x + 1) in order to
reduce the inherent left skewness of skin conductivity. SCL and SCR.amp values are
aggregated on the level of a single auction for each subject.
The skin conductance data shows a difference in physiological processing for low and
high time pressure auctions, respectively. First, bidders’ general level of arousal is an-
alyzed. The ∆SCL values are significantly higher for low in comparison to high time
pressure auctions (−0.08 vs. 0.40, two-tailed t-test, p < .02). Therefore, bidders’ general
level of arousal is higher in low time pressure auctions. Interestingly, this observation
is counterintuitive to the understanding of time pressure and bidding behavior in the
literature (cf. Section 2.2.1). Second, bidders’ SCR.amp values are analyzed in response
to deciding whether to accept the current standing price or not. The results show that
SCR.amp values are significantly higher for low time pressure auctions (0.06 vs. 0.08,
two-tailed t-test, p < .05). Third, bidders’ SCR.amp values in response to winning or
losing an auction are investigated. A 2 (time pressure) x 2 (outcome) ANOVA shows
again that bidders’ SCR.amp values are on average higher for low time pressure auctions.
Further, SCR.amp are significantly higher when winning an auction in comparison to
losing an auction. Significant interactions were not observed (time pressure: F = 4.82,
p < .03; outcome: F = 8.88, p < .01; interaction: F = 0.82, p = .37).
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Figure 4.4.: Skin Conductance Level (SCL)
4.3.3. Discussion
The main aim of the proof-of-concept study is to show (1) that the introduced phys-
ioeconomic ascending auction framework allows for measuring physiological differences
regarding the auction design, and (2) that the auction design parameters of the frame-
work can induce a change in bidding behavior.16 In particular, the degree of time pressure
is manipulated here by changing the time a bidder has to accept the current standing
price. The results of the study show that manipulating the degree of time pressure can
induce a change in bidding behavior. More specifically, the low time pressure auctions
yield on average final prices below the expected value of 220 MU, whereas the high time
pressure auction yield on average final prices above 220 MU.
The analysis of the physiological results shows that the intensity of immediate emo-
tion processing is stronger in the low time pressure auctions. In other words, bidders
experience stronger physiological responses when winning and losing an auction in the
low time pressure auctions. Similarly, also the bidders’ general level of arousal, as mea-
sured by the skin conductance level (SCL), is higher in low time pressure auctions. This
observation seems somewhat counterintuitive, because the literature on auction fever
16Kagel (1995) provide a thorough review of auction experiments. In this proof-of-concept study, it is
important to show that the proposed physioeconomic auction framework also allows for observing
changes in bidding behavior. Furthermore, there are only few laboratory experiments on time
pressure in auctions at this stage (cf. Section 2.2.1).
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Figure 4.5.: Skin Conductance Response Amplitudes (SCR.amp)
generally conjectures higher degrees of arousal in high time pressure auctions (see Sec-
tion 2.2.1). One may explain this observation, however, with the individual number of
bids in this specific auction. As depicted in Figure 4.3, the variance of the number of
bids is much larger in the low time pressure treatment. Generally, a higher degree of
emotional processing can also cause subjects to reconsider their actions (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005). The particular auction conducted in this proof-of-concept study allows
bidders to rejoin the auction at a later stage. Therefore, a low time pressure may cause
bidders to more thoroughly reconsider their actions, which is reflected both in emotional
processing and bidding behavior.
Furthermore, and irrespective of the time pressure, bidders’ immediate emotions are
stronger when winning in comparison to losing an ascending auction. This again is
contradictory to existing auction fever literature, which often conjectures that the “loser
regret” is stronger than the respective “joy of winning” (see Section 2.3). Therefore, also
the intensity of immediate emotions in response to the auction outcome seems to depend
on various factors, which need to be systematically analyzed in future research. In this
particular setting, however, bidder’s joy of winning is stronger than the respective loser
regret. The results of the proof-of-concept study indicate that future research has to put
more focus on the interactions between auction design parameters, emotional processing,
and bidding behavior. Taking physiological proxies of emotional processing into account,
the introduced physioeconomic ascending auction framework can be used to investigate
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these interactions in the context of ascending auctions. Furthermore, the framework
allows for analyzing single elicitors of auction fever isolated and in combination.
4.4. Lessons Learned
The presented proof-of-concept study shows that changes in auction design parameters
of the discussed framework can also result in significant changes in bidders’ physiological
processing. However, the proof-of-concept study also provides methodological experience
for future physioeconomic auction experiments. In particular, the following insights can
be drawn for conducting auction experiments with physiological measurements:
1. The behavioral data reveals different bidding behavior for low and high time pres-
sure auctions, respectively. It remains unclear, however, what the impact of time
pressure on bidding behavior is exactly. Do bidders place higher bids in high time
pressure auctions, or do bidders place lower bids in low time pressure auctions? In
other words, there is no behavioral benchmark for changes in bidding behavior. It,
therefore, seems worthwhile to introduce a self-report questionnaire that asks bid-
ders (1) whether they set themselves a bidding limit and (2) whether they tend to
over- or underbid this limit during the auctions. It should be considered, however,
to conduct questions regarding the subjects’ behavior after all auctions ended, as
such questions may have an distorting influence in between auctions.
2. The physiological data reveals different levels of bidders’ physiological arousal.
However, it remains unclear how this arousal is perceived by bidders. Again, this
subjective impression can be assessed with a self-report perception questionnaire.
Do bidders feel more excited in these auctions? Do they experience higher degrees
of perceived competition? Based on the results of the proof-of-concept, this issue
is already reflected in a perception phase in the physioeconomic session framework
(cf. Section 3.5.1).
3. The design of the proof-of-concept study only allows for 4 observations per subject
in the low time pressure treatments, and 6 observations in the high time pressure
treatments, respectively. This, however, is a rather small number of observations
compared to traditional psychophysiological experiments (Dawson et al., 2007).
Due to the large inter- and inner-subject variability, the experimenter needs to
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obtain more observations for physiological data than for mere behavioral data.
Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the time per auction and, thereby, increase the
number of auctions and observations. This can be achieved by focusing on specific
events in a single study and avoid unnecessary waiting times. Particularly in the
low time pressure treatments, auctions lasted up to 20 minutes due to additional
waiting times.
This section focused in particular on systematically investigating the phenomenon of
auction fever in ascending auctions with the newly developed physioeconomic method-
ology. In contrast, the following section aims at providing physiological evidence for a
“utility of suspense” (Cox et al., 1982, 1983) in descending auctions. The insights of
the proof-of-concept study are reflected in the experimental design and the self-report
questionnaire of the “utility of suspense” experiment. The self-report questionnaire is




An Experiment on the Utility of
Suspense in Dutch Auctions
In contrast to the last chapter, which focused specifically on measuring auction fever in
electronic ascending auctions, the present chapter addresses Research Question 4 and
concentrates on descending auctions. In particular, it seeks to provide physiological
evidence for a “utility of suspense” (Cox et al., 1982, 1983) in Dutch auctions based on
a physioeconomic laboratory experiment.
Research Question 4: Can the methodology of physioeconomics provide
physiological evidence for a utility of suspense in Dutch auctions?
More specifically, the main interest of this experiment is (1) to provide the missing
link between the utility of suspense hypothesis and actual physiological values of Dutch
auction participants, and (2) to further characterize the elicited emotional state bidders
experience and investigate how this emotional state is reflected in bidding behavior.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the
Dutch auction and gives a short overview of its use in the field. Section 5.2 discusses
related literature on the utility of suspense and clock speeds in Dutch auctions. Section
5.3 presents the experimental design of the physioeconomic laboratory experiment. The
hypotheses and results of the experiment are discussed in Section 5.4. Moreover, Section
5.5 identifies characteristic patterns of emotional processing, which occur in the dynamic
process of Dutch auctions. Section 5.6 concludes.
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5.1. The Dutch Auction
In a Dutch auction, sometimes also referred to as “reverse clock auction” (Katok and
Kwasnica, 2008), the auctioneer starts the auction by setting an initial high price pmax
and then continuously decreases the standing price pst by a decrement δ after each time
interval τ , until one of the bidders claims the good by accepting the current standing
price.1
5.1.1. Dutch Auctions in the Field
Dutch auctions have a long standing history in practice and in academic literature. The
Dutch auction originally obtained its name from the flower market in Amsterdam, which
has used this particular auction mechanism since the end of the nineteenth century (van
Heck and Ribbers, 1997).2 At the end of 2008, FloraHolland, the operator of the Dutch
flower market, reported an annual turnover of €4 billion, 11 billion units of cut flowers
sold, and a worldwide market share of almost 60% (FloraHolland, 2009; Huges, 2009).
Over the decades, further flower markets based on the Dutch auction mechanism have
emerged in many other countries.3 Similarly, Dutch auctions are also used for other
perishable goods, for instance on the fish markets in Sydney, Auckland, and Taipei.
Another prominent example of the Dutch auction is the oldest discount retailer in the
US: Filene’s Basement (Bell and Starr, 1993). If a product is not sold within 14 selling
days at Filene’s Basement, its price is reduced by 25%, after 21 selling days by 50%, and
after 28 selling days by 75%.4
The Dutch auction is also used in Internet consumer auctions. For instance, the
platform 1-2-3.tv conducts multi-unit uniform price Dutch auctions, which are simulta-
1As outlined by Katok and Roth (2004), the term Dutch auction is ambiguously also used for a
multi-unit auction mechanism on eBay, in which bids are specified by price and quantity.
2In his well-known historical sketch of auctions, Cassady (1967) reports that a similar auction mech-
anism was already used occasionally in England in the seventeenth-century called “mineing.” The
mechanism got its name because the auctioneer reduced the price until one of the bidders shouted
“Mine!”
3The emergence of flower markets based on the Dutch auctions can be observed, for instance, in
Belgium (Euroveiling Flower Trade Center), Brazil (Veiling Holambra), Canada (flowerbuyer.com),
France (Société Anonyme d´Intérêt Collectif Agricole (SICA) Flower Market), Germany (Landgard),
Japan (Ota Floriculture Auction Co. Ltd.), and Taiwan (Taipei Flower Auction Co. Ltd.).
4After having been more than a century in business, Filene’s Basement had to file bankruptcy in the
course of the global economic crisis in 2009 and announced closing 17 of its 25 stores (The New York
Times, 2009).
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neously broadcasted on German television.5 Further, in recent years consumer auction
sites like luupo.de have emerged, on which the current standing price is unknown to the
bidders. Each bidder can individually reveal the current standing price by paying a fee.
For a short moment, she then has the exclusive right of buying the commodity for this
price.
5.1.2. Dutch Auction Theory
From a theoretical perspective, Dutch auctions have first been analyzed in the seminal
work of Vickrey (1961). Considering the single-unit case, which is also the focus of the
present experiment, Vickrey analytically shows that Dutch auctions are “isomorphic” to
first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions. In this context, the term isomorphic means that
these two auction mechanisms are strategically equivalent from a bidder’s perspective
and, thus, that the equilibrium bidding functions for the two auctions are identical.
Therefore, these auctions should also yield the same revenue to the auctioneer.6
In a FPSB auction, each bidder submits a single sealed-bid. The auctioneer then
determines the highest of all bids. The bidder who placed the highest bid obtains the
commodity and has to pay the amount of her bid. The intuition behind the isomorphism
of Dutch and FPSB auctions lies in the reasoning that in a Dutch auction a bidder only
has to “determine [ex ante] at what point [s]he should be prepared to make a bid so as to
obtain the greatest expectation of gain” (Vickrey, 1961). Therefore, the optimal bidding
strategy in a Dutch auction is fully specified by the point in time, or equivalently, by
the current standing price, at which one seeks to stop the clock. It is important to
note that, from a theoretical perspective, this isomorphism generally holds “regardless
of which of the assumptions about risk attitudes and value correlations apply” (McAfee
and McMillan, 1987a).
For the specific case of independent private values, Vickrey derives a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for FPSB auctions and, thus, for the isomorphic Dutch auctions. In this
equilibrium, a bidder should place her bid according to the bidding function b(vi)∗, in
order to maximize her expected profit.
5The focus of this thesis are single-unit auctions. For more information on human bidding behavior
in multi-unit uniform price Dutch and English auctions, please refer to (McCabe et al., 1990).
6Katok and Kwasnica (2008) note that “[t]his is true even under the assumptions of risk aversion and
affiliated values.”
103





The model considers an exogenous number n ≥ 2 of symmetric bidders. Moreover, the
model assumes that each bidder i is risk neutral and independently draws a valuation
from the uniform distribution function F with support on [0, v].
Contrary to the analytical reasoning of Vickrey (1961), evidence from the laboratory
and the field consistently indicates that FPSB and Dutch auctions are in fact non-
isomorphic. Thereby, Dutch auctions can yield final prices above or below those observed
in the strategically equivalent FPSB auctions (e.g. Cox et al., 1982, 1983; Lucking-Reiley,
1999). In particular the clock speed, i.e. the speed at which the auctioneer decreases the
price, seems to play an important role in this regard.
5.1.3. The Real-Time Element of Dutch Auctions
The behavioral non-isomorphism of FPSB and Dutch auctions is first observed in the
laboratory experiments of Coppinger et al. (1980). In particular, the authors observe
lower final prices in Dutch in comparison to FPSB auctions. However, Coppinger et al.
did not find a satisfactory explanation for their observation and eventually conjecture
that the non-isomorphism “may be due to information differences in the two types of
auctions.”
In their seminal laboratory experiments, Cox et al. (1982, 1983) consistently report
that Dutch auctions generally yield lower final prices than the equivalent FPSB auc-
tions. The authors argue that Dutch auctions have an inherent “real-time” element that
distinguishes this auction mechanism from FPSB auctions. This real-time characteristic
is, however, not considered in Vickrey’s model. Cox et al. (1983) note:
“The fact that the Dutch auction is a ‘real-time’ auction and the first price
auction is not, and therefore that the extensive forms of the bidding games for
the two auctions are different, is viewed as being irrelevant to bidding theory.
It is assumed that only the strategic forms matter.” (Cox et al., 1983)
While the real-time element of Dutch auctions has been identified as the actual cause of
the non-isomorphism, the question remains how this real-time element is finally reflected
in human bidding behavior. Cox et al. (1982) introduce two possible explanations: (1)
a systematic violation of Bayes’ rule and (2) a “utility of suspense.”
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With respect to erroneous Bayesian updating, Cox et al. (1982) argue that the real-
time element of Dutch auctions allows a bidder “to observe some bidding behavior of
his rivals,” which is not the case for FPSB auctions. More specifically, the bidders can
observe the absence of bidding activity in Dutch auctions, because the auction ends
immediately as soon as one of the bidders places a bid. While the absence of bidding
activity is actually “not informative” (Cox et al., 1982), bidders may suffer from a
behavioral bias and believe that they can actually gain some additional information
from their observations. In particular, a bidder may systematically violate the Bayes’
rule such that she “underestimates the risk [s]he bears by continuing to let the auction
clock run” (Cox et al., 1983). If, however, the bidder adequately applied the Bayes’
rule, there would be no update of the ex ante predefined bidding strategy. Therefore,
so Cox et al., while bidders can actually gain no additional information from observing
the auction process whatsoever, a systematic violation of the Bayes’ rule can serve as a
possible explanation for the real-time effect and, thus, for lower final prices in Dutch in
comparison to FPSB auctions.
Cox et al. (1982) also introduce a second explanation for the effect of the Dutch
real-time element, which they call the “utility of suspense” hypothesis. The authors
conjecture that bidder i may derive an additional non-monetary utility ai(t) ≥ 0 from
participating in a Dutch auction of length t, which is additive with the utility of mone-
tary reward. This conjecture is based on an observation the authors made during their
laboratory experiments:
“On a more impressionistic level it is worth noting in this regard that many
subjects report that they enjoy the ‘clock experiment’ more than the others
because of the ‘suspense of waiting.’ In this sense they seem to perceive the
Dutch auction as a ‘waiting game,’ in which lower bids are entered than in
the first-price sealed-bid auction.” (Cox et al., 1982)
Cox et al. (1983) conduct a series of laboratory experiments in order to test between
the erroneous Bayesian updating and the utility of suspense hypotheses. In particular,
the authors manipulate the conversion rate between experimental monetary units (MU)
and real money. In one series of treatments, they set the monetary reward level three
times higher than in the other treatments. The authors argue that if the utility of
suspense hypothesis was correct, then “increasing the reward level would cause Dutch
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auction prices to approach the prices in the paired first price auctions.” The intuition
behind this reasoning is that the (non-monetary) utility of suspense does not increase
with the utility gained from the monetary reward.7 Therefore, if the monetary utility
is increased through the reward level, bidders should place higher bids as the relative
impact of the utility of suspense diminishes. To the contrary, there should be no such
change in bidding behavior if the erroneous Bayesian updating hypothesis was correct,
because the probability miscalculation model is independent from the reward level. Cox
et al. report no change in final prices between low and high reward levels and therefore
discard the utility of suspense hypothesis in favor of the erroneous Bayesian updating
hypothesis.
5.2. Clock Speeds and Human Behavior in Dutch
Auctions
As outlined in the last section, the real-time element of Dutch auctions has been iden-
tified as the actual cause of the non-isomorphism between Dutch and FPSB auctions.
However, there are different theories on how the real-time element actually affects bid-
ding behavior. Taking into account this real-time element, it turns out that there is not
a bijective mapping between the FPSB and Dutch auction mechanisms. In addition to
the defining characteristics of the FPSB auction institution, each implementation of the
Dutch auction mechanism has to specify
1. the initial high price pmax, which also defines the distance poff between the initial
high price pmax and the highest possible valuation v of a bidder for the commodity
(poff = pmax − v),
2. the decrement δ by which the current standing price pst is decreased at each (dis-
crete) tick of the Dutch clock, and
3. the time interval τ between two consecutive price steps.
7This assumption seems intuitive at first sight. However, the physiological data in Section 5.5 shows
that the resale value of the auctioned commodity has a significant impact on the hedonic value a
bidder derives from auction participation, i.e. on the utility of suspense. Therefore, and in contrary
to the assumption of Cox et al. (1983), the utility of suspense may actually increase with the utility
gained from the anticipated monetary reward.
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5.2.1. Dutch Auction Clock Speeds in the Literature
Over the past decades, experimental economists have consistently reported evidence that
the seller revenue in Dutch auctions depends crucially on the clock speed at which the
standing price is decreased. Thereby, slow Dutch auctions yield higher and fast Dutch
auctions lower seller revenues than FPSB auctions, respectively. The clock speed θ can
be defined as the quotient of the decrement δ and the time interval τ , i.e. θ = δ/τ .8
An overview of studies on Dutch auctions, along with the respective clock speed and
research methodology is provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1.: Selected Literature on Clock Speeds in Dutch Auctions
Author(s) TH LE CFE δ τ θ Dutch vs. FPSB
Vickrey (1961) X =
Coppinger et al. (1980) X $0.50 7 sec 0.07 $/sec <
Cox et al. (1982) X X $0.20 2 sec 0.10 $/sec <
$0.30 2 sec 0.15 $/sec <
$0.40 2 sec 0.20 $/sec <
$0.60 2 sec 0.30 $/sec <
Cox et al. (1983) X X (3 x) $0.60 2 sec (3 x) 0.30 $/sec <
Lucking-Reiley (1999) X 5 % of pmax 1 day 5 %/day >
Carare and Rothkopf (2005) X >
Katok and Kwasnica (2008) X X 5 MU 1 sec 5.00 MU/sec <
5 MU 10 sec 0.50 MU/sec <
5 MU 30 sec 0.17 MU/sec >
(TH = theory, LE = lab experiment, CFE = controlled field experiment)
(δ = decrement, τ = time interval, θ = clock speed, sec = second(s), MU = monetary units)
As outlined before, the experiments of Coppinger et al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1982,
1983) consistently indicate that the Dutch auction generally yields lower final prices
than the FPSB auction. To the contrary, Lucking-Reiley (1999) finds in a controlled
field experiment on the Internet that Dutch auctions yield higher revenues than FPSB
auctions. Carare and Rothkopf (2005) explain this outcome with the existence of in-
cremental transaction costs in slow Dutch auctions, which may for example stem from
the costs of monitoring the auction process. Thereby, Carare and Rothkopf are able
to formally show that slow Dutch auctions can result in higher revenues than in FPSB
auctions, because the latter incur less transaction costs.
8Note that sometimes the clock speed is simply defined as the time interval between two consecutive
price steps (Katok and Kwasnica, 2008). However, the literal meaning of the term speed indicates a
progress per time.
107
Chapter 5. An Experiment on the Utility of Suspense in Dutch Auctions
5.2.2. A Tradeoff between Transaction Costs and Utility of
Suspense
Building on these previous insights, Katok and Kwasnica (2008) finally present a unified
experiment in which they show that the clock speed in Dutch auctions has a system-
atic impact on final prices, or equivalently, on sellers’ revenues. The authors discard
the erroneous Bayesian updating hypothesis of Cox et al. (1983) as an explanation for
differences in final prices due to varying clock speeds. In particular, they argue that
human decision makers generally fail to perform Bayesian updating properly and, thus,
“there is no reason to believe a few extra seconds would make a difference.”9 In the
experiment, auction participants are induced with private resale values for an artificial
commodity for which they compete in a FPSB or Dutch auction. Katok and Kwasnica
observe that fast Dutch auctions (with clock speeds of 5 price decrements per second and
0.5 price decrements per second) result in lower revenues and the slow Dutch auction
(with a clock speed of 0.17 price decrements per second) results in higher revenues than
the benchmark FPSB auction. Formally, the authors conjecture that these differences
depend on the tradeoff between transaction costs (in the spirit of Carare and Rothkopf,
2005) and utility of suspense (in the spirit of Cox et al., 1982, 1983), both of which are
believed to depend on the elapsed auction time.
More precisely, classically bidders are believed to bid optimally in the sense that
they weigh the expected marginal benefits with the marginal costs. In a sealed-bid
auction, this means that bidders equate the benefits of lowering their bid with the
opportunity costs incurred by the increased probability of not winning the auction. In
the Dutch auction, these static marginal effects are possibly distorted by additional
dynamic marginal effects of the inherent real-time element. On the one hand, marginal
benefits may be increased through utility of suspense. Hence, at any given standing price,
bidders have a higher marginal benefit per second in fast Dutch auctions compared to
fast Dutch auctions. On the other hand, transaction costs steadily increase the marginal
costs side, which ceteris paribus induces bidders of slow Dutch auctions to stop the
auction earlier. In the framework of Katok and Kwasnica (2008), the overall real-time
effect of Dutch in comparison to FPSB auctions will, thus, depend on the relative size
9However, the Katok and Kwasnica (2008) do not discuss whether the utility of suspense is independent
of the anticipated monetary payoff. This is the major assumption of Cox et al. (1983) for the
erroneous Bayesian’ updating hypothesis. This issue will be discussed again in Section 5.5.
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of the utility of suspense compared to the transaction costs.
Katok and Kwasnica extend the model of Cox et al. (1982, 1983) such that the utility of
suspense a(t) also depends on the time interval τ between two price steps: a(t) = (a/τ)·t.
The constant a represents one unit of non-monetary joy of Dutch auction participation.
Therefore, bidders derive more utility of suspense from one second of participation in a
fast in comparison to a slow Dutch auction. In fact, the amount of utility of suspense
is the same when considering the number of price steps in this model. For instance, 10
price steps yield 10 units of non-monetary joy of Dutch auction participation. However,
bidders place higher bids in the slow Dutch auctions, because for the same price more
auction time elapses in these auctions and, therefore, the transaction costs are higher.10
5.3. Experimental Design
This chapter presents an experiment, which investigates the utility of suspense explana-
tion of Cox et al. (1982, 1983) and Katok and Kwasnica (2008). The main interest of this
experiment is (1) to provide the missing link between the utility of suspense hypothesis
and actual physiological values of Dutch auction participants, and (2) to further charac-
terize the elicited emotional state bidders experience and investigate how this emotional
state is reflected in bidding behavior. Furthermore, Section 5.5 identifies characteristic
patterns of emotional processing, which occur in the dynamic process of Dutch auctions.
The experiment presented in this chapter is similar to that of Katok and Kwasnica
(2008), but also includes physiological measurements of bidders’ heart rate and skin con-
ductivity as proxies for their arousal during the auction process. Moreover, in addition
to Katok and Kwasnica, who exclusively investigate Dutch auctions where bidders have
independent private values, I also conduct common value Dutch auctions, in which the
resale value of the artificial commodity is ex ante unknown but identical to all bidders.
The particular advantage of a common value auction is that bidders need not perform
Bayesian updating.11
10Katok and Kwasnica note: “it is as if the same amount of enjoyment is garnered from the auction for
each ‘tick’ of the clock regardless of how slow the clock is, but costs per tick of the clock increase as
the clock slows down.”
11Recall that erroneous Bayesian updating is proposed by Cox et al. (1982, 1983) as a possible alter-
native explanation for the non-isomorphism of Dutch and FPSB auctions.
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5.3.1. Clock Speed, Utility of Suspense, and Emotional States
The first aim of the experiment is to provide physiological evidence that the utility of
suspense depends on the clock speed. The experiment is based on the framework for
emotional bidding introduced in Chapter 2. Figure 5.1 depicts the conjectured rela-
tion between the auction system, the utility of suspense, the current emotional state
of a bidder, and her bidding behavior. As outlined in Chapter 2, a bidder’s current
emotional state can be directly influenced by the auction system. Katok and Kwasnica
(2008) argue that bidders derive a higher utility of suspense per second in fast Dutch
auctions. Following this reasoning, fast clock speeds should also be reflected in a bidder’s
current emotional state. More specifically, bidders should experience higher degrees of
physiological arousal in fast Dutch auctions. In this experiment, the change of the bid-
der’s current emotional states due to the clock speed is measured with physiological






















Figure 5.1.: Clock Speed in the Framework for Emotional Bidding
The second aim of the experiment is to further characterize the elicited emotional
state and investigate how this emotional state is reflected in bidding behavior. In this
regard, the central claim is that the higher utility of suspense in fast Dutch auctions
stems from an increased level of perceived competition. When the clock speed is high,
bidders have less time to revise their decisions and, hence, may perceive a stronger de-
gree of competition. Following the terminology of Ku et al. (2005) and of Malhotra et al.
(2008), the corresponding current emotional state may be referred to as “competitive
110
5.3. Experimental Design
arousal.” Subsequently, such an intense current emotional state may affect a bidder’s
bidding behavior, which has been defined as auction fever in Section 2.1.2. In this ex-
periment, bidders level of perceived competition is assessed with a self-report perception
questionnaire.
5.3.2. Treatment Structure
In the experiment presented in this chapter, I conduct slow and fast Dutch auctions,
in which the standing price is decreased by δ = 1 monetary units (MU) every τ = 0.5
seconds or every τ = 5.0 seconds, respectively. Thereby the experimental set-up allows
for more fine grained bids than that of Katok and Kwasnica, who chose price decrements
of δ = 5 MU.12 This translates into clock speeds of 2.0 MU per second and 0.2 MU per
second, which are in between the range of clock speeds analyzed by Katok and Kwasnica.
The experiment is implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and is based on a between-
subject design (cf. Kagel, 1995), i.e. bidders exclusively participate in one of the four
treatments depicted in Figure 5.2.13
Clock Speed / Value Model Fast (2.0 MU/sec) Slow (0.2 MU/sec)
Common Value (CV) CV fast CV slow_ _
Independent
Private Value (IPV) IPV_fast IPV_slow
Figure 5.2.: Treatment Structure of the Dutch Auction Clock Speed Experiment
The Dutch auctions are designed as follows. In all treatments, the auctioneer starts
the auction at the initial high price of 120 MU and then consecutively lowers the standing
price by δ = 1 MU per time interval τ . This time interval τ is 0.5 seconds in the fast and
5.0 seconds in the slow treatments, respectively. There are three bidders in each auction.
The auction is finished as soon as one of the three bidders accepts the current standing
price. The winning bidder receives the resale value for the commodity and has to pay
the price at which she accepted to finish the auction. In the independent private value
12As a matter of fact, in email correspondence, Elena Katok suggested to use decrements of 1 MU to
allow for a “cleaner analysis.”
13The website http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree provides further information on the z-Tree experimental
software environment.
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(IPV) treatments, bidders receive an individual resale value of the artificial commodity
before the auction starts, which is independently drawn from a uniform distribution with
support on the discrete integer interval [21 MU, 120 MU]. In the CV treatments, the
common resale value is ex ante unknown to the bidders and determined from a uniform
distribution with support on the discrete interval interval [46 MU, 95 MU] after the
auction ends.
Before the experiment starts, the participants are endowed with a lump sum payment
of €15. The experimental currency is set to monetary units (MU) with 1 MU being
equivalent to €0.20. Depending on their individual performance, the bidders accumulate
all gains and losses during the auctions on their individual accounts. The individual
accounts are paid out in cash to the participants at the end of the experiment.14
5.3.3. Session Structure
In order to allow for physiological measurements, it is necessary to adapt the experi-
mental design of Katok and Kwasnica slightly by introducing rest periods in between
different auctions, which allow the participants’ physiological values to return to an
individual basic level. Therefore, the experiment applies the physioeconomic session
framework introduced in Section 3.5.1. Further, following the recommendations of the
proposed physioeconomic methodology (cf. Section 3.5.1), subjects’ interactions with
the experimental system are limited to mouse inputs and subjects are equipped with a
pair of ear-muffs.15 The Dutch auction instance of the physioeconomic session framework
is depicted in Figure 5.3. Each session of the experiment comprises three stages.
First Stage. The first stage corresponds to the preparation phase of the physioeco-
nomic session framework. Subjects have to successfully complete a quiz regarding the
instructions of the experiment, in order to ensure full comprehension of its rules. The
participant instructions are provided in Appendix A.2. The quiz is followed by an initial
practice period and a five minute rest period. The initial practice period, which com-
prises a test auction in which no money is gained or lost, is applied in order to introduce
the experimental environment to subjects and, thus, reduce the impact of novelty on
14In this experiment, the average payment was €34.00, with €23.00 and €47.80 being the minimum
and maximum payments, respectively. Sessions lasted between 90 to 150 minutes.
15The experimental environment, comprising the experimental laboratory and the experimental soft-
ware, is documented in Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.3, respectively.
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Figure 5.3.: Dutch Auction Instance for Physioeconomic Session Framework
physiological values (cf. Dawson et al., 2007). The five minute rest period enables to
assess an individual basic level of physiological arousal for each subject (cf. Boucsein,
1992).
Second Stage. In the second stage, the subjects consecutively participate as bidders
in 15 periods of Dutch auctions. A Dutch auction is an instance of the decision-making
phase of the physioeconomic session framework. Six participants are invited for a single
experimental session. In a random stranger matching (cf. Kagel, 1995), participants are
randomly reassigned to two groups of three before every single auction period. Each
group independently plays a single Dutch auction with three bidders each.
Third Stage. In the third stage, the bidders have to answer a self-report questionnaire
regarding their individual feelings during the auctions.16 The questionnaire is based on
a series of statements to which subjects indicate agreement or disagreement on a 5-
16Note that the physioeconomic session framework depicted in Figure 5.3 allows for an optional ques-
tionnaire after each period of decision-making. In this experiment, however, the questionnaire is
conducted after all 15 auctions have finished. The reason is that the perception questionnaire in-
cludes questions regarding the subjects’ behavior and, therefore, may have an distorting influence
in between the auctions.
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point Likert scale. In order to reduce the impact of social desirability biases, each
statement occurs twice with one statement being the reverse of the other. In particular,
the questionnaire addresses the degree of excitement, competition, and arousal in the
auction, but also whether participants set themselves a limit before the auction starts
and if they tend to overbid or underbid this limit. The self-report questionnaire is
provided in Appendix A.3. Further, the subjects’ individual risk preference is assessed
with the questionnaire of Holt and Laury (2002) in order to check whether there are
differences in risk preferences across treatments.17
5.3.4. Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) in Karls-
ruhe, Germany. Altogether, 17 female and 79 male students (96 in total, mean age =
22.64 years) participated in 16 sessions (6 students per session, 4 sessions per treat-
ment). Subjects are randomly recruited from a pool of undergraduate students with
an academic background in economics. During the whole experiment, participants’ skin
conductivity was recorded with a constant current amplifier measurement system and
Ag/AgCl (silver/silver chloride) electrodes.18 The electrodes were attached on the thenar
and hypothenar eminences of the palm of the the non-dominant hand by use of standard
EDA electrode paste (cf. Boucsein, 1992). Further, the measurement system recorded an
electrocardiogram (ECG) for each subject, which was later transformed into tonic and
phasic heart rates. All sessions were conducted within the period of three weeks with
an average room temperature and relative humidity of 23.55 ◦C (74.39 ◦F) and 46.80%,
respectively.
5.4. Hypotheses and Results
As outlined in the last section, the main interest of this experiment is (1) to provide the
missing link between the utility of suspense hypothesis and actual physiological values
of Dutch auctions, and (2) to further characterize the elicited emotional state bidders
17Based on the answers in the questionnaire and a dice, each subject received an additional monetary
payoff Holt and Laury (e.g. 2002). In the experiment, subjects were on average slightly risk averse.
Differences in risk preferences between treatments were not observed.
18For further information on the measurement system see Gharbi et al. (2008) and Appendix B.1.3.
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experience and investigate how this emotional state is reflected in bidding behavior. In
particular, the central claim is that fast clock speeds increase bidders’ levels of physiolog-
ical arousal and perceived competition, which in turn induces them to protract placing
a bid. Based on the framework for emotional bidding and the reasoning of Section 5.3,
the following subsections 5.4.1 to 5.4.4 outline the corresponding hypotheses and the
results of the physioeconomic experiment.
5.4.1. Utility of Suspense
The model of Katok and Kwasnica (2008) conjectures that bidders experience fast Dutch
auctions more exciting than slow Dutch auctions and, therefore, derive a higher utility of
suspense per second in fast Dutch auctions. Following this reasoning, fast clock speeds
should also be reflected in a bidder’s current emotional state. More specifically, bidders
should experience higher degrees of physiological arousal in fast Dutch auctions. This
conjecture is reflected in hypothesis H1:
H1: The average level of physiological arousal is higher in fast in comparison
to slow Dutch auctions.
The hypothesis is subdivided into two sub-hypotheses. In particular, it is assessed
whether physiological arousal in terms of skin conductivity and heart rate depends on
the clock speed of the Dutch auctions:
H1a: The average skin conductance level (SCL) is higher in fast in compar-
ison to slow Dutch auctions.
H1b: The average heart rate (HR) is higher in fast in comparison to slow
Dutch auctions.
Regarding hypotheses H1a and H1b, Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 depict bidders average
SCL and HR, respectively. Because these physiological parameters have an inherent
between-subject variability (cf. Dawson et al., 2007), every SCL and every HR value is
referenced separately for each subject to an individual basic level of physiological arousal
(∆SCL and ∆HR). The basic level is individually assessed for each subject based on the
initial 5 minute rest period. The left part of the figures depicts the overall level of
physiological arousal during the whole auction process. Both for SCL and HR, the
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(SCL = skin conductance level, µS = microsiemens)
Figure 5.4.: Average SCL During the Auction Process
average level of physiological arousal is significantly higher for fast in comparison to
slow Dutch auctions. Two-tailed t-tests confirm that the SCL is higher in the fast CV
(2.40 vs. 0.49, p < .001) and IPV (1.98 vs. 0.22, p < .001) treatments, respectively.
Equivalently, two-tailed t-tests confirm that the HR is higher in the fast CV (3.81 vs.
−0.12, p < .001) and IPV (5.05 vs. 0.24, p < .001) treatments, respectively.
In contrast, the right part of Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 concentrates on the last 20
seconds of an auction. Again, two-tailed t-tests confirm that the SCL is higher in the fast
CV (2.85 vs. 2.28, p < .05) and IPV (2.33 vs. 1.37, p < .001) treatments, respectively.
Equivalently, a two-tailed t-test confirms that the HR is higher in the fast IPV (5.32 vs.
2.87, p < .001) treatment, respectively.19
Summarizing the physiological data over the whole auction process and the last 20 sec-
onds of an auction, the results are in favor of hypothesis H1. Fast Dutch auctions induce
a higher degree of physiological arousal in comparison to slow Dutch auctions. Thereby,
this experiment provides the missing link between the utility of suspense hypothesis and
actual physiological values of Dutch auction participants. Katok and Kwasnica (2008)
conjecture that bidders experience fast Dutch auctions more exciting and, therefore,
derive a higher utility of suspense. However, a direct link between clock speeds and
excitement in Dutch auctions has not been provided before.
19However, the difference in HR for the last 20 seconds of a common value auction is not significant.
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Figure 5.5.: Average HR During the Auction Process
Building on this first main result, the following subsections focus on further character-
izing the elicited emotional state bidders experience (cf. Section 5.4.2) and investigate
how this emotional state is reflected in bidding behavior (cf. Section 5.4.3 and Section
5.4.4).
5.4.2. Perceived Competition
After providing physiological evidence that the utility of suspense depends on the clock
speed of Dutch auctions, I now focus on further characterizing the elicited current emo-
tional state. The conjecture behind the experiment is that fast clock speeds induce
a current emotional state, which is characterized by increased levels of physiological
arousal and perceived competition. Following the terminology of Ku et al. (2005) and
of Malhotra et al. (2008), this emotional state is referred to as “competitive arousal” in
the following. The interaction of the clock speed and the current emotional state of a
bidder is reflected in hypothesis H2:
H2: Fast Dutch auctions induce a higher degree of ‘competitive arousal’ than
slow Dutch auctions.
The hypothesis is subdivided into several sub-hypotheses. In particular, it is assessed
whether the level of perceived arousal, competition, and excitement depends on the clock
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speed of the Dutch auctions:
H2a: The perceived level of arousal is higher in fast in comparison to slow
Dutch auctions.
H2b: The perceived level of competition is higher in fast in comparison to
slow Dutch auctions.

































(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree)
Figure 5.6.: Bidder Perception: Arousal, Excitement, and Competition
Regarding hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c, Figure 5.6 depicts bidders’ perceived levels
of arousal, competition, and excitement. Conducting 2 (value model) x 2 (clock speed)
ANOVAs for perceived arousal and excitement shows that, similar to the objectively
measured arousal, bidders report a higher degree of perceived arousal and excitement in
the fast treatments.20 Further, an ANOVA regarding the level of perceived competition
reveals that on average bidders perceive fast Dutch auctions more competitive than slow
20Arousal: (value model: F = 4.06, p < .05; clock speed: F = 9.32, p < .01; interaction: F = .16,
p = .69). Excitement: (value model: F = 4.89, p < .05; clock speed: F = 9.84, p < .01; interaction:
F = .21, p = .64).
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Dutch auctions.21 Thus, the results of the self-report questionnaire are in line with
hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c.
Summarizing the results of the physiological data in Section 5.4.1 and the self-report
questionnaire, the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of hypothesis H2. Therefore,
I conclude that fast clock speeds induce a current emotional state which is characterized
by increased levels of arousal and a stronger degree of perceived competition. Moreover,
subjects also state that they are more excited in the fast treatments. Therefore, bidders
really derive a utility of suspense from participating in fast Dutch auctions. By further
investigating the physiological parameters, one can observe in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5
that the utility of suspense starkly depends on the current stage of the auction process.
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SD
(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree)
Figure 5.7.: Bidder Perception: Spitefulness, Relevance of Other Bidders’ Payoffs
Value Models. The main focus of the analysis is the impact of clock speed on bidders’
arousal and perceived competition. However, it is also interesting to observe differences
in bidders’ emotional processing for different value models. Figure 5.6 indicates that
bidders perceive a higher degree of competition in the CV treatments. This seems
intuitive, as the commodity for sale has the same value to all bidders in the CV auctions.
21Competition: (value model: F = 4.22, p < .001; clock speed: F = 2.78, p < .01; interaction: F = .59,
p = .44).
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In contrast, a bidder with a high valuation in the IPV treatments has a comparatively
high subjective probability of winning the auction and, thus, may perceive a lower degree
of competition. Section 5.5.1 will focus specifically on the impact of induced valuations
on bidders’ emotional processing. Figure 5.7 depicts the degree of perceived spitefulness
and how important the payoff of other bidders was for a bidder’s own decision-making.
The corresponding ANOVAs reveal that bidders are more spiteful in the CV treatments,
i.e. they grudge other bidders a positive payoff (cf. Section 2.2.1). Further, the other
bidders’ payoffs gain a higher degree of importance for an individual bidder’s decision-
making in the CV treatments.22 In contrast to the results presented above, however,
spitefulness and the relevance of other bidders’ payoffs are not affected by the clock
speed of the Dutch auctions.
5.4.3. Preselected Bidding Strategy
The analysis now focuses on how the elicited current emotional state is reflected in
bidding behavior. In this regard, the central claim is that fast clock speeds in Dutch
auctions can cause auction fever. As defined in Section 2.1.2, auction fever is an intense
current emotional state elicited in the course of one or more auctions that distorts a bid-
der’s preselected bidding strategy. Therefore, it first has to be assessed, whether bidders
commit themselves to a bidding strategy before the auction starts. This translates into
hypothesis H3:
H3: Bidders cognitively set themselves a price limit before the Dutch auction
starts at which they intend to end the auction.
It is important to note, however, that the preselected bidding strategy does not
necessarily need to be derived by means of auction theory. As already observed by
Vickrey (1961), some of the bidders may be “insufficiently sophisticated to discern the
equilibrium-point strategy.” In a rather behavioral approach, one can argue that bidders
may set themselves a price limit by estimating a subjective valuation for the commodity
and then heuristically deriving a corresponding bidding strategy (Ariely and Simonson,
2003). This is in line with the observation of an Internet survey conducted by Ku et al.
22Spitefulness: (value model: F = 30.08, p < .001; clock speed: F = 1.27, p = .26; interaction:
F = 2.04, p = .16). Relevance of other bidders’ payoffs: (value model: F = 6.44, p < .05; clock
speed: F = .01, p < .92; interaction: F = 1.12, p = .29).
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(2005). The authors report that 82% of the survey respondents set themselves a price
limit prior to bidding.
2.00SA




















(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree)
Figure 5.8.: Bidder Perception: Setting a Preselected Price Limit
The results of the self-report questionnaire of my experiment with respect to setting
a preselected price limit are depicted in Figure 5.8. The results show that independent
of the value model and independent of the clock speed bidders on average agree that
they ex ante set themselves a price limit at which they intend to place a bid and end
the auction. A 2 (value model) x 2 (clock speed) ANOVA shows that differences in
responses between treatments are not significant (value model: F = .00, p = .95; clock
speed: F = 8.88, p = .73; interaction: F = .00, p = .95).
Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of hypothesis H3. Bidders in
fact cognitively set themselves a price limit before the Dutch auction starts at which
they intend to end the auction.
5.4.4. Bidding Behavior
In line with the framework for emotional bidding, the last sections showed that (H3)
bidders ex ante set themselves a price limit at which they intend to end the auction, and
(H1, H2) fast Dutch auctions induce a current emotional state which is characterized
by increased levels of arousal and perceived competition. Again, the central claim is
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that fast clock speeds in Dutch auctions can cause auction fever. Therefore, this section
investigates whether the induced current emotional state distorts the preselected bidding
strategy and leads bidders to place lower bids. This translates into hypothesis H4:
H4: The current emotional state in fast Dutch auctions causes bidders to
protract placing a bid at their preselected price limit.
This hypothesis is subdivided into three sub-hypotheses:
H4a: Fast Dutch auctions result in lower final prices than slow Dutch auc-
tions.
H4b: In fast Dutch auctions bidders tend to place bids below their preselected
price limit.
H4c: In fast and in slow Dutch auctions bidders do not tend to place bids













Figure 5.9.: Final Prices in the Dutch Auctions
The final prices of the auctions are presented in Figure 5.9. In the CV treatments,
average final prices are 64.68 MU and 68.56 MU in the fast and slow setting, respectively
(two-tailed t-test, p < .001). In the IPV treatments, average final prices are 77.99 MU
and 82.43 MU in the fast and slow setting, respectively (two-tailed t-test, p < .001). The
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results show that fast auctions yield significantly lower prices in both the CV and the
IPV treatments. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of H4a. While
the IPV final prices replicate the results of Katok and Kwasnica (2008), the CV final














(RNNE = Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium)
Figure 5.10.: Deviations from the RNNE Bidding Strategy
Following economic theory and assuming risk neutral bidders, I will now focus on
theoretical predictions of bidding behavior in the respective CV and IPV Dutch auctions.
The deviations from the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bidding strategy are
depicted in Figure 5.10.
CV Treatments. In the CV treatments, the resale value of the artificial commodity
is the same for every bidder and uniformly drawn from the discrete interval [46, 95] after
the auction ended. Therefore, a risk neutral bidder (who also expects the other bidders
to be risk neutral) will bid at a price of 70 MU in the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium:
bids placed at any integer value above 70 MU would exceed the expected resale value of
70.50 MU and, therefore, incur an expected loss. Bids placed at any integer value below
70 MU will result in economic profits of zero, because one of the other two bidders, who
placed their bid at 70 MU, will win the item. Consequently, if all three bidders intend
to place their bid at 70 MU, the expected economic profit of each bidder is:
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Table 5.2.: Estimation of the Empirical IPV Bidding Function
IPV (fast) Std. err. IPV (slow) Std. err.
β .6784604*** .031571 .6497064*** .0431917
c 12.65028*** 3.097043 19.74208*** 4.246681
R-squared .7964796 .6572489
Observations 120 120
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Π∗CV =
1
3 · (70.5− 70)
In the experiment, the winning bidders bid at 98% and 92% of the RNNE on average
in the slow and fast treatment, respectively. Bids placed below the RNNE are consistent
with bidder’s risk aversion. The intuition is that risk aversion has two opposing effects
in the CV auction. On the one hand, bidders would like to lower their bid in order
protect them from overpaying the ex ante uncertain value of the commodity. On the
other hand, lowering the bid increases the probability of losing. Thus, overall bidders
will slightly adjust their bid downward. However, risk aversion cannot explain why
participants of the fast treatment place bids which are on average 3.89 price increments
below the average bid in the slow treatment.
IPV Treatments. Now consider the IPV auctions and suppose again that bidders
behave according to the RNNE bidding strategy. Following the reasoning of Vickrey
(1961), the equilibrium bidding strategy b(v)∗ is given by
b(vi)∗ =
2
3 · (vi − 20) + 20 =
2
3 · vi +
20
3 ,
where vi is the individual resale value of bidder i.23 Thus, the optimal bidding strategy
follows a simple linear structure of the type y = β · v + c, which can also be estimated
from the experimental data. The results of the linear regression analysis are presented
in Table 5.2.
In both IPV treatments, the slope of the bidding function closely resembles the optimal
value of 0.66. However, the intercepts are significantly above those of the RNNE bidding
23The exact discrete bidding function, which takes the possibility of ties into account, may differ by at
most one bid increment.
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Table 5.3.: Estimation of the Intercepts with Fixed β Coefficient
IPV (fast) Std. err. IPV (slow) Std. err.
β .66 .66
c 13.78611*** 0.5838331 18.10556*** 0.8092157
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
strategy, which is in line with bidder’s risk aversion. Contrary to the CV treatment,
bidders face no uncertainty with respect to the resale value of the artificial commodity.
Therefore, risk averse bidders tend to increase their bid compared to the risk neutral
equilibrium in order to increase the probability of winning. Again, the difference of the
intercepts (19.74−12.65 = 7.09) in the estimates for the slow and fast treatment cannot
be explained by risk aversion. However, notice that the leverage of β is very large because
it is only possible to observe the bids of the winning bidders, who have an average
resale value of 96.49 MU and 96.31 MU in the slow and fast treatment, respectively.
By repeating the estimation of the intercepts while fixing β at its theoretical value of
β = 0.66, the remaining difference between the intercepts amounts to 4.31 MU. The
results are summarized in Table 5.3. Alternatively, by simply comparing the means of
the final prices, a similar price differential of 4.44 MU can be observed.
In the IPV treatments, bidders have different valuations for the auctioned off commod-
ity. Therefore, some of the auctions may result in an inefficient outcome. The outcome
of a Dutch auction is defined efficient, if the bidder with the highest valuation is the
first bidder who accepts the current standing price and obtains the commodity. Both
the fast and slow setting yield high efficiency ratios. Overall, 86.67% of fast and 89.17%
of slow IPV auctions are efficient, respectively. Thus, only 13.33% and 10.83% of the
auctions yield inefficient outcomes.
Bidder Perception. As discussed in Section 5.4.3, bidders ex ante set themselves a
price limit at which they intend to end the auction. Figure 5.11 depicts the results of the
self-report questionnaire with respect to the question whether bidders tended to overbid
or underbid their preselected price limit. The results show that, irrespective of the value
model and the clock speed, bidders do not tend to overbid their preselected bidding
limit.24 However, participants in the fast treatments generally confirm that they tend to
24Differences among treatments do not turn out to be significant for overbidding (value model: F = .08,
p = .77; clock speed: F = .08, p = .77; interaction: F = 0.03, p = .86)
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(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree)
Figure 5.11.: Bidder Perception: Underbidding and Overbidding
underbid their price limit, i.e. they protract placing their bid.25 Therefore, the results
of the self-report questionnaire are in favor for hypotheses H4b and H4c.
Summary. Summarizing the results of the behavioral data and the self-report ques-
tionnaire, the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of hypothesis H4. Therefore, I
conclude that bidders underbid their preselected price limit in fast Dutch auctions. The
price differences between the fast and slow treatments translate into an average bid
protraction of about 4 price decrements in the fast Dutch auctions, i.e. approximately
2 seconds. In other words, when the standing price reaches the final price of the slow
Dutch auctions, bidders wait about 2 seconds longer in the fast treatments before ac-
cepting the price. Moreover, I conclude that fast clock speeds induce auction fever. In
fast Dutch auctions, bidders experience an intense current emotional state (H1, H2) that
distorts (H3) a bidder’s preselected (H4) bidding strategy. This is the second main result
of this experiment.26
25Underbidding: (value model: F = 4.45, p < .05; clock speed: F = 11.19, p < .01; interaction:
F = 0.00, p = .96)
26Recall, that the main interest of this experiment is (1) to provide the missing link between the
utility of suspense hypothesis and actual physiological values of Dutch auctions, and (2) to further
characterize the elicited emotional state bidders experience and investigate how this emotional state
is reflected in bidding behavior.
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5.4.5. Immediate Emotions on Auction Outcome
This section focuses on immediate emotions bidders experience when learning the auction
outcome of a Dutch auction. As outlined in Section 2.3, the framework for emotional
bidding suggests that revealing the auction outcome triggers immediate emotions as a
“joy of winning,” “winner regret,” and “loser regret.” Therefore, I test whether bidders
indeed show psychophysiological signs of immediate emotions when learning the auction
outcome. This translates into hypothesis H5:
H5: Upon learning the auction outcome of a Dutch auction, bidders experi-
ence an immediate emotion.
Concentrating on changes in emotional processing due to the clock speed and the
auction outcome, hypothesis H5 is further subdivided into two sub-hypotheses:
H5a: Bidders processing of “loser regret” has a different intensity than that
of the respective “joy of winning.”
H5b: Bidders’ intensity of immediate emotions processing is different in fast
Dutch auctions in comparison to slow Dutch auctions.
H5c: Bidders’ intensity of immediate emotions processing is different in
common value in comparison to independent private value auctions.
Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) argue that bidders cannot experience “winner regret”
in Dutch auctions, because “in the descending auction the winner never learns whether
she would have won if she waited a bit more.” In other words, it remains unknown, at
what standing price the second highest bidder would have placed a bid. In contrast,
so the authors, bidders can experience “loser regret,” because the losing bidders are
informed about the price at which the auction ended.27 Therefore, the design of the
experiment only allows for two possible emotions upon learning the auction outcome:
“joy of winning” and “loser regret.” H5a conjectures that these two emotions are pro-
cessed with different intensities. Furthermore, as bidders have higher levels of arousal
and perceive stronger competition in the fast treatments, hypothesis H5b conjectures
27Recall that loser regret is sometimes also referred to as “frustration of losing,” respectively (e.g. Ding
et al., 2005; Peters and Bodkin, 2007). Ding et al. (2005) argue that “anticipated regret is similar
to [the] concept of anticipated frustration.”
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that bidders also process immediate emotions upon learning the auction outcome with
different intensities. Finally, there may also be a different intensity depending on the





















































event time relative to auction end
(in seconds)
(SCR.amp = Skin Conductance Response Amplitude)
Figure 5.12.: SCR upon Winning and Losing
Bidders’ log transformed skin conductance response amplitudes (SCR.amp) in re-
sponse to the auction outcome are depicted in the left part of Figure 5.12. The SCR.amp
is a proxy for the intensity of immediate emotions induced by a discrete stimulus (see
Section 3.3.2). As this response usually occurs 1 to 3 seconds after the event (e.g. Bouc-
sein, 1992; Schmidt and Walach, 2000), only amplitudes are taken into account, which
are observed in that specific time frame. Furthermore, amplitudes have to comply with
a predefined amplitude criterion, i.e. amplitudes have to be greater or equal to 0.01µS
(cf. Fowles et al., 1981). All amplitudes smaller than 0.01µS are transformed to a value
of 0µS in the analyses. The SCR.amp values are obtained by decomposing skin conduc-
tivity into its tonic and phasic components with the Ledalab analysis software (Benedek
and Kaernbach, 2010).28 Following the recommendation of Venables and Christie (1980),
all SCR.amp values are then transformed log(x+ 1) in order to reduce the inherent left
skewness of skin conductivity. Exemplified for the IPV_slow treatment, the right part
of figure Figure 5.12 shows the undecomposed skin conductance values. One can observe
28The website http://www.ledalab.de provides further information on the Ledalab skin conductance
analysis software.
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a response about 1 to 3 seconds after the auction end.
With respect to hypothesis H5, it is obvious that the SCR.amp is everywhere signifi-
cantly different from zero (two-tailed t-test, p < .001). A linear regression based on the
value model, the clock speed and the auction outcome provides support for hypotheses
H5a. More specifically, bidders’ SCR.amp values regarding “loser regret” are larger than
the respective “joy of winning” values.29 This confirms the results of Delgado et al.
(2008), who found in a neuroeconomic experiment on the FPSB auction that bidders’
behavior is actually more dominated by the anticipation of losing an auction than by
the respective anticipated joy of winning.
Furthermore, the results also provide support for H5b. The intensity of immediate
emotions is consistently stronger when the clock speed is slow, i.e. bidders respond
stronger to the auction outcome in slow Dutch auctions. Therefore, while bidders ex-
perience higher levels of arousal and perceived competition in fast Dutch auctions, the
actual end of the auction is perceived less intense than in the slow treatments. This is
particularly interesting, when considering the differences in average nominal payoffs of
the winning bidder. Recall that fast Dutch auctions yield lower final prices and, thus,
on average a higher nominal payoff for the winner than slow Dutch auctions. Bidders
respond stronger when winning a slow Dutch auction, although the average payoff is
higher when winning a fast auction. Equivalently, bidders experience less immediate
regret in the fast treatments, although the average amount of “money left on the table”
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1989) is higher. Finally, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
in favor of hypothesis H5c. Differences in emotional processing due to the value model
are not significant.
Figure 5.13 depicts bidders perceived emotional processing regarding the auction out-
come. In particular, bidders were asked to report (1) the degree of irritation they
perceived when losing an auction, and (2) the importance of the non-monetary joy of
winning in contrast to their nominal payoff. In other words, bidders were asked in the
second question whether it is more important to win the auction than gaining a high
payoff. On average, bidders report that they are slightly irritated when losing an auction
and that they value the nominal payoff more than the non-monetary joy of winning in
the Dutch auction, respectively. The results do not indicate a difference in bidder per-
ception regarding neither the value model, nor the clock speed. This again underlines
29Details on the linear regression: (Value model: p = .436; Clock speed: p < .001; Winner: p < .001).
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Irritation Importance of Winning
SD
Figure 5.13.: Bidder Perception: Irritation of Losing, Importance of Winning
(SD = strongly disagree, D = disagree, N = neutral, A = agree, SA = strongly agree)
the advantage of physioeconomics. Measuring psychophysiological parameters allows for
a more fine grained analysis of emotional processing in the moment emotions actually
occur, while bidder perception questionnaires only allow for an ex post impression of
subjective feelings.
5.5. Characteristic Patterns of Emotional
Processing in Dutch Auctions
Based on the framework for emotional bidding, the last sections provided physiological
evidence for a utility of suspense in Dutch auctions. Moreover, it has been shown that the
elicited emotional state is characterized by higher degrees of perceived competition and
excitement, which results in a distortion of the bidders’ preselected bidding strategies.
In contrast, the following subsections identify characteristic patterns of emotional pro-
cessing in Dutch auctions. More specifically, Section 5.5.1 discusses how induced values
in the independent private value (IPV) treatments affect bidders’ emotional processing.
Then, Section 5.5.2 focuses on the moment, when a bidder places a bid.
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5.5.1. Induced Values and Bidders’ Arousal
In the independent private value (IPV) treatments, bidders each receive an individual
valuation for the artificial auctioned off commodity. This individual valuation is in-
dependently drawn, for each subject, from a uniform distribution with support on the
discrete integer interval [21 MU, 120 MU]. Bidders are informed about their individual
valuation before the auction starts. This subsection investigates, how inducing a bidder
with a random private value influences her emotional processing.
Value Class Value Interval
HIGH 88 MU 120 MU
MEDIUM 54 MU 87 MU
LOW 21 MU 53 MU
Total Range 21 MU 120 MU
Table 5.4.: Value Classes for Bidders’ Independent Private Values
For the analysis, bidders’ randomly drawn independent private values are categorized
into three different value classes: LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH. As listed in Table 5.4,
the three value classes segment the range of the value distribution into three intervals
of almost equal size. By applying Bayes’ rule, bidders can derive a probability function
of having been induced with the highest valuation in the auction, which depends on the
induced value (e.g. Krishna, 2002; Seifert, 2006).30 If the bidders’ individual bidding
functions are symmetric and monotonically increasing in a bidder’s private value, the
probability of having the highest valuation is also the probability of winning the auction.
The conjecture of this subsection is that bidders’ degree of physiological arousal is
affected by their individual induced value. This conjecture is reflected in hypothesis H5:
H6: Bidders’ degree of physiological arousal is higher for comparatively large
induced independent private values.
More specifically, when a bidder is induced with a value of the HIGH value class, she
has a high probability of winning the auction. Therefore, she may also get more excited
about participating in the auction. In contrast, when the bidder is induced with a value
30Note that the expected values of the first, second, and third order statistic lie in the respective value
classes. The first, second, and third order statistic is the highest, second-highest, and third-highest
induced value of the bidders in an auction (Seifert, 2006, p. 142).
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of the LOW value class, she has a low probability of winning the auction. Consequently,














































(SCL = skin conductance level, HR = heart rate, bpm = beats per minute)
Figure 5.14.: Level of Physiological Arousal for Different Value Classes
The average level of bidders’ physiological arousal for the three different value classes
is depicted in Figure 5.14. Referenced to the initial base period, the left part shows
bidders’ skin conductance level (SCL), while the right part shows bidders’ heart rate
(HR). Moreover, Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 show the curve progressions of the SCL
and HR values, respectively, for the last 20 seconds of an auction.
Linear regressions for bidders’ HR and SCL values reveal a significant impact of the
clock speed and the value class on bidders’ level of physiological arousal.31 Therefore, the
null hypothesis can be rejected in favor for hypothesis H6. Bidders have a higher degree
of physiological arousal when they are induced with a comparatively high valuation for
the auctioned off commodity.
As argued before, this effect presumably stems from the probability of winning an
auction, which bidders derive from their individual resale value.32 The physiological data
shows that bidders are more excited in a Dutch auction, if they have a high individual
resale value and, correspondingly, a high probability of winning the auction. When the
31Linear regression for skin conductance level (SCL): (Clock speed: p < .001; Value class: p < .001).
Linear regression for heart rate (HR): (Clock speed: p < .001; Value class: p < .001).
32Note that it does not matter, whether bidders adequately apply Bayes’ rule or not. Even if bidders
cannot derive the exact probability of having the highest value, they can approximate whether it is
comparatively high or low. This is also reflected in the different levels of physiological arousal for
the three value classes.
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Figure 5.15.: Skin Conductance Level (SCL)
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time relative to auction end
(in seconds)
Figure 5.16.: Heart Rate (HR)
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individual resale value is high, bidders also show a higher degree of physiological arousal.
In contrast, when the individual resale value is low, bidders also show a lower degree
of physiological arousal. Again, this effect is not reflected in the model of Katok and
Kwasnica (2008). In their model, which also focuses on the independent private value
case, the utility of suspense only depends on the time between two subsequent price
steps and not on the induced valuation.
Along with the higher probability of winning goes also a higher expected payoff.
However, the experimental design of the present study does not allow for distinguishing,
whether the bidders’ arousal is high in the HIGH value class because of (1) the higher
probability of winning, (2) the higher expected monetary payoff, or (3) both. In the spirit
of Cox et al. (1983), this can be investigated by varying the conversion rate between
experimental monetary units and real money. The authors use different conversion
rates to distinguish between the erroneous Bayesian updating and the utility hypothesis,
and discard the utility of suspense hypothesis. Cox et al. base their reasoning on the
assumption that the utility of suspense does not depend on the anticipated monetary
payoff. However, the physiological data of the present experiment indicates that the
anticipated payoff plays an important role for a bidder’s level of excitement.
5.5.2. Preparation for Action
The following analysis focuses on the moment, when a bidder places a bid in a Dutch
auction. As a single-unit Dutch auction ends as soon as the first bidder places a bid,
this moment is also the single most salient and anticipated event in such an auction.
Therefore, this moment has a strong influence on bidders’ emotional processing. Section
5.4.5 investigated the intensity of immediate emotions in response to learning the out-
come of a Dutch auction. In contrast, this subsection investigates emotional processing
in the seconds directly before the winning bidder places her bid.
In particular, the analysis focuses on phasic33 changes in bidders’ heart rates based
on their electrocardiogram. In this study, the heart rate is quantified by measuring the
time between the peaks of two successive R-waves. In the literature, this time interval
is referred to as inter-beat interval (IBI) (cf. Jennings et al., 1981). In order to be
able to analyze phasic changes in bidders’ heart rates, one has to very precisely identify
33As described in Section 3.3.2, the term phasic refers to quick changes in emotional processing, i.e.
changes lasting for a few seconds. In contrast, the term tonic refers to ongoing changes.
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every single heart beat of each bidder, by detecting the peaks of the corresponding
R-wave. For the analysis, the IBIs are detected by using the Open ANSLAB analysis
software (Wilhelm and Peyk, 2005).34 However, as the phasic heart rate analysis is
very sensitive to inaccuracies in the peak detection, the result of the peak detection is
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time relative to auction end
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(HR = Heart Rate, bpm = beats per minute)
Figure 5.17.: Preparation for Action
The average heart rate of the winning bidder is depicted in Figure 5.17. Again, the
heart rate of each subject is referenced to an individual basic level, which is assessed
in the initial 5 minute rest period. The figure shows the heart rate in a 10 seconds
time window, relative to the auction end, i.e. the moment when the bidder places her
bid. One can observe that the heart rate drops about two seconds before the bid is
actually placed. This effect occurs irrespective of the value model and the clock speed.
Such a characteristic heart rate pattern signifies increased arousal and tension and is,
for example, also observed in competitive rifle shooting (cf. Konttinen et al., 1998). This
pattern occurs immediately before the bidder places her bid. In contrast, a physiological
response in skin conductivity can only be observed after the auction ends (cp. Figure
34For further information regarding the Open ANSLAB physiological data analysis software, please
refer to http://www.psycho.unibas.ch.
35For instance, the automatic R-wave peak detection may not detect a single peak. Then, there is a
IBI anomaly, because the corresponding IBI is extraordinary big. This anomaly can be fixed by
manually setting the missing peak.
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5.15). As soon as the auction ended, the heart beats faster again.
The physiological data shows that bidders become very tense about two seconds before
they actually place a bid. This indicates a “preparation for action” (Requin et al., 1991):
bidders become tense and prepare for placing a bid. In consequence, their heart beats
slower for an instant. Most interestingly, the time span of about 2 seconds also matches
the average time of bid protraction reported in Section 3.3.2. Therefore, future research
should also investigate, how the arousal induced by the preparation for action affects
bidding behavior. Furthermore, the preparation for action effect may be helpful for
developing intelligent decision support systems, which provide the decision-maker with
a biofeedback. This biofeedback system could not only indicate high levels of tonic
activation, but also abnormal changes in the inter-beat intervals. Additionally, it would
be worthwhile investigating, whether this characteristic pattern depends on a bidder’s
expertise and performance. For instance, Pojman et al. (2009) finds differences in phasic
heart rate activity in a study with expert and novice marksmen.36
5.6. Discussion
The main interest of this experiment was (1) to provide the missing link between the
utility of suspense hypothesis and actual physiological values of Dutch auctions, and (2)
to further characterize the elicited emotional state bidders experience and investigate
how this emotional state is reflected in bidding behavior.
First, the chapter provides the missing link between the utility of suspense hypothesis
and actual physiological values of Dutch auction participants. Previous studies argue
that the effect of lower prices in fast Dutch auction stems from hedonic value bidders
derive from auction participation. This hedonic value has been titled “utility of suspense”
(Cox et al., 1982, 1983). Katok and Kwasnica (2008) conjecture that bidders experience
fast Dutch auctions more exciting and, therefore, derive a higher utility of suspense.
In this experiment, I provide physiological evidence for this conjecture and show that
bidders have higher degrees of arousal in fast Dutch auctions.
Second, the chapter further characterizes the elicited emotional state and investigates
how this emotional state is reflected in bidding behavior. Bidders perceive fast Dutch
36More specifically, Pojman et al. (2009) find in a rifle shooting task that novices have a stronger heart
rate variability than experts, when they pull the trigger.
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auctions more exciting and experience a higher degree of perceived competition. This
emotional state may be referred to as “competitive arousal” (Ku et al., 2005). More-
over, fast clock speeds can induce auction fever. Bidders state that they cognitively set
themselves a price limit before the Dutch auction starts. However, they consistently un-
derbid this price limit in the fast treatments. In line with previous research, the results
show that final prices are significantly lower in Dutch auctions with a fast clock speed.
Furthermore, while the independent private value (IPV) auctions replicate the results
of Katok and Kwasnica (2008), the common value (CV) auctions show that the impact
of clock speeds on the final prices holds irrespective of the value model.
Third, I also provide physiological evidence that the market outcome is emotionally
processed with respect to a joy of winning or a loser regret. Interestingly, the intensity
of bidders’ immediate emotions is consistently stronger in the slow treatments. There-
fore, while bidders experience higher levels of arousal and perceived competition in fast
Dutch auctions, the actual end of the auction is perceived less intense than in the slow
treatments. Furthermore, the regret of losing an auction is stronger than the respective
joy of winning an auction. This confirms the results of Delgado et al. (2008), who argue
that bidders’ behavior is actually dominated by the anticipation of losing an auction,
and not by the respective anticipated joy of winning.
Moreover, Section 5.5 identified characteristic patterns of emotional processing Dutch
auctions. First, inducing a bidder with an individual resale value for the auctioned off
commodity has a direct impact on her physiological arousal. If a bidder is induced with
a high value, she gets more excited about participating in the auction. In contrast,
when the bidder is induced with a low value, she almost has the same level of arousal
as in the initial 5 minute rest period. This effect presumably stems from the perceived
probability of winning an auction, which bidders derive from their individual resale
value. However, this effect is not reflected in the utility of suspense model of Katok and
Kwasnica (2008). Second, about 2 seconds before a Dutch auction ends, the winning
bidder’s heart rate drops. This indicates a “preparation for action” (Requin et al., 1991):
the bidder becomes tense and prepares for placing a bid.
Future research should further investigate the issue of clock speeds in Dutch auctions.
Thereby, in particular the initial high price pmax and the conversion rate to real money
can be systematically manipulated in addition to the clock speed. First, by changing the
initial high price, the experimenter can question the conjecture of Katok and Kwasnica
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(2008), whether “the same amount of enjoyment is garnered from the auction for each
‘tick’ of the clock”. The physiological data of my experiment indicates that particular
the end of a Dutch auction is perceived exciting. Second, by changing the conversion
rates, the experimenter can further analyze whether the impact of induced values on
a bidder’s level of arousal stems from (1) the higher probability of winning, (2) the
higher expected monetary payoff, or (3) both. In this regard, one can also investigate
the assumption of Cox et al. (1983). The authors argue that the utility of suspense does
not depend on the anticipated monetary payoff. In consequence, Cox et al. discard the
utility of suspense hypothesis in favor for the erroneous Bayesian updating hypothesis.
However, the physiological data of the present experiment indicates that the anticipated





The question of how human individuals derive economic decisions is probably as old
as economics. In recent years, particularly the interactions between emotional pro-
cessing and cognitive reasoning have gained more and more attention. In the words
of Thaler (2000), the traditional homo economicus is becoming “more emotional,” i.e.
economists devote more attention to the study of emotions and include emotional fac-
tors in their models of decision-making. The main goal of this thesis is to develop a
structured methodology, which allows to systematically analyze how emotional process-
ing and cognitive reasoning interact in electronic auctions. This chapter summarizes
the main contributions of this thesis, discusses its implications, and outlines avenues for
future physioeconomic research.
6.1. Contributions
The fundamental elements of the physioeconomic methodology are provided in Chapter
2 and Chapter 3. Chapter 2 focuses on how cognitive reasoning and emotional process-
ing of human bidding behavior interact. A profound understanding of these dynamic
interactions is essential for successful market engineering. This objective is reflected in
Research Question 1.
Research Question 1: How do cognitive reasoning and emotional process-
ing interact in deriving market decisions?
Therefore, in Chapter 2, I propose a unified framework for emotional bidding in elec-
tronic auctions. In this framework, I combine the traditional perspective of auction
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theory with the emotional processing induced by the auction system and environment,
the auction events, and the auction outcome. Based on the framework, a definition for
auction fever is derived: auction fever is defined as an intense current emotional state
elicited in the course of one or more auctions that distorts a bidder’s preselected bidding
strategy. Definitions of auction fever in the literature cover a wide spectrum, ranging
from overbidding an analytically optimal bidding strategy to mere descriptions of an
intense emotional state. Therefore, a new definition is needed, which is based on the
proposed framework. Moreover, Chapter 2 provides a detailed literature review on single
elements of the framework for emotional bidding. Thereby, results from the literature
are summarized of how bidding behavior is affected by emotional processing.
Chapter 3 focuses on how emotions can actually bemeasured in economic experiments.
More specifically, this chapter investigates how emotions can be objectively recorded, by
including physiological measurements in economic experiments. This translates into
Research Question 2.
Research Question 2: How can economic laboratory experiments be aug-
mented to allow for physiological measurements as proxies for emotional pro-
cessing?
I develop a methodology called physioeconomics. Physioeconomics extends existing
methods of experimental economics by measuring autonomic nervous system activity
using well-established psychophysiological methodology, in order to gain a profound un-
derstanding of the dynamic process of human economic decision-making. Experimental
economics provides a well-established methodology for analyzing human behavior in eco-
nomic decision-making. Therefore, the paradigms underlying experimental economics
methodology should consequently also be adhered to in physioeconomic experiments.
Chapter 3 discusses physiological parameters for their use in economic experiments and
identifies in particular skin conductivity and heart rate. These parameters allow for
assessing the (tonic) arousal of a subject’s current emotional state, as well as the inten-
sity of (phasic) responses to single events. Then, a physioeconomic session framework
is proposed, in which methodological implications are reflected for conducting such ex-
periments. Importantly, it has been pointed out that physiological measurements have
to be accompanied by a sophisticated experimental structure and complementary ques-
tionnaires, in order to identify specific emotions and their valence. Finally, the chapter
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provides a detailed literature review of experiments with an economic focus, which al-
ready apply physiological measurements.
Based on the foundations of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the following chapters de-
scribe how the framework for emotional bidding and the newly developed physioeco-
nomic methodology can be used to systematically investigate emotions and their impact
on bidding behavior in electronic auctions. Chapter 4 focuses on Research Question 3,
i.e. on the case of auction fever in ascending electronic auctions.
Research Question 3: Is the newly developed physioeconomic methodology
suitable to measure emotional processing in electronic auctions?
I introduce a basic ascending auction framework for physioeconomics in Chapter 4,
which is an instance of the physioeconomic session framework discussed in Chapter 3.
The basic framework allows for a series of variations, for instance introducing different
degrees of time pressure, perceived ownership, and previous investments. Thereby, single
elicitors of auction fever can be investigated both in isolation as well as in combination.
Finally, a proof-of-concept study is presented, which shows that changes in auction
design parameters of the proposed framework can actually result in significant changes
in bidders’ physiological processing and behavior.
In contrast to Chapter 4, which focuses specifically on ascending auctions, Chapter 5
addresses Research Question 4 and concentrates on descending auctions. In particular,
it provides physiological evidence for a “utility of suspense” (Cox et al., 1982, 1983) in
Dutch auctions.
Research Question 4: Can the methodology of physioeconomics provide
physiological evidence for a utility of suspense in Dutch auctions?
Consistently with previous research, the results of the experiment in Chapter 5 show
that fast Dutch auctions yield lower final prices than slow Dutch auctions. Moreover,
I show that this effect does not only hold for independent private values, but also for
common values. Previous studies argue that this effect stems from hedonic value bidders
derive from auction participation (Cox et al., 1982, 1983; Katok and Kwasnica, 2008).
Indeed, in my experiment bidders have higher degrees of physiological arousal and per-
ceive the auctions more exciting in the fast treatments. In particular, I find evidence
that the utility of suspense stems from the clock speed and the current stage of the
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auction process. Bidders are more aroused in fast auctions and especially in the final
stages of an auction. Furthermore, the data reveals that bidders tend to underbid their
preset price limit in fast Dutch auctions. Moreover, Chapter 5 identifies characteristic
patterns of bidders’ emotional processing in Dutch auctions. More specifically, it has
been shown that (1) inducing a bidder with a resale value influences her level of arousal,
and (2) the heart rate of the winning bidder momentarily decreases about two seconds
before she places her bid.
6.2. Implications
Weinhardt et al. (2003) argue that apart from the market engineer, a number of further
stake holders is involved in electronic markets: the sellers, the buyers, the regulators,
and the providers of complementary services. Accordingly, this thesis has important
implications for a variety of interest groups. These implications will be discussed in the
following.
6.2.1. Market Engineering
The success of electronic market design crucially depends on a profound understanding of
the behavior of market participants. When taking into account the emotional processing
of market participants, the market engineer faces two important challenges, regarding
both the auction mechanism design and the user interface design. First, how can the
auction system induce emotionality and, thus, attract excitement oriented consumers?
As described in Section 2.4.2, emotions are, for a substantial part of the bidders, an
important incentive for participating in Internet consumer auctions. With respect to
the competition between market platforms, it will therefore be increasingly important
for market places to distinguish themselves by how products are sold. In particular
in consumer markets, emotionless and unexciting market models will hardly have the
potential to draw the attention of (new) customers and eventually end up as losers in
this highly competitive business segment. Second, what is the impact of emotionality
on bidding behavior, and subsequently, on the auction outcome and seller revenue?
In order to approach both challenges, this thesis provides a structured methodology for
systematically measuring emotions in electronic auctions. Particularly, the framework
for ascending auctions introduced in Chapter 4 allows for systematically analyzing single
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elicitors of auction fever in isolation as well as in combination. Thereby, physioeconomic
experiments can also help to enrich or stress-test economic models.1 With explicit focus
on integrating emotional factors into economic models, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2007) note: “To the extent that auction theory is there to guide auction designers,
accepting a model that fits some data without clearly understanding why it does may lead
to poor designs" (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2007). As described in Section 5.5,
the measurement of physiological parameters can help identifying characteristic patterns
of human emotional processing in auctions and, thereby, gain a deeper understanding of
the underlying emotional processing. For instance, inducing bidders with an independent
private value has a direct impact on her level of arousal. However, this effect has not
been reflected in models of the utility of suspense so far (Cox et al., 1982, 1983; Katok
and Kwasnica, 2008).
6.2.2. Auction Participants
Auction participants can be distinguished into the buyers and the sellers. On the one
side, the sellers want to maximize their revenues and attract auction participants. As
argued before, particularly buyers in Internet consumer auctions are often attracted by
the hedonic value they derive from auction participation. However, some sellers may
want to explicitly minimize the impact of emotions, e.g. in government spectrum license
auctions. Physioeconomic experiments can contribute to developing exciting auction
mechanisms and systematically analyze how this emotionality is reflected in final prices.
For instance, Chapter 5 shows that a high clock speed induces higher levels of arousal
and lower final prices in Dutch auctions.
On the other side, a profound understanding of how emotional processing and cognitive
reasoning interact is also important for the buyers in an auction. For instance, Sokol-
Hessner et al. (2008) show that decision behavior and emotional processing significantly
change when bidders are told to “think like a trader.” In this vein, being aware of
behavioral biases and avoiding such situations can help bidders, and their respective
principals, to prevent getting caught up in auction fever. Similarly, bidders can gain
strategic advantages by knowing behavioral biases of their competitors.
1Similarly, Rubinstein (2001) notes with respect to experimental economics: “Experimental economics
provides us with a safeguard which protect us from mistaken intuitions. An economist’s intuition is
often distorted by his own model’s assumptions.”
145
Chapter 6. Conclusion and Outlook
6.2.3. Complementary Service Providers
Measuring bidders’ physiological parameters may also be used to provide bidders with
a biofeedback. In this vein, skin conductivity and cardiovascular activity can be inte-
grated by complementary service providers into a sophisticated decision support system.
For instance, a bidder on eBay may be warned when her level of arousal reaches an in-
dividual threshold. As a matter of fact, at the end of 2009, the electronics company
Philips announced developing a biofeedback system for financial traders based on skin
conductivity. In a joint project with the Dutch bank ABN AMRO, Philips seeks to “mit-
igate the negative effect that emotions may have on financial decision-making processes”
(Royal Philips Electronics Inc., 2009). In the corresponding concept study, the trader is
equipped with a bracelet, which measures skin conductivity. The bracelet transmits the
physiological data to an illuminated bowl, “a saucer-like object which displays a moving
pattern to illustrate the user’s mood” (The Economist, 2009). When the bowl turns into
a deep red color, the trader is advised to take a break and cool down. Going one step
further, such a biofeedback decision support system may also integrate auction events
and bidders’ physiological responses. With respect to perceived ownership, for instance,
a bidder may be warned, when she has an individual high physiological response to the
event of having been outbidden in an auction. The methodology introduced in this thesis
provides the basic elements for such a technology.
6.2.4. Regulators
Emotional aspects of human bidding behavior also have important implications for the
regulators of electronic markets. Apparently, legal scholars already debated in ancient
Rome, whether auctions were void if the winner was infected by “bidder’s heat” (Mal-
mendier, 2002). However, as Roman law provides the basis for many legal system in
Europe, including Germany, similarities can be found in the current legal situation.
Concerning German law, for instance, Heiderhoff (2001) argues that time pressure in
Internet consumer auctions and uncertainty about the behavior of other bidders may
foster “irrational” bids.2 Following this reasoning, and taking into account that bidders
cannot physically inspect the item, Heiderhoff (2001) argues that bidders are inherently
2I would like to thank Tim Klümper for pointing out this insightful legal perspective of auction fever




disadvantaged in Internet consumer auctions.3 Therefore, so the author, a bidder should
be able to withdraw from the contract of sale (cf. §119 (1) German Civil Code). Heider-
hoff even claims that, under extreme circumstances, the contract can be void by violation
of morality (cf. §138 (1) German Civil Code). In particular, this applies if the bidder’s
“weak will” is exploited by the seller.4
In this respect, the high levels of arousal elicited in the course of auctions may impair a
bidder’s ability to decide with free will, or a bidder may take a different decision if she was
not experiencing this arousal. Physioeconomic experiments can provide the regulators
of electronic markets, as well as judges concerned with law suits, with insightful data of
how emotional processing interferes with decision-making in electronic auctions. This
has important implications for the design of electronic auctions, as well as for consumer
rights, and opens interesting questions for future research.
6.3. Outlook
This thesis provides the main elements to systematically measure emotions and their
impact in electronic auctions. Based on the framework for emotional bidding, future
research can investigate interactions between cognitive reasoning in physioeconomic auc-
tion experiments. In particular, single elicitors of auction fever, as for instance perceived
competition (e.g. Heyman et al., 2004; Ku et al., 2005), previous investments (Ku, 2008;
Park et al., 2008), and perceived ownership (Heyman et al., 2004; Ehrhart et al., 2008),
can be systematically analyzed, isolated as well as in combination. Moreover, there are
challenges for future research on emotions in auctions, which have only gained little
attention in the literature at this stage and are, therefore, frequently neglected. These
challenges, along with how physioeconomic auction experiments can contribute to re-
solving them, will be discussed in the remainder of this thesis.
3In particular, Heiderhoff (2001) refers to the legal term “situative Unterlegenheit.”
4Heiderhoff (2001) uses the legal term “gezielte Ausnutzung von Willensschwäche” in this context.
If the contract is void by violation of morality (“Sittenwidrigkeit”), the contract never existed. In
contrast, if the bidder is able to withdraw from the contract of sale, she can be made responsible for
costs that occurred because the seller could not sell the item to someone else.
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6.3.1. Interdependent Utilities
The degree of rivalry increases ceteris paribus along with the number of bidders in
an auction (cf. Section 2.2). However, rivalry can also become more intense, when a
bidder’s utility does not only depend on her own individual monetary gains and losses,
but also on the utilities of other bidders. This concept of utility is usually referred to as
“interdependent utilities” (e.g. Schall, 1972; Bault et al., 2008). For instance, subjects
may develop personal rivalries with other individuals and perceive feelings of envy or
gloating (Smith et al., 1996). In the context of auctions, the literature has identified
in particular “spitefulness” and (non-monetary) “joy of winning” as sources for such
interdependencies.
Bidders’ utility functions which exhibit such interdependencies can result in “head-to-
head battles” (Ku et al., 2008) among a small (sub-)group of bidders. In a survey among
bidders participating live auctions, Johns and Zaichkowsky (2003) observe a U-shaped
dependency between the number of bidders and the degree of rivalry. In auctions with
only two active bidders, the authors state that “the bidding war was more personal.”
However, when an auction attracted a large number of active bidders, there is a “race to
bid on and win the item.” In contrast, Ku et al. (2005) argue that rivalry is particularly
intense when only two bidders compete in a single auction. Based on data from a
laboratory experiment, the authors report that bidders experience higher levels of self-
report arousal and place higher bids in high rivalry treatments, i.e. when bidders face one
single opponent in comparison to facing eight other individuals. Thus, so the authors
conclude, rivalry and arousal seem to be higher with few rather than with many bidders.
These observations seem to be contradictory to the statement above that rivalry increases
ceteris paribus along with the number of bidders. However, when taking interdependent
utilities into account, one may conjecture an interaction between the degree of utility
interdependencies and the number of bidders.
As depicted in Figure 2.2 in Section 2.3, the immediate emotions upon winning and
losing an auction can be distinguished into (1) emotions regarding the monetary payoff
and (2) emotions regarding the social competition.5 Both categories of emotions play
an important role for human decision-making in auctions (e.g. Delgado et al., 2008;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008). However, the phenomenon of auction fever
seems to be particularly depending on emotions regarding the social competition. For
5Recall that interdependent utilities are an inherent characteristic of the social competition.
148
6.3. Outlook
instance, Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2004) argue that for the experience of auction
fever, it is a necessary condition “that an auction participant competes directly with
other human bidders.” Heyman et al. (2004) refer to this phenomenon as the “oppo-
nent effect” and Delgado et al. (2008) argue that actually the “fear of losing the social
competition” inherent in auctions is responsible for overbidding.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) intentionally exclude emotions regarding the
social competition by letting subjects compete with computerized agents.6 Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok argue that “theories [of spitefulness] require inter-personal com-
parisons and, therefore, cannot explain similar behavior by subjects who were bidding
against computerized rather than human competitors.” Following this reasoning, the
experimenter can investigate the impact emotions originated in interdependent utilities,
by benchmarking human behavior when bidding against computerized agents with bid-
ding against human individuals. This seems to be a promising approach for investigating
the significance of interdependent utilities for auction fever. The actual intensity dif-
ference of emotional processing can then be simultaneously assessed with physiological
parameters and the methodology of physioeconomics.
6.3.2. Product Characteristics
Ariely and Simonson (2003) argue that the occurrence and degree of auction fever is
subject to the specific characteristics of the auctioned item, e.g. “whether the product
offered is such that the allure of its low starting price has the potential to generate
emotional involvement.”7 At this stage, there has been little research on how the phe-
nomenon of auction fever depends on product characteristics. This research question is
particularly important, however, because the literature on auction fever analyzes auc-
tions ranging from retail products, such as electronic equipment, to collectibles, such as
6It is important to note here that Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) explicitly tell subjects that
they compete against computerized agents. In contrast, similar studies deceive subjects by telling
them that they are bidding against human individuals while they are actually competing against
computerized agents (e.g. Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2004; Ku et al., 2008). Regarding this
procedure in auction experiments, Ockenfels et al. (2006) criticize that it remains unclear to what
extent participants “will actually believe any part of the information they are given,” if the subject
pool has been exposed to deception in experiments before.
7The conjecture that characteristics of the auctioned commodity have an impact on the degree of
auction fever is supported by the observation of Lee and Malmendier (2010). The authors report
that the amount of overbidding in eBay auctions depends on the product category, with proportions
of overbidding ranging “between 30% and 60% for most categories.”
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one-cent coins and fiberglass cows (cf. Ku et al., 2005; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007).
In particular, I conjecture that a product’s value, scarcity, and public interest play
an important role for the occurrence of auction fever. First, if the value of the item
is comparatively high, this affects bidder’s individual involvement and, thus, arousal.
For instance, Ku et al. (2008) report that bidding behavior is more aggressive when
stakes are high by manipulating conversion rates. The perceived loss of the current
high bidder in the event of being outbidden is probably higher when stakes are high.
Second, Smith (1990) argues that bidders are often uncertain about their own product
valuation. In this respect, Lucking-Reiley (1999) notes that this uncertainty inherently
increases in Internet auctions, where bidders’ information regarding product quality and
seller reliability is rather limited and biased. Third, product scarcity affects rivalry
among bidders. For instance, Hou (2007) argue that a long auction duration only then
positively affects the endogenous number of bidders, if scarcity is sufficiently high and
bidders do not have “more options at any point of time.”
A promising approach for analyzing the influence of product characteristics seems to be
auctioning off real world commodities, or “real goods,” in laboratory experiments (Kah-
neman et al., 1990). While the theory of induced values is a well-established method-
ological approach to induce real world behavior, one can also directly auction off real
goods. Kahneman et al. (1990) conduct a now famous auction experiment in which
participants can place bids on coffee mugs.8 In another well-known auction experiment
comprising real goods, Lucking-Reiley (1999) conducts a controlled field experiment. In
particular, the authors auction off collector cards. Ehrhart et al. (2010) conduct a labo-
ratory experiment comprising real goods to investigate the effect of perceived ownership
on bidding behavior, by auctioning off USB mass storage devices. The authors argue
that it is particularly important to properly choose the auctioned commodity when con-
ducting economic experiments with real goods. Therefore, before running the laboratory
experiment, Ehrhart et al. initially conduct a survey study to assess which objects are
actually appropriate.
One main advantage, so Ehrhart et al. (2010), for using real goods in auction fever
8Kahneman et al. (1990) analyze the endowment effect, i.e. effect of actual ownership, by endowing
coffee mugs to one half of the participants (sellers), while the other half (buyers) receives no cof-
fee mugs. Sellers and buyers can then exchange the coffee mugs through a double-sided auction.
The authors report that the average price a seller is willing to accept (WTA) for a coffee mug is
significantly larger than the average price a buyer is willing to pay (WTP).
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experiments is that subjects can actually develop a psychological attachment with an
object, which is not or not to this extent the case for money.9 Going one step further, it
would now be particularly interesting to use real world commodities for identifying those
product characteristics which actually mediate psychological attachment. Therefore, I
believe that using real world commodities is a promising approach for investigating
auction fever. The actual differences in emotional processing can then be assessed with
physiological parameters and the methodology of physioeconomics.
6.3.3. Emotional State Induction
Traditionally, economic laboratory experiments are conducted in a controlled, clinical
environment (Guala, 2005). However, Bosman and van Winden (2002) report that a
subject’s “emotional state systematically influences bidding behavior.” More specifically,
in this study subjects are asked to report their current emotional state before taking part
in an auction. Therefore, and with respect to the emotional bidding framework, future
research should take into account how external influences, i.e. influences which are not
directly related to the bidding task, affect emotional processing and bidding behavior.
More specifically, one can investigate the influence of inducing a specific current emo-
tional state, by using methodologies of emotion psychology. Thereby, one can analyze
more specifically if and under which circumstances an unrelated arousal has an impact
on bidding behavior. Such an emotional state can be induced, for instance, by means of
videos (Rottenberg et al., 2007), pictures (Bradley and Lang, 2007), music (Eich et al.,
2007), or tasks proceeding the actual experiment (Roberts et al., 2007). For instance,
the experimenter can show videos of sport events in between the auctions to induce a
competitive atmosphere.
6.3.4. Bidder Heterogeneity
As discussed in Section 2.4, auctions are particularly sensitive to heterogeneities among
consumers, as they “systematically pick those buyers as winners” who have a tendency
to overbid (Lee and Malmendier, 2010). This amplification effect leverages behavioral
biases among bidders and disproportionally pronounces the behavior of even a small
9This is in line with the observation of Wolf et al. (2008), who find that even the time a bidder has
for observing the item plays an important role for developing her attachment.
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group of bidders. For instance, bidders can be categorized based on their personality
and their expertise. Future research on emotions in auctions should also put more focus
on identifying systematic differences in bidding behavior and emotional processing, which
can be linked to differences in personality or expertise.
First, standardized questionnaires of personality psychology can be used to categorize
bidders according specific personality traits (McCrae and Costa, 1999) or their ability
to regulate emotions (Gross and John, Oliver P., 2003). Second, experienced bidders
may also have a different pattern of emotional processing. Regarding economic decision-
making in general, Falk and Heckman (2009) note that “it is an empirically interesting
question how experience, learning, etc. affect behaviors.” Specifically for the case of
electronic auctions, the phenomenon of auction fever seems to be less prominent for
experienced bidders (Bramsen, 2008b). Again, the actual differences in emotional pro-
cessing can then be assessed with physiological parameters in physioeconomic auction
experiments.
6.3.5. Summary
This section outlined four main challenges for future research on emotions in auctions.
In particular, I identify interdependent utilities, product characteristics, emotional state
induction and bidder heterogeneity. While these issues only gained little attention in auc-
tion literature so far, this thesis provides the main elements to systematically investigate
these challenges in physioeconomic experiments. Based upon the unified framework for
emotional bidding in auctions, such experiments can contribute to enriching the under-





A.1. Participant Instructions for the
Proof-of-Concept Study
This appendix lists the participants instructions of the proof-of-concept study presented
in Chapter 4. The instructions were translated to English from the original German
version.
A.1.1. Introduction
This is an experiment in market decision-making. During the entire experiment, your
heart rate, skin conductance and pulse will be recorded for further analysis. If you
follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable
amount of CASH. The experiment consists of a sequence of [4 / 6 auctions]. At the
end of the session you will receive fifteen Euros (€15) PLUS your total earnings from
all [4 / 6 auctions]. This experiment uses tokens for calculation. At the beginning
of the experiment you will be endowed with an initial amount of 750 token on your
experimental account. The experimental system will use this experimental account to
enter your gains and losses from the auctions you participated in.
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A.1.2. Session Agenda
After the instructions there will be a rest period of 5 minutes, which is essential for
the measurement of the physiological parameters. Please try to calm down and relax
during this rest period. After the rest period you will take part as a bidder in [4 /
6 consecutive auctions]. In each auction you and the three other participants of
the experiment will compete to purchase a fictitious asset. After each auction there is
another rest period of 1 minute. The auction process will be described in detail in the
next section.
After the end of the experiment you will be asked to enter your anonymous participant
identification and your seat number. Your questionnaire answers and the data collected
during the auctions will be processed anonymously. Therefore, a mapping between you
and the data assessed in this experiment is not possible.
A.1.3. Auction Description
In each auction you participate as a bidder in an auction with the three other participants
of the experiment, in which a single fictitious asset is auctioned off. Starting from 0
tokens, the auction system increments the current standing price in each round by 10
tokens. In each round you have to decide, whether you are willing to accept the current
standing price or not. For this decision you have [5 / 15 seconds]. If you let this time
pass without taking a decision, this equals to not accepting the current standing price.
The auction ends as soon as no bidder accepts the current standing price in one round.
The winner of the auction is the high bidder of the last round. If no bidder accepts the
bid in the first round, no bidder wins the auction. If only one bidder accepts the current
standing price in one round, she is automatically the current high bidder. If more than
one bidder accepts the current standing price, one of these bidders will be randomly
selected as the current high bidder.
The resale value is identical for all bidders, but will not be revealed until the auction
has ended. The resale value for the asset will be drawn randomly from the values 170
tokens, 180 tokens, 190 tokens, . . . , 250 tokens, 260 tokens, 270 tokens with equal chance
of being chosen. The winner of the auction receives the resale value minus the price at
which she won the auction.
154
A.1. Participant Instructions for the Proof-of-Concept Study
Example: Suppose that you won the auction at a price of 240 token. Then the fol-
lowing cases are possible:
1. The random resale value is larger than 240 tokens.
⇒ This results in a gain: resale value - 240 tokens.
2. The random resale value is exactly 240 tokens.
⇒ This results in a payoff of zero.
3. The random resale value is smaller than 240 tokens.
⇒ This results in a loss: resale value - 240 tokens.
A.1.4. Payment
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial payment of 750 tokens. At
the end of the experiment, your earnings from all auctions will be totaled and converted
to dollars at the rate of two cents (2¢) for each token. The total payment will be paid
to you in CASH after the experiment.
A.1.5. Concluding Remarks
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and I will come to where you are
sitting and answer them. Please only use your free hand to operate the computer and
try to avoid any other body movements, as these would result in unwanted measurement
artifacts. Please also try to handle the mouse with very little energy. You will now be
equipped with ear muffs in order to reduce the influence of background noise on the
measurement data.
Before the experiment begins, you will be asked to answer a few comprehension ques-
tions in a short quiz on your computer screen. Please enter the answers on your com-
puter. After the quiz you will take part in one sample auction, in which gains and losses
will not be considered. Before the sequence of auction starts, there will be a rest period
of 5 minutes.
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A.2. Participant Instructions for the Utility of
Suspense Experiment
This appendix lists the participants instructions of the utility of suspense experiment
presented in Chapter 5. The instructions were translated to English from the original
German version. CV and IPV refer to the common value and independent private value
treatments, respectively. Section A.2.2 only applies for the CV treatments, Section A.2.2
only for the IPV treatments. The numbers 0.5 and 5 indicate the time interval τ between
two consecutive price steps.
A.2.1. Introduction
This is an experiment in market decision-making. During the entire experiment, your
heart rate, skin conductance and pulse will be recorded for further analysis. If you
follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable
amount of CASH. The experiment consists of a sequence of 15 auctions. At the end
of the session you will receive fifteen Euros (€15) PLUS your total earnings from all 15
auctions.
A.2.2. Auction Description
In each auction you and two other participants will compete to purchase a fictitious
asset. The price of the asset will start at 120 tokens and decrease every [0.5 seconds
/ five seconds] by 1 token. Any of the bidders can stop the auction and purchase
the asset at the price displayed on the screen by clicking the “Accept” button. The first
person to click the button purchases the asset and pays the price displayed on the screen.
The other participants will earn 0 tokens in this auction. If you purchase an asset, your
earnings equal the difference between your resale value for that asset and the price you
paid for the asset:
Your Earnings = Resale Value - Purchase Price
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Common Value
The resale value is identical for all bidders, but will not be revealed until the auction has
ended. The resale value for the asset will be between 46 and 95 tokens. Each number
between 46 and 95 has an equal chance of being chosen. It is as if the numbers were
stamped on 50 balls, one number on each ball, and placed in an urn. A random draw
from the urn determines the resale value of an asset for one specific auction. The winner
of the auction receives the resale value of the asset and has to pay the purchase price at
which the auction ended.
Example: Assume that you clicked the “Accept” button at a price of 65 tokens. Then
the following cases are possible:
1. The random resale value is smaller than 65 tokens, e.g. 51 tokens.
⇒ This results in a loss of 51 tokens - 65 tokens = -14 tokens.
2. The random resale value is exactly 65 GE.
⇒ This results in a payoff of zero, as 65 tokens - 65 tokens = 0 tokens.
3. The random resale value is larger than 65 tokens, e.g. 79 tokens.
⇒ This results in a gain of 79 tokens - 65 tokens = 14 tokens.
If one of the other two bidders clicks the “Accept” button before you, you receive a
payoff of zero tokens in this auction.
Independent Private Value
Resale values will differ among individuals and auctions. For each bidder the individual
resale value for the asset will be between 21 and 120. Each number from 21 to 120 has
an equal chance of being chosen. It is as if the numbers were stamped on 100 balls, one
number on each ball, and placed in an urn. A random draw from the urn determines the
resale value of an asset for an individual bidder. Your chance of drawing a resale value
between 21 and 30 is 10%, between 31 and 40 is 10%, between 41 and 50 is 10%, and so
on. Do not reveal your resale values to anyone. It is your own private information and
will change from auction to auction. The winner of the auction receives the individual
resale value of the asset and has to pay the purchase price at which the auction ended.
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Example: Assume that your individual resale value for the asset is 85 tokens. Then
the following cases are possible:
1. You place a bid of more than 85 tokens, e.g. 95 tokens.
⇒ This results in a loss of 85 tokens - 95 tokens = -10 tokens.
2. You place a bid of exactly 85 tokens.
⇒ Payoff of zero, as 85 tokens - 85 tokens = 0 tokens.
3. You place a bid of less than 85 tokens, e.g. 72 tokens.
⇒ This results in a gain of 85 tokens - 75 tokens = 10 tokens.
If one of the other two bidders clicks the “Accept” button before you, you receive a
payoff of zero tokens in this auction.
A.2.3. Session Agenda
After these instructions you will be asked to answer a few comprehension questions
in a short quiz on your computer screen. You have to answer all questions correctly
in order to continue with the experiment. After the quiz you will take part in one
sample auction, in which gains and losses will not be considered. Before the sequence
of 15 auctions starts, there will be a rest period of 5 minutes, which is essential for the
measurement of the physiological parameters. Please try to calm down and relax during
this rest period.
After the rest period you will take part as a bidder in 15 consecutive auctions. In each
auction you and two other participants will compete to purchase a fictitious asset. You
will not be matched with the same two participants for two consecutive auctions. You
will not be told with which of the other participants in the room you are matched, and
they will not be told that you are matched with them. What happens in one auction
has no effect on what happens in any other auction. After each auction there is another
rest period of 1 minute.
A.2.4. Payment
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial payment of 75 tokens. At the
end of the experiment, your earnings from all 15 auctions will be totaled. This payoff
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will then be converted into Euro at the rate of twenty cents (20¢) for each token. The
total payment will be paid to you in CASH after the experiment.
A.2.5. Concluding Remarks
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and I will come to where you are
sitting and answer them. Please only use your free hand to operate the computer and
try to avoid any other body movements, as these would result in unwanted measurement
artifacts. Please also try to handle the mouse with very little energy. You will now be
equipped with ear muffs in order to reduce the influence of background noise on the
measurement data.
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A.3. Self-Report Questionnaire for the Utility of
Suspense Experiment
Anonymous Participant Identification: ____________________
Questionnaire
Please read the following instructions thoroughly. On the next pages you will find 20 statements,
which suit to describe your impressions in the preceding experiment. Please mark for each statement
one of the five boxes with a cross:
SD (strongly disagree), if you cannot agree on the statement or if you
regard it absolutely inapplicable.
SD D N A SA
D (disagree), if you rather do not agree on the statement or if you regard
it inapplicable.
SD D N A SA
N (neutral), if you neither agree nor disagree, or if you regard it neither
applicable nor inapplicable.
SD D N A SA
A (agree), if you rather agree on the statement or if you regard it
applicable.
SD D N A SA
SA (strongly agree), if you fully agree on the statement or if you regard it
fully applicable.
SD D N A SA
Your answers will be assessed and processed anonymously. Therefore, a mapping between you and
your answers is not possible. Please also briefly submit comments and notes regarding your strategy
and the experiment in general.
Please turn over the page now and start with answering the questions.
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SD = Strongly disagree D = Disagree N = Neutral A = Agree SA = Strongly agree
1. Before each auction I set myself a price at which I intended to end
the auction.
SD D N A SA
2. The auction mechanism in this experiment is exciting.
SD D N A SA
3. I did not want that another player gained a profit in an auction.
SD D N A SA
4. I never accepted a lower price than I initially intended.
SD D N A SA
5. I was in a competition with the other participants of this experiment.
SD D N A SA
6. I was irritated when another bidder accepted the price before me.
SD D N A SA
7. I sometimes accepted a higher price than I initially intended.
SD D N A SA
8. I felt aroused when participating in the auctions.
SD D N A SA
9. Winning an auction was more important to me than my individual
payoff.
SD D N A SA
10. The payoffs of other bidders played an important role in my own
decision making.
SD D N A SA
11. Before the auction, I did not think about which price I was going to
accept.
SD D N A SA
12. The auction mechanism used in this experiment is boring.
SD D N A SA
13. I would rather have ended the auction earlier by accepting a higher
price than letting another bidder gain a profit.
SD D N A SA
14. I sometimes accepted a lower price in the auctions than I initially
intended to.
SD D N A SA
15. The other participants in the experiment were not in a competition
with me.
SD D N A SA
16. I did not care when another bidder accepted the price before me.
SD D N A SA
17. I never accepted a higher price than I initially intended.
SD D N A SA
18. I did not feel aroused while participating in the auctions.
SD D N A SA
19. My individual payoff was most important to me – mere winning was
not that important to me.
SD D N A SA
20. The payoffs of other bidders were not important to me.
SD D N A SA
How did you decide on a bid price? If you had a price limit, what was it?
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Figure B.1.: Participant Cabin in the Experimental Laboratory
(Subjects are equipped with a pair of ear-muffs, a pen, a blank sheet of paper, and a
ruler. Interaction with the experimental system is limited to mouse inputs.)
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B.1.2. Participant Measurement
Figure B.2.: Participant with Attached Measurement System
(In this case a staff member for documentation.)
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B.1.3. Participant Cabin Backside
Figure B.3.: Participant Cabin Backside with Measurement System
The laboratory biosignal measurement system depicted in Figure B.3 was developed
by the research group hiper.campus1 and the Institut für Technik der Informationsverar-
beitung (ITIV)2 at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). Please refer to Gharbi
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B.2. Experimental Software of the Proof-of-Concept
Study
The experimental software is developed using the z-Tree platform (Fischbacher, 2007).
The screen of the 5 minute initial rest period and the 1 minute rest period in between
auctions is depicted in Figure B.4. Figure B.5 shows the value information screen, which
is displayed before the auction starts. The auction screen is depicted in Figure B.6. The
auction outcome screens in case of winning and losing an auction are depicted in Figure
B.7 and Figure B.8, respectively. All screens were translated from the original German
version.
Figure B.4.: Screenshot: Rest Period
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The resale value of the fictitious asset in this auction
will be randomly drawn from the interval U[46; 95].
Figure B.5.: Screenshot: Value Information
Resale Value: U[170; 270]Account Balance: 750 MU
Bid: 10 MU
place bid do not bid
Figure B.6.: Screenshot: Auction Screen
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The auction ended!
You won the auction.
Succesful Bid: 190 MU
Resale Value: 200 MU
Old Account Balance: 750 MU
Payoff in this Auction: 10 MU
New Account Balance: 760 MU
continue
Figure B.7.: Screenshot: Auction Outcome (Win)
The auction ended!
You did not win the auction.
Succesful Bid: 190 MU
Resale Value: 200 MU
Old Account Balance: 750 MU
Payoff in this Auction: 0 MU
New Account Balance: 750 MU
continue
Figure B.8.: Screenshot: Auction Outcome (Lose)
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B.3. Experimental Software of the Utility of
Suspense Experiment
The experimental software is developed using the z-Tree platform (Fischbacher, 2007).
The screen of the 5 minute initial rest period and the 1 minute rest period in between
auctions is depicted in Figure B.9. Figure B.10 and Figure B.11 show the value in-
formation screens for the common value (CV) and independent private value (IPV)
treatments, respectively. These are displayed before an auction starts. The respective
auction screens are depicted in Figure B.12 and Figure B.13. The auction outcome
screens in the case of winning an auction for the CV and IPV treatments are depicted
in Figure B.14 and Figure B.15, respectively. The auction outcome screens in the case
of losing an auction for the CV and IPV treatments are depicted in Figure B.16 and
Figure B.17, respectively. All screens were translated from the original German version.
Figure B.9.: Screenshot: Rest Period
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The resale value of the fictitious asset in this auction
will be randomly drawn from the interval U [46; 95].
Figure B.10.: Screenshot: Value Information in CV Treatments
Your individual resale value of the fictitious asset
in this auction is:
92 MU
Figure B.11.: Screenshot: Value Information in IPV Treatments
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The resale value of the fictitious asset in this auction
will be randomly drawn from the interval U [46; 95].
Auction
Current Price: 116 MU
Accept
Figure B.12.: Screenshot: Dutch Auction in CV Treatments
Individual Resale Value: 92 MU
Auction
Current Price: 116 MU
Accept
Figure B.13.: Screenshot: Dutch Auction in IPV Treatments
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You won the auction.
Succesful Bid: 68 MU
Resale Value: 72 MU
Payoff in this Auction: 4 MU
next
Figure B.14.: Screenshot: Auction Outcome in CV Treatments (Win)
You won the auction.
Succesful Bid: 80 MU
Individual Resale Value: 92 MU
Payoff in this Auction: 12 MU
next
Figure B.15.: Screenshot: Auction Outcome in IPV Treatments (Win)
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You did not win the auction.
Succesful Bid: 68 MU
Resale Value: 72 MU
Payoff in this Auction: 0 MU
next
Figure B.16.: Screenshot: Auction Outcome in CV Treatments (Lose)
You did not win the auction.
Succesful Bid: 80 MU
Individual Resale Value: 92 MU
Payoff in this Auction: 0 MU
next
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